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Abstract 
Background: Alcohol consumption is one of the leading contributors to 
preventable disease and deaths globally, and alcohol marketing exposure is a 
significant contributing factor to harmful alcohol consumption. As with smoking 
reduction policies, comprehensive marketing regulation has been recommended 
by the World Health Organization as part of efforts to denormalise excessive 
alcohol consumption and reduce alcohol-related harm. In Australia, alcohol 
marketing is predominantly regulated by the alcohol and marketing industries, 
and their codes do not protect vulnerable populations from exposure. While 
public health researchers often call for strengthened regulation, Australian 
governments are committed to deregulation and light-touch regulation and have 
shown no commitment to legislating in this area to date.	Instead, decentred 
regulatory approaches and industry partnerships are its preferred options. In 2009, 
the National Preventative Health Taskforce (NPHT) proposed the use of the 
Responsive Regulation theory and an accompanying regulatory pyramid to 
strengthen alcohol marketing regulation and to escalate up the regulatory pyramid 
incrementally when the industry fails to meet set benchmarks. In this thesis, I 
explored the application and the refinement of the Responsive Regulation theory 
and the NPHT regulatory pyramid in the Australian alcohol marketing space 
regarding their effectiveness in reducing marketing impact, as part of efforts to 
prevent harmful consumption of alcohol in the population. 
Methods: In Study 1, I conducted 28 semi-structured interviews with experts 
from eight different professional disciplines, discussing the current alcohol 
marketing regulatory framework, barriers to and conditions for effective 
regulation, and responsive regulation of alcohol marketing. In Study 2, I 
conducted thematic analyses of submissions from the Australian alcohol industry 
 2 
to the Australian National Preventative Health Agency (ANPHA) issues report on 
alcohol marketing regulation. The analysis was based on a system previously 
developed in relation to the tobacco industry’s claims against increased 
regulation. 
Results: Study 1 found barriers to the uptake of effective alcohol marketing 
regulation within the Australian Government, such as a lack of political will and 
the government’s deregulation agenda. Additionally, this study identified industry 
claims that the current alcohol marketing regulation is sufficient and that there is a 
lack of evidence for the effectiveness of restricting marketing. Moreover, industry 
strategies such as lobbying and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) were seen 
by other interviewees as important obstacles to increasing alcohol marketing 
regulation. Study 1 further found that the NPHT Responsive Regulation pyramid 
is limited by itself, however, can become a useful alternative regulatory approach 
with some adaptations to the pyramid. Fundamental conditions need to be in place 
for the pyramid not to become another CSR opportunity or a way for the industry 
to delay effective regulation. First, the government needs to show political 
leadership, drive the changes, commit to clearly defined overarching public health 
objectives, and communicate a threat of legislating. To avoid regulatory capture 
by industry, stakeholder engagement guidelines and tripartite regulation should be 
in place. Further, to increase the legitimacy and credibility of the system, 
transparency and accountability mechanisms should be in place. The regulatory 
framework needs to be evaluated regularly by an independent agency, which 
tracks progress towards objectives and KPIs. Objectives need to be time-bound, 
and outcomes should inform decisions to move up the pyramid to strengthen 
regulation. Finally, there is a need for a comprehensive single marketing code.  
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Study 2 confirmed the results found in Study 1 around industry barriers, and 
identified five frames in which the alcohol industry claimed that increased alcohol 
marketing regulation: 1) is unnecessary; 2) is not backed up by sufficient 
evidence; 3) will lead to unintended negative consequences; and 4) faces legal 
barriers to implementation; underpinned by the view 5) that the industry consists 
of socially responsible companies working toward reducing harmful drinking. 
Discussion: The results were incorporated in a new model for responsive 
regulation of alcohol marketing, the Polder model, which utilises a metaphor of 
‘holding back the sea of advertising’. Public health objectives need to be put in 
place (dikes) to lay the foundations for solid governance of an alcohol marketing 
code. To ensure that the effectiveness of regulation is not lowered below current 
ineffective arrangements, the two bottom options of the NPHT pyramid ‘no 
regulation’ and ‘self-regulation’ were removed. Therefore, the newly proposed 
regulatory pyramid has only three regulatory levels, with ‘explicit government 
regulation’ at the apex. The first level, ‘quasi-regulation’ and second level ‘co-
regulation’ both require active monitoring of breaches and effective enforcement 
mechanisms, with a legal backstop for co-regulation. 
Conclusion: This Polder model might provide a politically palatable and practical 
solution to the alcohol marketing regulation impasse in Australia. With the 
potential for step-by-step escalation up the pyramid, this framework could 
ultimately lead to effective alcohol marketing legislation in the future.
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem statement & aim 
The American Marketing Association claims that the average person is exposed to 
thousands of brand messages a day across a wide range of media platforms, such 
as traditional mass media like broadcast and print, new social media platforms, 
and brand labelling (Marshall, 2015; Saxon, 2017). Marketing influences 
consumption, attitudes, norms, and behaviour at individual and cultural levels. 
However, for products like alcohol, harmful levels of consumption can lead to 
adverse health and social outcomes. Thus, questions have been raised around the 
ethical and moral grounds of promoting this harmful product. 
The Australian Government has actively regulated tobacco marketing since the 
introduction of the Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act in 1992. This 
comprehensive piece of legislation was part of a successful multifaceted approach 
to reduce smoking in the Australian population; the prevalence of smokers aged 
over 18 declined from 27% in 1995 to 14% in 2016 (Greenhalgh, Bayly, & 
Winstanley, 2018). Around the same time, like in many other Western high-
income countries, the Australian alcohol industry developed voluntary alcohol 
marketing codes, to appear to be engaging in responsible marketing and 
protecting minors from appealing content, although subsequent research has 
shown that most of this activity was inspired by the tobacco industry to avoid 
similar regulatory conditions (Bond, Daube, & Chikritzhs, 2010). Since then, the 
regulatory framework has somewhat evolved over time and now includes some 
federal government involvement. However, research shows that these codes are 
not effective, as they are poorly enforced, full of loopholes, and, importantly, they 
do not address where and when marketing is allowed. 
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Figure 1. Responsive regulatory pyramid proposed by NPHT for alcohol marketing. From 
“Australia: the healthiest country by 2020: National preventative health strategy - The 
roadmap for action” (p. 57), by the NPHT, 2009, Canberra: ANPHA. In the public domain. 
Despite this evidence and the public health successes achieved through tobacco 
control policies, the Australian Government is reluctant to introduce meaningful 
changes. This is likely due to significant political influence from the alcohol 
industry and the government’s deregulation agenda, both based on neoliberal 
narrative and ideology. To address this public health issue in an unfavourable 
political context, the National Preventative Health Taskforce (NPHT) sought a 
middle ground solution and recommended the adoption of an incremental 
regulatory approach based on the Responsive Regulation theory (see Figure 1). 
The former Labor government and the current Liberal government have not taken 
up ANPHA’s recommendations. There is a lack of scholarly or policy work on 
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how the Responsive Regulation theory can be applied to alcohol marketing. Thus, 
in this thesis, I aim to explore the application and the refinement of the 
Responsive Regulation theory and the regulatory pyramid proposed by the NPHT 
to alcohol marketing in Australia, especially regarding their effectiveness in 
reducing alcohol marketing impacts, as part of efforts to prevent harmful 
consumption of alcohol in the population. 
1.2 Overview of this thesis 
First, in Chapter 2, I will examine the literature on alcohol-related harm, and the 
influence of marketing on norms, attitudes, and consumption of alcohol. In order 
to draw lessons from the long history of tobacco policy, I will then compare 
tobacco and alcohol industry practices and their regulatory frameworks of 
marketing. Drawing on governance and regulatory literature, in Chapter 3, I will 
provide an overview of some of the main regulatory concepts and discuss several 
approaches to regulation. Subsequently, I will describe the Responsive Regulation 
theory and its real-world application in other fields. 
In Chapter 4, I will present the research question and objectives, and here I will 
explain the research design, including the intention and purpose of this thesis. In 
Chapter 5, I will present the methods, results and discussion of Study 1. In 
Chapter 6, I describe research instruments and present the results and discussion 
for Study 2. This study was published in a peer-reviewed journal and is presented 
verbatim. Finally, in Chapter 7, I will compare findings from Study 1 and 2, and 
propose a final regulatory model for alcohol marketing. This chapter will end with 
an overall conclusion.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review - Alcohol, Marketing, 
and Regulatory Frameworks in Australia 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to review national and international literature that investigates 
alcohol-related harm, marketing effects on alcohol consumption behaviour, and to 
explore why and how to increase marketing regulation. 
This chapter starts by explaining what the effects of alcohol consumption are and 
why this is a problem. Next, I will present the Availability Theory, which 
proposes that numerous determinants increase the availability of alcohol 
(including physical, economic, social and psychological), which in turn increases 
alcohol consumption and harm. Research shows that availability of alcohol is 
mainly driven by the alcohol industry. I will explain that the Australian 
Government endorses the neoliberal idea that industry should be allowed to make 
profits and that there should be a minimal level of interference. From a critical 
social perspective, I argue that one could question if industry profits should be 
prioritised over individual and population health. 
To be able to design effective regulation, it is important to understand why 
marketing is employed. I will provide theories around how alcohol marketing can 
potentially increase social and psychological availability, followed by evidence 
for alcohol marketing impacting attitudes and consumption patterns. 
Subsequently, I will review the option of banning alcohol marketing, as research 
suggests that comprehensive alcohol marketing regulation is one of the main 
interventions for governments to focus on if they want to reduce alcohol-related 
harm in societies. While this chapter establishes that the government has 
legislative powers to ban marketing, the governments in this era of neoliberalism 
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have been reluctant to enact upon these powers, and instead endorse the voluntary 
codes set up by the alcohol industry 20 years ago. However, international and 
Australian research shows that voluntary and self-regulatory codes are not 
effective in protecting vulnerable populations from the impact of alcohol 
marketing, and delay effective regulation. I will first provide an overview of the 
current standards and codes that affect alcohol marketing and next identify the 
multiple gaps in the regulatory framework. Finally, this chapter will provide 
directions from tobacco marketing regulation and its history 
The structure of this chapter is presented in Figure 2.  
 













2.2 Consumption related health and social outcomes 
Harmful consumption of alcohol is defined by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) as “drinking that causes detrimental health and social consequences for 
the drinker, the people around the drinker and society at large, as well as the 
patterns of drinking that are associated with increased risk of adverse health 
outcomes” (WHO, 2014). Alcohol consumption is the leading risk factor for 
burden of disease for people aged 15-49 worldwide (Burton & Sheron, 2018; Lim 
et al., 2012), placing it alongside tobacco as one of the main preventable causes of 
death and disability. In 2016, alcohol use accounted worldwide for over 3 million 
deaths (WHO, 2018) and 99.3 million DALYs (disability-adjusted life years) 
(GBD 2013 Risk Factors Collaborators, 2015). It is causally related to over 200 
chronic and acute medical conditions (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
[AIHW], 2008; WHO, 2018), of which the most important ones are: cancers of 
the liver, mouth, oropharynx, oesophagus, and breast; cardiovascular diseases 
(e.g. coronary heart disease and strokes); neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g. alcohol 
dependence, depression and epilepsy); gastrointestinal conditions (e.g. liver 
cirrhosis and pancreatitis); Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders (FASD); 
transmission and severity of infectious diseases (e.g. tuberculosis and HIV); 
unintentional injuries (e.g. traffic accidents and poisoning); and intentional 
injuries (e.g. homicide and suicide) (Babor et al., 2010; GBD 2016 Disease and 
Injury Incidence and Prevalence Collaborators, 2017; Rehm et al., 2010; Room, 
Babor, & Rehm, 2005). Additionally, alcohol consumption causes social and 
economic harm on a large scale by inducing violence, vandalism, public disorder, 
child abuse, marital problems, financial problems, work-related problems, and 
educational difficulties (Babor et al., 2010; WHO, 2018). Recently, researchers 
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have concluded that there is no safe level of alcohol consumption (Burton & 
Sheron, 2018; GBD 2016 Alcohol Collaborators, 2018). 
Alcohol-related harm is disproportionately distributed in the Australian society. 
For example, Indigenous males are three times more likely, and Indigenous 
females are seven times more likely, to be affected by alcohol-related disease and 
injury compared to the general population (Calabria, Doran, Vos, Shakeshaft, & 
Hall, 2010). Young people’s alcohol consumption behaviour is another important 
focus of researchers because young people’s brains are not fully developed until 
the age of 25, which makes them more prone to impulsive and risk-taking 
behaviour. While alcohol is often perceived by young people as beneficial as a 
social lubricant (Monahan & Lannutti, 2000), binge drinking behaviour in this 
group is strongly associated with physical injuries, accidents and sexual risk-
taking (Bonomo et al., 2001). Additionally, high levels of alcohol use by young 
people can permanently impair brain development and increase the risk of 
damaging brain structure and functioning before it is matured (Hermens et al., 
2013; Spear, 2002). Further, a systematic review of 54 cohort studies found that 
adolescents who binge drink are more likely to become adults with heavier 
consumption levels and alcohol dependence, and will more likely experience 
alcohol-related harm (McCambridge, McAlaney, & Rowe, 2011).  
Alcohol consumption is common in Australia; it was estimated that 77% of 
Australians aged 14 years or older drink alcohol (AIHW, 2017). While harmful 
drinking trends have been declining, 25% of people still consume at short-term, 
high-risk levels (defined as more than 4 drinks in one occasion, by National 
Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) guidelines) at least once a 
month (AIHW, 2017). This is most prevalent among young adults aged 18-24 
years (42%) (AIHW, 2017). A recent study found that 28% of the Australian 
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population drink to long-term risk levels and consume 84% of the total 
consumption, the proportion being highest in drinkers aged 35-54 (Callinan, 
Livingston, Room, & Dietze, 2018). While, the alcohol industry’s profits are 
dependent on sales from these most-at-risk drinkers (Foundation for Alcohol 
Research and Education [FARE], 2018a), the costs to the Australian society and 
tax-payers remain high. In 2013, alcohol consumption was also the fifth leading 
risk factor in terms of DALYs (GBD 2013 Risk Factors Collaborators, 2015), and 
in 2010, attributed to 5,554 deaths and 157,132 hospitalisations (Gao, Ogeil, & 
Lloyd, 2014). The annual cost of alcohol-related harm in Australia is estimated to 
be between $15.6 (Collins & Lapsley, 2008) and $36 billion (Laslett et al., 2010).  
2.3 Availability theory 
Harmful alcohol consumption is influenced and driven by a complex causal 
system of interconnected determinants (Petticrew et al., 2017b). In particular, the 
availability of alcohol seems to be a key mechanism in the prevalence of alcohol-
related harm (Babor et al., 2010). This concept not only includes physical 
availability (convenience and access) (Single, 1988), but also economic 
availability (affordability or price vs. disposable income), social availability 
(degree of normative support for drinking), and psychological availability 
(expectancies about alcohol use, drinker identity, lifestyle, response to marketing) 
(Babor, Robaina, & Jernigan, 2015; Robaina & Babor, 2017). The ‘Availability 
Theory’ postulates that increased availability leads to increased consumption and 
harm, and suggests that these four factors can guide the development of 
interventions to reduce alcohol-related harm (Robaina & Babor, 2017). One of the 
major drivers of availability of alcohol and alcohol-related harm are transnational 
alcohol corporations (Babor et al., 2015; Moodie et al., 2013; Stuckler, McKee, 
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Ebrahim, & Basu, 2012) and their ‘government-sanctioned’ profit making that 
affects environments, social norms, and ultimately, the health of the consumers 
(Jahiel & Babor, 2007; Jahiel, 2008). The next section briefly discusses how 
prioritising of corporate gain became accepted in Australian politics. 
2.4 Neoliberal values vs. individual freedom 
In the 1980s and 90s, ‘Thatcherism’ and ‘neo-liberalism’ influenced Australian 
politics significantly; free market, privatisation, low taxes, and de-regulation were 
perceived as ideals to encourage a thriving economy (Robinson, 2013). At its core 
is the neoliberal concept of freedom as non-interference, which means an 
absence of coercion, and therefore a freedom of choice, which has been the 
dominant thinking among the people in power since the industrial revolution 
(Pettit, 2015). This concept was further influenced by the philosophical principles 
of F.A. Hayek, who argued that societal progress arises from inequality and that 
progress depends on the liberty for the rich to do what they want, to make as 
much money as they want, and to spend it as they see fit (Hayek, 1960). 
Therefore, as all rules interfere with this liberty, there should be minimal state 
interference. While not strictly pursued (soft neo-liberalism), Australian politics 
(within both the major Liberal and Labor parties) is still dominated by neo-liberal 
narrative and ideology, and the current Liberal government has an official de-
regulation agenda (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet [PM&C], 
2014). The public health area is not exempt from de-regulation, and therefore, the 
neoliberal definition of freedom does not serve social justice or protect the 
individual from corporate interest. 
However, there are many other schools of thought around freedom that do serve 
social justice, such as the neo-republican definition of freedom as non-domination 
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(Pettit, 1997). This has been around since the Roman Republic and was the 
dominant thinking for a long time (until the mid-1800s). To be free means to be 
free as a person, e.g. you are not free as a slave and when a dictator or monarch 
rules. Neo-republicans value the freedom of the individual from the capacity of 
others (public and private actors) to impose their will on them (domination). A 
legal framework can assist individuals by protecting their choices and freedom of 
domination from corporations and can provide citizens with a range of securities, 
including public health (Pettit, 2015). Regulation can address social disparities in 
health (McCartney et al., 2018; Wright, 2015) and create an equal society where 
people can act according to their choice, provided it is within the rules (Pettit, 
2015). One way the alcohol industry dominates or interferes with individual 
decision making is through marketing, which increases the social and 
psychological availability of alcohol (Babor et al., 2015). Effective marketing 
restrictions can help to defend the individual’s free and informed choice from the 
influence of commercial interests (Hoek, 2015). To be able to design effective 
restrictions, it is important to understand the purpose of marketing, what kind of 
marketing tools are utilised, and why marketing is vital to alcohol producers and 
retailers. 
2.5 Marketing 
A current marketing textbook for tertiary education describes marketing as: “the 
process by which marketing organisations engage customers, build strong 
customer relationships and create customer value in order to capture value from 
customers in return” (Armstrong, Adam, Denize, & Kotler, 2018). Marketing 
aims to attract new customers by promising exceptional value, and to maintain 
and grow current customers by delivering satisfaction. While ‘old’ marketing was 
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about marketing brands to consumers mainly through mass media, new marketing 
is defined as ‘customer-engagement marketing’ (Armstrong et al., 2018). This 
type of marketing has the goal to make a brand a meaningful part of consumers’ 
lives, to build closer relationships with customers, and foster direct involvement 
by customers, enabled by the internet and social media in narrowly defined 
‘micro-markets’ (Armstrong et al., 2018). Many companies now adopt the 
concept of ‘integrated marketing communications’: “Careful integration of a 
company’s many communications channels to deliver a clear, consistent and 
compelling message about the organisation and its brands” (Armstrong et al., 
2018, p. 345). Rather than using a single tool, integrated marketing 
communications include a meticulously blended mix of promotional tools: 
advertising (broadcast, print, internet etc.); public relations (e.g. press releases, 
sports and event sponsorship, lobbying, company web pages); point of sale 
promotions (e.g. discounts, displays, coupons); direct marketing (e.g. digital 
marketing, mobile phone, influencer marketing); and personal selling (e.g. shop 
salesperson and social selling through salesperson using online and social media) 
(Armstrong et al., 2018). 
Da Silva Lopes argues that marketing and branding are essential for alcohol 
companies, as their long-term survival and growth relies on marketing 
intelligence and consumer data to maintain or increase sales, rather than 
technological innovation (Da Silva Lopes, 2003). Gathering consumer 
information, targeting smaller and specific audiences, and promoting 
individualised interaction is easier in this digital marketing space, and thus 
alcohol companies are diverting marketing efforts here (Barry, Valdez, Padon, & 
Russell, 2018; Lobstein, Landon, Thornton, & Jernigan, 2017). While it is known 
that the Australian alcohol industry spends enormous amounts of money on 
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traditional marketing (estimation of 3.4 billion AUS$ between 1997 and 2011 
(White et al., 2015)), the total expenditure on alcohol marketing is unknown, but 
believed to be much higher (NPHT, 2009b; White et al., 2015). 
Thus, Australian alcohol companies understand the value of marketing to their 
business and rely heavily on marketing techniques to increase profits. However, it 
is also important to understand how marketing seduces individuals to consume a 
particular product and how it can influence social norms, as this can guide 
intervention design in order to reduce the availability of alcohol. 
2.6 Theory: Marketing influence on consumption 
Marketing increases sales by shaping consumer preferences, increasing demand, 
promoting frequency of purchases, building brand awareness and brand loyalty, 
and encouraging people to try new products (Armstrong et al., 2018), however the 
exact mechanisms of influence on behaviour are not well understood (McClure, 
Stoolmiller, Tanski, Engels, & Sargent, 2013; Plassmann, Venkatraman, Huettel, 
& Yoon, 2015). However, several research disciplines have provided possible 
clues that impact on the individual and social level. 
2.6.1 Psychological availability - Individual cognitions and behaviour 
Consumer behaviour research and neuromarketing studies indicate that mood and 
emotions can be altered by marketing (Chang, 2006; Lee, Brandes, Chamberlain, 
& Senior, 2017), which can affect product evaluation and purchases immediately 
(Puccinelli et al., 2009). This is partly explained by decision-making research 
which shows that consumer behaviour often unfolds unconsciously (heuristic 
processing), simply as a result of cues in the environment (Cohen, 2008; 
Dijksterhuis, Smith, van Baaren, & Wigboldus, 2005) and because of emotionally 
dominated processing that reduces the effect of logic-based processing 
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(Kwasnicka, Dombrowski, White, & Sniehotta, 2016). That is, people often lack 
time and energy to fully evaluate the marketing to which they are exposed (Meier, 
2011). Additionally, Braun-La Tour et al. found that advertising cues cannot only 
alter current and future consumer experience, but even re-engineer past memories 
(Braun-LaTour, LaTour, Pickrell, & Loftus, 2004). 
Furthermore, researchers have attempted to explain the specific pathways of 
cumulative exposure to alcohol marketing in relation to alcohol consumption 
behaviour. For example, McClure et al. proposed a ‘heuristic model of marketing 
receptivity’ and found that greater levels of alcohol marketing exposure, 
receptivity, and engagement lead to an increased chance of internalisation of these 
messages (measured as ‘drinker identity’ and ‘brand allegiance’ – which 
marketers aim to encourage in consumers), which mediates the association 
between alcohol marketing exposure and binge-drinking in youth (McClure et al., 
2013). In a separate study, the authors found that greater receptivity to online 
alcohol marketing was positively associated with underage binge drinking one 
year later (McClure et al., 2016). Similarly, a recent longitudinal study found that 
cumulative exposure to alcohol marketing positively predicted consumer 
socialisation1 to alcohol (measured as ‘brand recognition’ and ‘brand recall’) in 
adolescents, which predicted harmful alcohol consumption two years later 
(Harris, Gordon, MacKintosh, & Hastings, 2015). Further, having positive 
expectancies of alcohol consumption has been found to increase harmful levels of 
drinking in youth (McClure et al., 2013; Patrick, Wray-Lake, Finlay, & Maggs, 
2009). 
                                                
1 This study used the definition of ‘consumer socialisation’ as defined by Ward: “Processes by which young 
people acquire skills, knowledge, and attitudes relevant to their functioning as consumers in the 
marketplace” (Ward, S. (1974). Consumer socialization. Journal of Consumer Research, 1, 1–14, p. 2). 
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2.6.2 Social availability –  Cultural norms 
Social norms are self-enforcing group behaviours and have been defined as “the 
unwritten codes and informal understandings that define what we expect of other 
people and what they expect of us” (Peyton Young, 2015, p. 360). Social norms 
are shaped and understood through communication (Rimal & Lapinski, 2015), are 
socially negotiated, and dependent on context, e.g. alcohol consumption can be 
the norm in some cultures, but not in other cultures (Rimal & Lapinski, 2015). 
Collective social norms often guide the individual’s own behaviour (Rimal & 
Lapinski, 2015), yet, are often followed unconsciously (Peyton Young, 2015). On 
the other hand, how we perceive social norms is a more important predictor of 
behaviour (Rimal & Lapinski, 2015). This is because people want to adhere to the 
social norm if we expect others to do so too (descriptive norms) (Peyton Young, 
2015), and out of fear of social sanctions when we expect that others do not 
approve of our behaviour (injunctive norms) (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). Perceived 
norms are, however, dependent on how norms are communicated (Rimal & 
Lapinski, 2015). 
Marketing is a form of communication that can influence social norms and, 
therefore, behaviour (Anderson, Jané-Llopis, Hasan, & Rehm, 2018). The alcohol 
industry is well aware of this; the largest transnational alcohol company, AB 
InBev, has committed to invest 10 billion USD in changing social norms through 
social marketing campaigns in order to reduce harmful alcohol consumption 
(Anheuser-Busch InBev, 2017). However, research shows that the design of 
social norms marketing interventions is crucial; a recent study found that 
including injunctive norms in a campaign increased intention to drink 
(disapproval boosted perceptions that excessive drinking was prevalent), whereas 
adding descriptive norms (low prevalence information) reduced intention to drink 
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(Smith, Louis, & Abraham, 2018). Further, alcohol marketing campaigns have 
shaped community norms and societal acceptability of excessive alcohol 
consumption in Australia, for example, through alcohol sponsorship at sporting 
clubs (Munro, 2000; O'Brien, Miller, Kolt, Martens, & Webber, 2011) and by 
linking an important cultural day, such as ANZAC day2 with the need to consume 
alcohol. For example, a 7-year VB (Australian beer brand) marketing campaign 
encouraged viewers annually to raise a glass (of VB) to pay tribute to Australian 
soldiers (Canning, 2016; Legacy, 2013). 
As the level of consumption of alcohol is, in part, a function of social availability, 
researchers have suggested changing these norms at community level to one of 
social disapproval of excessive alcohol consumption in order to achieve large-
scale transformations (Anderson et al., 2018; Nyborg et al., 2016). Similarly, 
social disapproval of smoking was also found to be one of the primary reasons for 
smoking cessation in individuals (Chapman & Freeman, 2008; Hammond, Fong, 
Zanna, Thrasher, & Borland, 2006). Stricter alcohol marketing regulations could 
be put in place with the aim to gradually change social norms (Acemoglu & 
Jackson, 2017; Rimal & Lapinski, 2015).  
These theories and examples explain the mechanism through which marketing 
potentially can increase the social and psychological availability of alcohol, and 
how regulation can reduce it. The next section will discuss the available evidence 
around the effects of alcohol marketing on consumption behaviour and attitudes 
in people.  
                                                
2 ANZAC stands for Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. ANZAC day falls on the 25th of April each 
year and commemorates all Australians and New Zealanders who served and died in all wars, conflicts, and 
peacekeeping operations. 
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2.7 Effects of alcohol marketing on consumption 
Extensive systematic reviews of longitudinal studies have shown that exposure to 
marketing of alcoholic beverages increases consumption, especially in young 
people, and is also linked to earlier initiation to alcohol use and increased 
underage drinking (Anderson, De Bruijn, Angus, Gordon, & Hastings, 2009b; 
Babor et al., 2010; Jernigan, Noel, Landon, Thornton, & Lobstein, 2017a; Smith 
& Foxcroft, 2009). It has led to the development of positive attitudes toward 
harmful drinking in the general public (Anderson et al., 2018; Austin, Chen, & 
Grube, 2006). Corresponding outcomes were found in the tobacco marketing 
research, which showed that exposure to tobacco marketing increases the 
likelihood that adolescents will start to smoke (Lovato, Linn, Stead, & Best, 2003; 
Pollay & Dewhirst, 2002). The cumulative long-term effects of alcohol marketing 
have a more significant effect on alcohol consumption behaviour than individual 
advertisements (McClure et al., 2013), and it has been shown that the number of 
marketing techniques and channels utilised has a positive relationship with 
consumption behaviour (Gordon, Harris, Marie Mackintosh, & Moodie, 2011; 
Harris et al., 2015; MacFadyen, Hastings, & MacKintosh, 2001). 
It is widely demonstrated that younger children are more influenced by 
advertising than adolescents or adults (Livingstone & Helsper, 2006) because 
most children under the age of eight have not the cognitive ability yet to 
distinguish between commercial and other sources of information (Institute of 
Medicine, 2006). However, while adolescents and young adults understand the 
concept of advertising, they are thought to be more at risk because they are more 
prone to risk-taking behaviour and their brains are not yet emotionally matured 
(Bava & Tapert, 2010). Additionally, there is an increasing amount of robust 
evidence that shows that the alcohol industry specifically targets minors (people 
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under the legal drinking age) (Ross, Ostroff, & Jernigan, 2014b) and that minors 
are exposed at similar levels as adults (Jernigan et al., 2017a). 
However, there are also numerous studies that show that there are other 
vulnerable groups who are more likely to experience adverse outcomes from 
alcohol, such as ethnic minorities, low-income groups, people with alcohol 
dependence (Babor, Robaina, Noel, & Ritson, 2017b), and who are, on top of 
that, specifically targeted by alcohol marketers through segment marketing (Grier 
& Kumanyika, 2010). The ethical implications of this practice are widely 
discussed in the literature (Pan American Health Organization [PAHO], 2017; 
Pires & Stanton, 2002; Sautter & Oretskin, 1997). Yet, it may not be solely these 
minorities who are vulnerable to marketing; especially now that digital marketing 
allows marketing engagement with potential customers in narrowly defined 
‘micro-markets’, which has led to the targeting of health-conscious consumers 
with gluten-free and vegan alcohol products (Esser & Jernigan, 2018). 
In sum, alcohol marketing, and in particular high levels of exposure to marketing, 
has a substantial negative influence on the attitudes and consumption trends in 
young people, but other groups are proven vulnerable too. Restricting alcohol 
marketing could protect the population from exposure, and reduce the social and 
psychological availability of alcohol and thus harm. The next sections look at the 
evidence for banning alcohol marketing and the Australian Government’s 
legislative powers to do so.  
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2.8 Banning alcohol marketing? 
2.8.1 Evidence 
A recent Cochrane review concluded that there is insufficient evidence on the 
impact of restricting or banning alcohol marketing on alcohol consumption levels 
(Siegfried et al., 2014). The review had strict selection criteria and aimed to 
evaluate studies that looked at the direct influence of alcohol marketing 
restrictions on consumption levels. However, worldwide there are very few 
complete alcohol marketing bans that are well enforced. Therefore, the Cochrane 
review only included four studies: one small RCT and three interrupted time-
series studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s in Canada. As alcohol marketing 
has far wider effects than influencing consumption, such as changing attitudes, 
the psychological availability of alcohol, and social norms around alcohol 
consumption, this seems a narrow framing of the issue for the review to take 
(Petticrew et al., 2017b). The review ignored the large body of indirect evidence 
that shows negative effects of exposure levels of alcohol marketing on 
consumption levels, attitudes and behaviour (Anderson et al., 2009b; Jernigan et 
al., 2017a; Smith & Foxcroft, 2009); economic modelling studies which predict 
that complete alcohol marketing bans would be one of the most cost-effective 
ways to reduce alcohol-related harm (Chisholm et al., 2018; Cobiac, Vos, Doran, 
& Wallace, 2009; Cobiac, Vos, & Veerman, 2010); and tobacco marketing 
evidence that shows that comprehensive bans reduce marketing exposure (Kasza 
et al., 2011) and have contributed to a decrease in the prevalence of smoking 
(Henriksen, 2012; Saffer & Chaloupka, 2000). Thus, the robust evidence of the 
impact of marketing on consumption behaviour provides indirect proof that 
regulating alcohol marketing can reduce exposure and thus harm, and researchers 
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suggest that a wider approach to synthesising evidence should be taken when 
dealing with a complex issue like alcohol marketing (Petticrew et al., 2017b). 
2.8.2 Legislative power to ban 
Australia has three tiers of government; the federal Commonwealth Government, 
regional State and Territory governments, and local governments. All of these 
government levels have their own, and sometimes overlapping public health 
responsibilities. These three powers are concurrent powers, which means that they 
do not give the Commonwealth any exclusive right to make laws on advertising, 
and therefore, States and Territories can make laws with respect to advertising as 
well (including on television or internet). Commonwealth and state law can exist 
alongside each other, but only if it is possible to comply with both. When a state 
law is inconsistent with a Commonwealth law (when it is impossible to comply 
with both), the latter prevails (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 
s 109). The same applies when the Commonwealth indicates it wants to ‘cover the 
field’ to make laws consistent around the country (Morabito & Strain, 1993). 
The Commonwealth is restricted in the topics on which they may pass laws. 
However, extra-legislative powers can be given through international treaties; 
Section 51(xxiv) of the Constitution gives the Commonwealth the power to make 
laws ‘with respect to external affairs’ (Heyward & Liberman, 2008). The 
Framework Convention for Tobacco Control3 (FCTC) is an example of one of 
                                                
3 The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) was adopted in 2003 and came into force in 
2005 (Healy & Dugdale, 2009). Australia was one of the first 40 countries to sign up; as of July 2017, the 
FCTC has 181 Parties. Under international law, each of the Parties – having ratified, accepted, approved or 
acceded to the FCTC – must perform, in good faith, all obligations contained in the Convention. The primary 
objectives of the treaty are to reduce the demand and supply of tobacco. In relation to marketing, article 13.2 
states that ‘each Party shall, in accordance with its constitution or constitutional principles, undertake a 
comprehensive ban of all tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship’ (World Health Organization). 
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those treaties, which gave the Australian Government an incentive and the power 
to put federal tobacco legislation in place in 1992. 
While having the power to ban alcohol marketing, and despite the high level of 
minors still being exposed to alcohol marketing and the high levels of alcohol-
related harm in society, the Australian Government is reluctant to legislate 
alcohol marketing (at this point in time). Instead, the government endorses the 
current alcohol marketing regulatory framework, which is mostly industry 
regulated. The components of this framework will be outlined.  
2.9 Alcohol marketing regulatory framework in Australia 
The complex regulatory framework incorporates many responsible parties, such 
as federal government agencies, state governments, and media and alcohol 
industries; and is comprised of a number of standards and codes that deal with 
either/or ‘placement’ or ‘content’ of alcohol advertising in several media outlets. 
The alcohol industry itself regulates the content of several types of Alcohol 
Marketing Communications (AMCs), mainly through the ABAC scheme. In the 
following section, the most relevant provisions applying to alcohol advertising are 
briefly discussed, and it also provides an overview of these regulations and codes 











Table 1  
Overview of current regulation and voluntary codes affecting alcohol marketing in Australia 

























• Only prohibits AMCs during and around P 
(preschool) and C (children) programs: average of 1 
hour per day, not during children's peak viewing 
times (5.30-9.30pm) 
• A sporting event may displace a C or P program 
Commercial 
Television Industry 
Code of Practice 
(CTICP): FreeTV 
Australia 
CR# P/C  
Free to air 









implications   
• Registered with ACMA 
• Excludes subscription television and online 
streaming platforms 
• C or P classified programs must satisfy the CTS 
• AMCs can be broadcasted every day between 
8.30pm to 5am, and on school days between 12-3pm 
• Additionally, AMCs can be broadcasted during 
Sports programs and Live Sporting events on 
weekends and public holidays at any time of the day 
• Complex public complaint system 
ASTRA (Australian 
Subscription 
Television and Radio 
Association) 







years ASTRA n/a n/a 
• Codes registered with ACMA 
• Advertisements on subscription TV have to comply 
with the ABAC Code 
• Excludes online streaming platforms, such as Netflix  
• Commercial radio stations have no placement 















• Instated to “ensure that advertisements are legal, 
decent, honest and truthful” 



























• Code does not apply to marketing directed at broader 
audiences that also include children 
• Adolescents (14 to 17) are not protected from 
exposure to Alcohol Marketing Communications 
(AMCs) by this code 
ABAC Responsible 
Alcohol Marketing 














• Solely prohibits advertising that has “strong or 
evident appeal to minors” 
• Excludes in-store promotions initiated by retailers 
• Excludes sponsorship of sport and cultural event 
• Excludes promotions based on price 
• Since 2017, includes few and ineffective placement 
restrictions in relation to minors 
• Offers pre-vetting service to advertisers 
• Complaint process is complex 
• One person (Chief Adjudicator) decides if complaint 
goes to panel 
• No consideration complaints of one-off promotions 
• Amount of complaints per ad not considered 
• Voluntary code, which cannot be enforced 
• Low public awareness 
OMA (Outdoor 
Media Association) 















• OMA Code refers to all relevant AANA codes 
• OMA members only accept pre-vetted alcohol ads 
• Alcohol ads not within 150 meters from a primary or 
secondary school, except when in vicinity of a club, 
pub, or bottle shop and on transit advertisement 




2.9.1 Government regulation 
The Broadcasting Services Act 1992 allowed the Australian Communications and 
Media Authority (ACMA) to determine Children’s Televisions Standards (CTS). 
These standards apply to children’s programs from free-to-air broadcasting 
licensees and were developed to “provide protection of children from possible 
harmful effects of television” (ACMA, 2009). These are the only federal 
government regulations dealing specifically with the advertising of alcoholic 
drinks to children. During P (preschool) classified programs there is no 
advertising allowed at all, and the CTS prohibit the broadcast of alcohol 
advertising during a C (children) classified period or around and during any C or 
P classified programs broadcast outside a C period. However, P and C classified 
programs are only broadcasted for an average of about one hour per day. 
Most states and territories in Australia have a Liquor Act in place that regulates 
promotion of alcohol that encourages irresponsible consumption in licenced 
venues (in the opinion of identified authorised persons). The Liquor Acts could 
also regulate outdoor media and point-of-sale promotions (including bulk buys 
and price discounts) in and on bottle shops, which is another area where children 
are exposed to alcohol marketing (FARE, 2013). For example, since January 
2018, the Western Australian Government has begun phasing out alcohol 
advertising from public transport (Public Transport Authority WA, 2018). 
Monitoring and enforcement of these pieces of regulation rely heavily on public 
complaints, and there is usually no active monitoring by the regulatory 
institutions (e.g. Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation 
(VCGLR) in Victoria). Additionally, it is unlikely for retailers and licensed 
venues to receive a fine when not complying with the guidelines, as they are 
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given multiple warnings (VCGLR, 2013). Illustratively, in Victoria, only two 
inappropriate alcohol promotions were identified in 2015 (VCGLR, 2017). 
Contrarily, state and territory tobacco marketing regulation are much more 
advanced, actively monitored and enforced, and tobacco marketing is sparse.  
2.9.2 FreeTV Australia & ASTRA 
The Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice (CTICP) operates 
alongside the CTS, is administrated by FreeTV Australia, and registered with the 
Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). Alcohol 
advertisements can be broadcasted within the M, MA and AV periods, commonly 
8.30pm- 5am, but also outside this period when it is an accompaniment to the live 
broadcast of a sporting event on weekends or public holidays. Complaints 
regarding the placement of advertisements can be submitted to the broadcaster, 
whom itself determines the validity of complaints under the CTICP. Subscription 
television and radio is regulated by ASTRA’s (Australian Subscription Television 
and Radio Association) Code of Practice, which does not have any placement 
restrictions for Alcohol Marketing Communications (AMC). Members do not 
include online streaming platforms, such as Netflix and Stan. 
2.9.3 Australian Association of National Advertisers 
Another major player is the Australian Association of National Advertisers 
(AANA). This is the largest advertising industry body in Australia and has (co-) 
designed several codes as part of advertising and marketing self-regulation, 
including the ABAC Responsible Alcohol Marketing Code. All complaints by the 
public regarding alcohol advertising should be sent to the Advertising Standards 
Bureau (ASB). ASB assesses a complaint against AANA’s Code of Ethics, which 




against AANA’s Code for Advertising & Marketing Communications to Children. 
Children are here defined as 14 years of age or younger. The latter code was 
developed by AANA to “ensure that advertisers and marketers develop and 
maintain a high sense of responsibility in advertising and marketing to children in 
Australian” and stipulates that “advertising or marketing communications to 
children must not be for, or relate in any way to, alcohol products or draw any 
association with companies that supply alcohol products” (AANA, 2014). 
Subsequently, the ASB will send a copy of the complaint to ABAC’s Chief 
Adjudicator who will decide if the complaint will be assessed against the ABAC 
Code as well (this will be discussed further below). 
2.9.4 ABAC scheme 
The self-regulatory ABAC scheme, which regulates primarily the content of 
AMCs in Australia, consists of three elements: a self-regulatory alcohol 
marketing code; a pre-vetting service; and public complaints and adjudication 
panel. All these aspects are overseen by the Management Committee, which is at 
present comprised of three alcohol industry representatives, one representative 
from the advertising industry, one government representative, and one 
independent chair. ABAC Membership and compliance with the Code is 
voluntary. 
2.9.4.1 ABAC Responsible Alcohol Marketing Code 
In 1998, the Australian Association of National Advertisers (AANA) allowed the 
alcohol industry to develop their own code regarding alcohol advertising, which 
only addressed the content, not the placement of advertising. Since then the 
standards have evolved and expanded to include other forms of marketing. The 
recently updated (1st of November 2017) ABAC Responsible Alcohol Marketing 
Code (from now on referred to as the ‘ABAC Code’) introduced the following 
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standards for alcohol marketing content: a) Responsible and moderate portrayal 
of alcohol beverages, which in general terms prohibits AMCs showing abuse or 
misuse of alcohol, irresponsible and offensive behaviour that is related to alcohol, 
challenges or dares, and put emphasis on strength and intoxicating effects of 
alcohol; b) Responsibility toward minors (under 18), which prohibits advertising 
that has “strong or evident appeal to minors”, which means e.g. that a marketing 
communication should not “specifically target minors” or have “a particular 
attractiveness for a minor beyond the general attractiveness it has for an adult”; 
c) Responsible depiction of the effects of alcohol, which includes contribution of 
the consumption or presence of an alcoholic beverage to success and 
achievements, a significant change in mood or environment, or therapeutic 
benefits or relaxation; and d) Alcohol and Safety, which covers alcohol 
consumption during an activity that requires a high degree of alertness or physical 
co-ordination (The ABAC Scheme Limited [ABAC], 2017b). The ABAC Code 
does not apply to the sponsorship of sport and cultural events and point-of-sale 
marketing initiated by retailers. 
For the first time, the ABAC Code now includes some placement restrictions in 
relation to minors as well, such as: “If a digital, television, radio, cinema or print 
media platform does not have age restriction controls available that are capable 
of excluding Minors from the audience, a Marketing Communication may only be 
placed where the audience is reasonably expected to comprise at least 75% 
Adults” and “a Marketing Communication must not be placed with programs or 




2.9.4.2 Alcohol Advertising Pre-Vetting Service 
The ABAC scheme offers its members the use of their Alcohol Advertising Pre-
Vetting Service (AAPS). This is a confidential user-pays service that assesses 
proposed AMCs against the ABAC Code before it is released. Currently, pre-
vetting is compulsory for signatories of the ABAC scheme for a range of 
traditional forms of media, including TV, radio, and cinema. However, for other 
media outlets – such as print, digital, point-of-sale, marketing collateral, and 
packaging – pre-vetting is optional (ABAC, 2018c). Although the alcohol pre-
vetting service is also available for non-signatories, they can still advertise 
without approval from the AAPS service (ABAC, 2018c). The AAPS assessment 
is not binding; a pre-vetted marketing communication can still be assessed against 
the ABAC Code by the adjudication panel in case a complaint has been received. 
2.9.4.3 ABAC’s adjudication panel 
As stated above, all complaints regarding the content of any AMCs should first be 
directed to the ASB, who forwards cases concerning alcoholic beverages 
advertisements to the ABAC Chief Adjudicator. They independently determine if 
the complaint raises any issues under the ABAC Code and if the ABAC 
Adjudication Panel (minimum of three members, one of whom has a professional 
background in public health) should consider the complaint. The Panel will only 
assess sections that are indicated by the complainant. If the ABAC Adjudication 
Panel finds the marketing communication has breached the ABAC Code, the 
advertiser is asked to withdraw or modify the AMC within five business days. 
There are no (other) sanctions for breaching the Code. Compliance with the 




2.9.5 Outdoor Media Association 
The content of outdoor media is regulated by the Outdoor Media Association 
(OMA). OMA is a peak industry body that represents most of Australia's Outdoor 
Media Display companies that provide space for third-party advertisements in 
public areas, such as billboard and bus shelter advertisements. The OMA has 
developed a voluntary Code of Ethics, which is also administered by the ASB, 
and indicates an endorsement for the following (relevant) advertising industry 
codes of practice: AANA Code of Ethics; AANA Code for Advertising and 
Marketing Communications for Children; and the ABAC Code. OMA members 
only accept AMCs that have been approved by the ABAC’s pre-vetting system.  
Since 2009, OMA requires members to ensure that “alcohol advertising is not 
placed on fixed signs that are located within a 150 metre sight line of a primary 
or secondary school” (OMA, 2009). However, the policy does not apply to 
schools being in the vicinity to a club, pub or bottle shop, and to transit 
advertising on buses and taxis. 
This overview of this complex regulatory framework has shown that there are 
many issues that potentially impact on its effectiveness in protecting young 
people from the impacts of alcohol marketing (see Table 1 for notes on 
effectiveness). In order to provide advice or guidance on which gaps need to be 
addressed to be able to design a comprehensive and effective regulatory 




2.10 Gaps in Australian alcohol marketing frameworks 
The aims of advertising and alcohol marketing industry codes are framed “to 
ensure that advertisers and marketers develop and maintain a high sense of 
responsibility in advertising and marketing to children in Australia” (AANA, 
2014, p. 1). However, issues with the alcohol marketing codes discussed above 
undermine the potential effect of the codes, as they: only cover AMCs aimed 
explicitly at children; ignore marketing impacts on adults; have a focus on content 
instead of placement and the cumulative effect of AMCs; have substantive 
loopholes; allow exceptions; have inconsistencies between codes; and require an 
in-depth knowledge to lodge complaints successfully. Additional weaknesses can 
be attributed to the nature of self-regulatory schemes, such as a lack of monitoring 
and the use of weak enforcement mechanisms. The issues are discussed in more 
detail below.  
2.10.1 Directed at children 
One of the most important flaws in the Australian self-regulatory system is that 
the codes use a narrow and ambiguous definition of advertising directed at 
children, and that they ignore the fact that children often watch marketing and 
programs that are not specifically aimed at, or designed for, children. For 
example, The ANAA Code for Advertising or Marketing Communications to 
Children states that marketing directed at children (≤ 14 years-old) must not relate 
to alcohol products (AANA, 2014). Similarly, ABAC’s standards prohibit 
marketing communications that have a strong or evident appeal to minors 
(ABAC, 2017b). Out of the top ten programs watched by Australian children (0-
14) in 2016, seven programs were primarily aimed at adults (e.g. MasterChef and 
The Voice) (ACMA, 2017), which means that children are still exposed to alcohol 
advertising. Another major weakness of some of the codes (e.g. AANA- 
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Marketing to Children code) is that adolescents between the ages of 15 to 17, who 
are still below the legal drinking age, are not protected by these codes. 
2.10.2 Lack of placement restrictions 
The majority of codes only regulate the content of alcohol advertisements. The 
regulation of placement of marketing that children are exposed to (when and 
where) is under-addressed. As previously discussed, the cumulative effect of 
marketing has a much larger effect on consumer behaviour than single 
advertisements (Jernigan et al., 2017a; McClure et al., 2013). Yet, the CTS and 
the CTICP standards (television codes) only apply for an average of one hour per 
day, there are no radio placement restrictions, and the Outdoor Media 
Associations’ policy that restricts outdoor alcohol advertising near schools is 
undermined by exceptions, including venues that sell alcohol and transit 
advertising on buses and taxis (Alcohol Advertising Review Board [AARB], 
2016). 
Since 2017, the ABAC Code includes placement restrictions for AMCs in media 
where audience age restriction controls are available and where 25% of an 
audience are minors (ABAC, 2017b). However, the Alcohol Advertising Review 
Board has criticised these provisions for being not evidence-based and 
“incredibly generous to alcohol advertisers”, as minors represent only 22% of 
the population (AARB, 2017, July 20th). This means that popular youth or family 
programs, such as sporting matches are not included (FARE, 2018b). Moreover, if 
the aim is to protect youths at risk of initiation of alcohol, who are likely between 
12-18 years of age, then this proportion of the population is considerably lower 
(<10%). Regardless, a modest proportion of TV audience can represent hundreds 




Studies have also found that age-gating technology is currently not effective in 
protecting minors from online marketing (Jones, Thom, Davoren, & Barrie, 
2014). Thus, the ABAC placement standards are unlikely to reduce exposure to 
youth, and thresholds should be lowered significantly to be effective (Jernigan, 
Ostroff, & Ross, 2005). 
2.10.3 Lack of price promotion restrictions 
The codes do not regulate point-of-sale price promotions, thus excluding 
discounts and bulk buys from regulation, whereas these are considered essential 
to an integrated marketing communication strategy (Armstrong, et al., 2018). 
Additionally, evidence indicates that alcohol price promotions lead to increased 
sales and consumption (Jones, Barrie, Gregory, Allsop, & Chikritzhs, 2015; 
Wagenaar, Tobler, & Komro 2010). 
Some countries, such as Scotland and Finland, have therefore banned ads that 
included volume discounts or offered short-term price discounts (European Centre 
for Monitoring Alcohol Marketing [EUCAM], 2018a). However, studies have 
also shown that these bans need to be comprehensive to be effective; For 
example, in Scotland, a ban of bulk buy promotions in 2011 did not reduce 
amount of alcohol purchased, as the industry subsequently reduced the overall 
price of alcohol (Nakamura et al., 2014). Minimum unit pricing has recently been 
introduced in Scotland to combat these issues. Similarly, the draft report of the 
new National Alcohol Strategy (2018-2026) for Australia proposes minimum unit 
pricing and “regulatory measures to prevent promotion of discounted/low priced 
alcohol including bulk-buys, two-for-one offers, shop-a-dockets and other 
promotions based on price” (Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy, 2018, p. 18). 
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2.10.4 Loopholes and exceptions 
Various codes also contain exceptions to rules and definitions that can undermine 
their effectiveness, such as not including all forms of marketing communications, 
such as sponsorship (ABAC, 2017b). Further, the CTS and CTICP allow sporting 
events to be broadcasted during children’s viewing times. It was estimated that in 
2012, Australian minors were exposed to a total of 50.9 million alcohol 
advertisements during televised sports (not including sponsorship promotions), of 
which 47% was broadcasted during the day, and which was similar to young 
adults’ exposure rates (Carr et al., 2015). Advertising and promotions around 
sporting events are arguably the most effective forms of product promotion 
without regulation and continue to be a significant concern among the Australian 
public (FARE, 2018c). 
The ABAC scheme further allows the use of AMCs for internet, point-of-sale, 
events promotions, and sponsorship without going through the ABAC’s pre-
vetting process (ABAC, 2018c). This has created a loophole for one-off AMCs, 
because these campaigns are often ended before any complaints could be 
submitted. In practice, this could mean that some of the commercials that are most 
in breach of the code are free from regulation. In 2010, the ASB used this 
loophole to reject over one in six claims (17.4%) because of their status as 
discontinued advertisements and therefore did not assess these complaints (most 
likely including AMCs) against any of their codes (Advertising Standards Bureau, 
2010). 
2.10.5 Inconsistency 
Another problem is the inconsistency between codes, which leads to differences 
in applying the codes and adjudication of complaints. For example, the age of 




14 (CTS and AANA Code for Advertising and Marketing Communications to 
Children) to 18 (ABAC Code). The inconsistency and variability between codes 
can lead to a high level of confusion and may act as a deterrent for starting or 
pursuing the complaint process. 
2.10.6 Complexity and awareness 
There are several problems regarding complexity and awareness of the self-
regulatory schemes. Firstly, the large number of codes within the alcohol 
marketing regulatory framework and the complex complaint systems require in-
depth knowledge to be able to lodge a complaint successfully. Secondly, there are 
no instructions around how to construct the content of the complaint best; using 
the right terminology has an undeniable advantage (ABAC Adjudication panel 
member, personal communication), as e.g. the ABAC Adjudication Panel will 
only assess sections of the code that are indicated by the complainant (ANPHA, 
2014). Hence, if the statements in the complaint are too general or too vague, the 
adjudication panel will most likely dismiss the complaint. Third, the number of 
complaints regarding an AMC is not considered, and will, therefore, only be 
adjudicated once (Advertising Standards Bureau, n.d.). Fourth, even if someone 
knows how to complain, it takes time, effort, and persistence. Fifth, according to 
ABAC itself, there is a low awareness of alcohol advertising regulation and the 
complaint processes in Australia (ABAC, 2014a). Finally, there is a mismatch 
between the ABAC adjudication panel’s perceptions of what is appealing to youth 
and youth perceptions of this, indicating that more AMCs are breaching the 




The alcohol marketing codes’ procedures are not transparent enough. For 
example, it is unclear how the adjudication panel interprets and applies the ABAC 
Code and how much influence the ABAC Management committee members (i.e. 
industry members) have on the adjudication and pre-vetting processes. Similarly, 
the Alcohol Policy Coalition has previously expressed its concern regarding the 
independence and fairness of the ABAC pre-vetting process because of its 
confidential and non-transparent nature (Alcohol Policy Coalition, 2011). 
2.10.8 Lack of monitoring 
In self-regulatory schemes, monitoring is often performed by the industry itself. 
This is the same for alcohol marketing; The ABAC scheme, including the public 
complaint system and pre-vetting service, is funded by the alcohol industry, and 
the adjudication panel members are appointed by them too. Subsequently, there is 
no independent monitoring and determination of complaints and compliance to 
codes is not actively monitored by any institution or organisation. Pre-vetting of 
AMCs is in place to prevent breaches from ever been published, however, it is not 
compulsory for non-signatories and certain media outlets. Therefore, monitoring 
relies predominantly on a public complaint system, which guarantees very low 
accountability because of a low level of public awareness (Alcohol Policy 




2.10.9 Insufficient enforcement options 
Compliance to the industry codes is voluntary. The ABAC adjudication panel can 
only suggest to withdraw or adjust the campaign; ‘naming and shaming’ is the 
only enforcement strategy the alcohol industry can utilise to force compliance 
with the ABAC Code. The Australian National Preventative Health Agency 
(ANPHA) recommended, therefore, in 2014, to register the ABAC Code with the 
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC), which could give 
“real regulatory teeth” under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (ANPHA, 
2014). Moreover, the amount of time taken to resolve complaints (up to 30 days) 
is likely to reduce the effectiveness of self-regulatory codes in Australia. By the 
time someone decides to complain, the complaint is considered, and the company 
decides to adhere to the recommendation to withdraw the campaign, the damage 
has potentially already been done. Additionally, partial participation by the 
industry reduces the potential for enforcement. For example, OMA does not 
represent businesses that install on-premise advertisements4; thus these businesses 
do not have to adhere to their Code of Ethics (Outdoor Media Association Inc., 
2011). 
2.10.10   Denial of impact on adults 
Finally, the current frameworks deny the impact of advertising on adults, despite 
evidence showing that advertisements can contribute to maladaptive attitudes and 
consumption behaviour (Argyriou & Melewar, 2011; Meier, 2011), especially in 
vulnerable subsections of the population. Marketing influences social norms 
(Anderson et al., 2018) and are often processed on heuristic levels (Dijksterhuis et 
al., 2005), which could make anyone vulnerable to marketing (Meier, 2011). 
                                                
4 On premise advertising means: vehicles, billboards and other structures that advertise the business, services 
and products on the advertiser’s property (WHO, 2013) 
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Studies have also shown that existing drinkers are targeted by the alcohol industry 
to increase consumption and drinking occasions, and to normalise frequent (or 
harmful) alcohol consumption (Carah, 2014). Therefore, a focus on all existing 
alcohol consumers is needed to reduce the adverse effects of alcohol marketing. 
This could also reduce any spillover effects of AMCs that might be aimed at 
adults but to which minors are exposed to. 
2.10 Where to from here? Directions from tobacco policy 
The current framework is riddled with flaws, and, hence, the alcohol industry is 
hardly restrained in their marketing efforts to increase or maintain the level of 
social and psychological availability of alcohol in the Australian society. Over the 
last 20 years, the regulatory framework has been criticised and, consequentially, 
voluntary codes have been amended by the industry, but with what aim? Research 
suggests these are common industry strategies to delay effective regulation or 
prevent legislation, in order to continue to sell alcoholic beverages (Hillman, 
Keim, & Schuler, 2004; Jernigan, 2011). At the same time, the government is 
reluctant to legislate and is content with the industry initiatives to ‘deal’ with this 
public health problem. 
In contrast to the alcohol industry’s voluntary frameworks, Australia’s regulatory 
framework for tobacco control, which is not based on self-regulation and 
voluntary codes, has shown substantial declines in the incidence and prevalence 
of smoking (Chapman & Wakefield, 2001; White, Hill, Siahpush, & Bobevski, 
2003). Between 1980 and 2016, adult male smoking prevalence decreased from 
41% to 16%; and female smoking rates have fallen from 30% to 12% 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2018). The prevalence of smoking among teenagers is on a 




2015). The prohibition of tobacco marketing is one such tobacco control policy 
and has been an effective way to reduce overall consumption (Saffer & 
Chaloupka, 2000) and change public opinion around the acceptability of smoking 
(Chapman & Freeman, 2008).  
While Australia was a pioneer in this area since the 1980s, introducing the ban did 
not happen overnight. Tobacco marketing had been a topic of public concern for 
decades, and since the 1960s health advocates had been lobbying actively to put 
tobacco advertising on the political agenda (Chapman & Carter, 2003). At the 
same time, the tobacco industry denied or downplayed the negative impacts of 
smoking and the influence of marketing on the uptake of smoking. It took over 20 
years from the implementation of voluntary codes in 1966 by the ‘Menzies’ 
Government, to achieve a nationwide comprehensive tobacco marketing ban in 
1987. Many forms of regulations and codes were introduced in the meantime by 
both the government and industry (see Appendix A for a historical overview). For 
example, in 1977 the Media Council of Australia, who represented the interests of 
the Australian media and advertising industries, developed a voluntary advertising 
code for cigarette advertising in print, broadcast, and outdoor display (Pearson, 
1999). This was supported by the Liberal government at the time, who rejected 
Senate committee’s recommendations to ban tobacco advertising as it preferred a 
non-interventionist approach (Chapman, 1980). 
Tobacco marketing, industry claims and tactics to delay effective regulation, and 
the effect of public policies to regulate marketing on smoking cessation have been 
extensively researched over the last decades. The high level of understanding and 
evidence in this field informs other public health areas (Daube, 2012). The 
following section discusses if and how the alcohol and tobacco industries, their 
products, and their political activities can be compared (see Table 2 for a 
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summary), and how this can inform practical strategies to advance alcohol 
marketing regulation. 
2.10.11 Comparability of alcohol and tobacco: products, characteristics, and 
tactics 
A large number of items, including risks of smoking and drinking, industry 
characteristics, and claims and tactics to delay effective marketing regulation, are 
discussed here. Table 2 provides an overview. 
Tobacco products lead to high levels of dependence in smokers; Alcohol can also 
lead to dependence, but an American study showed that most people (90%) who 
drink heavily are not addicted (Esser et al., 2014). However, no levels of smoking 
and drinking are considered safe (Burton & Sheron, 2018), and cumulative 
consumption increases the risk of the development of numerous life-threatening 
diseases (WHO, 2011). Early onset of smoking and drinking are both directly 
associated with long-term unhealthy consumption and adverse consequences 
(Carson et al., 2011; McCambridge et al., 2011; Taioli & Wynder, 1991). Both 
smoking and alcohol-related problems are more prominent in high-risk 
populations (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). At the same 
time, similar to the tobacco industry in the past (Brownell & Warner, 2009), the 
alcohol industry denies the relationship between alcohol and cancer risk, and 






Comparing tobacco and alcohol-related problems, industry characteristics, and 
industry strategies to delay effective regulation worldwide 
*The Australian alcohol industry consists of a few major transnational companies that dominate most of the market. 
However, it also includes a large number of smaller independent alcohol companies, such as wineries, brewers, and 
distilleries. 
  
 Tobacco Alcohol 
Harmful effects of consumption   
Increased risk of numerous life-threatening diseases ü ü 
Adverse health outcome is singular cause of behaviour ü ü 
High levels of consumption is common ü ü 
More problems arise in high-risk populations, such as 
people from low SES areas, young people, and minority 
groups 
ü ü 
Industry characteristics   
Small number of large companies ü (ü)* 
Small diversity of products and marketing is main driver 
for sales (not innovation) ü ü 
Large industries budgets to promote unhealthy behaviours ü ü 
Industry tactics & claims   
Industry claims not to advertise to minors ü ü 
Industries claim marketing is only to influence choice of 
brand and does not increase consumption ü ü 
Industry develops ‘healthy’ alternatives to normalise 
consumption ü ü 
Long-term knowledge by industry of harmful effects 
product ü ü 
Harmful effects of product are denied or research is 
undermined ü ü 
Set up of SAPROs, lobby for industry-friendly policies ü ü 
Use of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) ü ü 
Sharing approaches and strategies through co-ownership ü ü 
Promoting neoliberalist views of personal freedom/ claim 
consumption is a matter of personal choice ü ü 
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Both tobacco and alcohol industries invest enormous sums into promoting their 
product. In contradiction to their own internal documents, which state aims like 
‘market expansion’ (Pollay, 2000) and “creating new customer experiences and 
[drinking] occasions” (Anheuser-Busch InBev, 2018b, p. 5), both industries have 
argued to governments and the public that marketing only intends to influence 
brand switching (Bond et al., 2010; McCambridge, Hawkins, & Holden, 2013). 
Chapman points out that brands, for products such as tobacco, cannot be 
promoted without promoting the behaviour at the same time, which makes the 
industries’ argument irrelevant (Chapman, 1996). Further, both industries claim 
not to advertise to minors, which has been found to be untrue for both industries 
(Bond et al., 2010; Mosher & Johnsson, 2005; Perry, 1999). Young people are, 
after all, important to target, as they are future consumers (Hall & Room, 2006). 
Similar to the tobacco industry’s introduction of the ‘healthy’ light cigarettes, 
which led to increased harm rather than a reduction of harm (Brownell & Warner, 
2009), and the controversial introduction of the e-cigarette (Voigt, 2015), the 
alcohol industry sells reduced-alcohol beverages as healthier alternatives. 
However, a recent study has shown that reduced-alcohol beverages are now 
promoted to be appropriate for any occasion and are marketed to replace soft 
drinks rather than ‘normal’ alcoholic beverages (Vasiljevic, Coulter, Petticrew, & 
Marteau, 2018), which might increase normalisation of alcohol consumption in 
our society and could contribute to the industry’s message that drinking can be 
part of a healthy lifestyle.  
International research shows that the industries are also comparable in their 
arguments and tactics to avoid and delay regulation, such as the use of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) and undermining of scientific evidence (Bond et al., 




national ‘social aspects/public relations’ organisations (SAPROs) that fund 
scientific research as a demonstration of its corporate social responsibility (e.g. 
IARD internationally, FOREST in the UK, and DrinkWise in Australia) (Miller, 
De Groot, McKenzie, & Droste, 2011). These organisations lobby politicians and 
policymakers for industry-friendly, non-effective policies, such as the industry-
developed education programs and labelling regimes, and oppose effective 
policies, such as tax or marketing restrictions (Daube, 2012). These types of 
corporate political activities are a common strategy to influence policy in ways 
favourable to corporations for the alcohol industry (Hillman et al., 2004; Jernigan, 
2011). Both industries use the same neoliberal discourse that the consumption of 
these products is a matter of personal choice and ‘nanny state’ governments 
should not interfere in such a fundamental human right (Brownell & Warner, 
2009; Hoek, 2015). 
Not only are the strategies similar, but studies have uncovered covert alliances 
between the two industries that have the aim to change policy that affects these 
industries negatively (Jiang & Ling, 2013). Additionally, shared board 
representation in both alcohol and cigarette companies provide opportunities to 
learn from each other and to discuss and share approaches and strategies. For 
example, Philip Morris (tobacco) owned one of the largest alcohol companies 
Miller Brewing for over 30 years, and Altria (parent company of Philip Morris) is 
now a major shareholder of the largest transnational alcohol company AB InBev. 
Their board is represented by past and present Altria executives (Anheuser-Busch 
InBev, 2018a). 
There are only a few differences between these industries, mainly in their 
company makeup. All legal tobacco and most alcohol products are produced by a 
few major global companies. However, in Australia, there also exist a large 
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number of independent alcohol companies, such as wineries, brewers, and 
distilleries. Hence, marketing regulation of these industries will require different 
forms of monitoring and enforcement. However, the two industries and their 
products are comparable in terms of harm, and it is likely that these industries 
have informed each other on strategies to delay effective regulation. 
2.10.12 What works for Tobacco? 
Tobacco policy research has shown that comprehensive mandatory restrictions on 
tobacco marketing work to reduce marketing exposure (Harris et al., 2006) and 
tobacco consumption levels (Saffer & Chaloupka, 2000). In Australia, tobacco 
marketing restrictions have also led to a massive reduction in smoking rates and 
have contributed to the ‘denormalisation’ of smoking in Australia (Chapman & 
Freeman, 2008). Comprehensive and effective regulatory frameworks for alcohol 
marketing may have the same effect on society’s perception of what levels of 
consumption are acceptable (Chisholm et al., 2018), and could assist in reducing 
the social and psychological availability of alcohol. 
The main alcohol marketing code (ABAC) is an industry-run, voluntary code that 
primarily addresses the content of marketing, which allows for loopholes and 
exceptions. Contrarily, Article 13 of the WHO’s Framework Convention for 
Tobacco Control (FCTC) requires parties to undertake a mandatory and 
comprehensive tobacco marketing ban, including cross-border marketing and all 
forms of advertising, promotion and sponsorship (WHO, 2013). Additionally, the 
FCTC guidelines recommend that “responsible entities should be defined widely, 
covering the entire marketing chain” (Organization, 2013, p. 107). Further, the 
guidelines recommend ‘actively monitoring by an independent agency’ and 
having effective, ‘proportionate’ enforcement strategies in place. These criteria 




when it has the opportunity (Hiilamo & Glantz, 2017) and only actively enforced 
(comprehensive) bans reduce public awareness of tobacco marketing (Yong et al., 
2008). 
Changes in tobacco marketing regulation in Australia happened incrementally and 
over a long period of time, despite public concern and significant efforts from the 
public health community. The delays can be attributed to powerful pushback from 
industry, which included strategies such as denial of harm caused by the product, 
self-regulatory efforts, dilution of scientific evidence, and a great deal of 
corporate political activity, such as lobbying. This took place during a political 
time favourable to industry commercial interest and when ideas of non-
interference by the government were dominant. 
Similarly, while the benefits of alcohol marketing legislation in reducing alcohol-
related harm in individuals and society are evident for public health researchers 
and advocates, the government is reluctant to ban alcohol marketing at this time, 
especially because of a powerful industry push for profit-making. The incremental 
progress from voluntary to mandatory marketing codes in tobacco highlights that 
practical strategies and alternative regulatory options should be explored to 
advance alcohol marketing regulation. 
2.11 Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this literature review has shown that harmful 
consumption of alcohol is a significant issue in Australia and that this is driven by 
the physical, economic, social, and psychological availability of alcohol. One of 
the forces behind social and psychological availability is exposure to alcohol 
marketing, which likely influences behaviour through individual heuristic 
processing pathways, and through establishing and maintaining social norms 
	 47 
favourable to drinking. Further, alcohol studies provide significant evidence for 
the impact of alcohol marketing on alcohol consumption levels in young people 
and other vulnerable populations. While marketing restrictions can be a very 
effective measure to reduce exposure levels and harm, the Australian alcohol 
marketing codes do not sufficiently protect the population from harm, which is 
consistent with the international research (Casswell & Maxwell, 2005; Noel & 
Babor, 2017; PAHO, 2016). However, the government is reluctant to legislate 
alcohol marketing at this point in time. Instead, the government endorses the 
industry’s self-regulatory scheme, despite: a) minors still being heavily exposed 
to alcohol marketing (Davoren & Sinclair, 2012; Pettigrew et al., 2012); b) 
substantial calls for increasing government involvement to strengthen regulation 
(ANPHA, 2014); c) evidence that self-regulatory alcohol codes all over the world 
are subject to under-interpretation and under-enforcement (Babor et al., 2010; 
King et al., 2010; Noel, Babor, & Robaina, 2017a); and, d) the success of 
marketing bans in reducing smoking. The decades-long battle between health 
advocates and the tobacco industry indicates a difficult journey ahead for the 
implementation of a more restrictive alcohol marketing framework in Australia. It 
also calls for an exploration of alternative solutions that increase government 
involvement and transparency, and enable effective monitoring and enforcement 
of a comprehensive alcohol marketing code. 
The next chapter builds on the material covered in this chapter, describes some of 
the main regulatory theories and concepts, and provides practical examples of 




Chapter 3 Regulation Theories and Practice 
1.1 Introduction 
Governments and civil society seek to regulate social and economic goods using 
either: 1) social regulation which tries to avert, for example, environmental 
catastrophe, ill health in mines, or adverse effects of tobacco marketing, and seeks 
to achieve social justice and inclusion for the disadvantaged groups; or 2) 
economic regulation that tries to extensively curb monopolies and promote 
competition (Parker & Nielsen, 2011). This thesis focuses on social regulation 
and adopts the view that alcohol marketing regulation can be used to increase 
people’s freedom of domination from the influence of alcohol corporations (Pettit, 
2015), to reduce the social and psychological availability of alcohol, and 
ultimately reduce alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harm. 
In this chapter, I will explore alternatives to legislation that are likely to improve 
current ineffective alcohol marketing regulation. First, I will introduce the 
definitions, roles and component of regulation, and describe which actors can be 
involved. Then I will describe options on the regulatory continuum, from laissez-
faire on one end to ‘explicit’ government regulation on the other hand. Next, I 
will give an overview of business compliance with rules, including motivations 
and organisation characters, and how this should guide the selection of regulatory 
instruments.  
The chapter will also explain the Responsive Regulation theory and critiques of 
the theory and will conclude by presenting the Responsive Regulation pyramid 
for alcohol marketing proposed by the National Preventative Health Taskforce.  
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3.1 What is regulation?  
Regulation has different meanings and purposes within different theoretical 
perspectives, in different research areas, political streams, governments, and 
businesses (Levi-Faur, 2010). For right-winged politicians, for example, 
regulation can be equal to the heavy hand of authority that limits and constrains 
individuals’ and business’ freedoms. However, left-winged politicians might see 
regulation as a tool in risk management that can prevent corruption and protect 
the public from corporate interests. For legal scholars, regulation is seen as a legal 
instrument, while social scientists study this phenomenon as a form of social 
control (Levi-Faur, 2010).  
In the era of the welfare state (approximately 1940s-1970s), governance by states 
was about the provision, distribution, and steering (regulating) of services and 
goods (Levi-Faur, 2005). The governance literature at that time exclusively 
coupled regulation with governments (state-centred) and law-based government 
interventions, backed by criminal sanctions (Black, 2001). In the 1980s, 
neoliberalist ideas of privatisation, individualism, and the retreat of the welfare 
state made its entry in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) member states’ politics, including in Australia 
(Braithwaite, 2008; Scott, 2017). While these governments have deregulation 
agendas, studies show that, paradoxically, regulation has increased exponentially 
worldwide since the 1980s, including in all the ‘neoliberal’ countries (Levi-Faur, 
2005). Regulatory scholars now largely agree that this era is one of ‘regulatory 
capitalism’, because regulation accompanied and enabled capitalism (Braithwaite, 
2008; Drahos, 2017). In the current era, governments’ roles have shifted away 
from ‘rowing’ (providing and distribution) towards an emphasis on ‘steering’ 




‘responsibilisation’ of businesses to self-regulate and to achieve policy objectives, 
and by decentred regulation and plural networks of regulation (Parker & Nielsen, 
2009a). The latter means that regulatory roles are divided between different actors 
such as government, businesses, industry associations, civil society, and 
international organisations (e.g. World Health Organization). Additionally, 
regulatory roles – such as sources of control, monitoring, and enforcement – are 
now more complex and increasingly fragmented (Black, 2001; Gunningham, 
2009; Scott, 2004). Thus, the current definition of regulation includes now both 
traditional ‘hard’ law (reliance on government authority and resources) and ‘soft 
law’ (reliance on participation and resources from non-state actors to construct, 
operate, and implement government arrangements) (Kirton & Trebilcock, 2004). 
A broad definition of regulation proposed by Levi-Faur encompasses the above: 
“Regulation is the promulgation of prescriptive rules as well as the monitoring 
and enforcement of these rules by social, business and political actors on other 
social, business and political actors” (Levi-Faur, 2010). 
Hence, regulation does not only include rules and standards, but also encompasses 
monitoring and evaluation of performance, and enforcement of these rules. The 
sections below describe why monitoring and evaluation are necessary, which type 
of data could be included, and what approaches to data collection are available. 
The subsequent section outlines different enforcement approaches and techniques 
that can be utilised.  
3.1.1 Monitoring and evaluation 
The World Bank provides a clear distinction between monitoring and evaluation; 
Monitoring is “tracking the key elements of programme performance on a regular 
basis (inputs, activities, results)”, whereas evaluation is “the episodic assessment 
of the change in targeted results that can be attributed to the programme/project 
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intervention” (World Bank, 2007, p. 4). They are both central to all regulations, 
but essential when there are risks involved and non-compliance can have adverse 
outcomes (Hood, Rothstein, & Baldwin, 2001). 
Subsequently, mechanisms should be in place to evaluate goals and to track key 
performance indicators5 (KPIs) and benchmarks6 to feedback into the system and 
trigger action (e.g. through enforcement) (Scott, 2004).  
KPIs can be evaluated at different levels for example, the WHO differentiates 
between: 1) process indicators, which measure the actions required to develop and 
implement a policy; 2) outputs, which are the immediate results of that policy; 
and 3) outcomes, which are the longer-term effects that the policy was designed 
to deliver (WHO, 2012, p. 44). Gathering of this data can also be performed using 
three different types of approaches: 1) pro-active, whereby information is sought 
out and assembled and the environment is scanned; 2) reactive, whereby is relied 
on others to come forward with information (e.g. whistle-blowers or public 
complaints); and 3) interactive, which is in between active and reactive and 
happens typically through regulators imposing periodic reporting and auditing 
(Hood et al., 2001). 
3.1.2 Enforcement  
Enforcement in regulation is also a term that can have different definitions. A 
simple version is the prosecution of those in breach of rules (Baldwin, Scott, & 
Hood, 1998). However, prosecution is expensive and governments often lack the 
recourses to prosecute every non-compliance case (Baldwin et al., 1998). 
                                                
5  KPIs are related to the overarching goals and specify what, how and when it should be measured (Outdoor 
Media Association Inc., 2011); 
6 A benchmark is “a standard or point of reference against which things may be compared” (Application 




Therefore, Baldwin et al. explain, regulatory enforcement often consists of a 
broader range of techniques or a hierarchy of sanctions which are used to respond 
to non-compliance, such as education, advising, warnings, and finally 
prosecution. There are two types of enforcement approaches: compliance and 
deterrence (Reiss, 1984). Although both approaches are intended to prevent non-
compliance with regulation, compliance systems are often pre-monitory and try to 
induce conformity by, e.g. use of education and rewards, and deterrence systems 
are post-monitory and impose penalties on the companies or persons that breach 
the rules (Hawkins & Thomas, 1984). 
3.2 Regulatory options 
There are multiple instruments of regulation that are tailored to different policy 
issues, and the regulatory design is at the core of the success of reaching 
overarching objectives. Regulation can be state-centred and law-based, also 
defined as ‘explicit government regulation’ (PM&C, 2014). However, there are 
also multiple other regulatory options that include different levels of engagement 
with the regulatee and or other parties. These alternatives are highly prevalent and 
will play an even larger role in the future of Australian regulation (PM&C, 2014). 
3.2.1 Legislation or ‘explicit government regulation’ 
According to the Australian Government, explicit government regulation is 
comprised of primary and subordinate legislation. It is “usually used as a 
regulatory tool where there is high perceived risk or public interest and achieving 
compliance is seen as critically important” (PM&C, 2014, p. 29). With its clear 
standards and adequate monitoring and enforcement, it should be relatively 
straightforward to identify breaches and enforce the law (Levi-Faur, 2010). In 
circumstances where, for example, firms are readily identifiable and accessible 
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(large companies), explicit government regulation can be very successful (Levi-
Faur, 2010). However, this form of regulation has been criticised for being rigid, 
economically inefficient and expensive and therefore leads to a decrease in 
competitiveness and innovation (Gunningham, Grabosky, & Sinclair, 1998). 
Regulatory agencies often lack resources for optimal monitoring and enforcement 
and therefore fail to pose a credible deterrent threat (Gunningham et al., 1998). 
Other critiques are that explicit government regulation has the tendency to 
continually expand the number of rules and increase complexity in existing rules 
to cover loopholes – also called the ‘regulatory ratchet effect’ (Bardach & Kagan, 
1982). This can lead to a loss of understanding by companies on how to comply 
(Parker, 2002b); it can subsequently lead to regulatees’ resentment, and therefore 
non-compliance or ‘creative compliance’ (Levi-Faur, 2010). Additionally, 
knowledge gaps between regulators and industry, due to lack of communication, 
can limit the effectiveness of command and control regulation. Finally, the use of 
overly legalistic regulation does not encourage companies to improve these 
standards (Gunningham et al., 1998). 
3.2.2 Decentred regulatory approaches 
In many areas of governance, explicit government regulation is deemed not 
effective enough. To deal with its weaknesses, a plethora of decentred hybrid 
approaches to regulation has been developed that include different levels of 
engagement with business and other stakeholders (Levi-Faur, 2010). The term 
self-regulation is often used to describe a wide scope of arrangements. In the early 
2000s, self-regulation most commonly involved industry-level organisations 
setting rules and standards for companies within their own industry (Gunningham 
et al., 1998). However, contradictory to what the term implies, self-regulation 




Vass, 2005; Price & Verhulst, 2005) or industry, state and/or civil society (Levi-
Faur, 2010). 
Several authors have suggested placing self-regulation on a continuum, where 
explicit government regulation is on one end of the scale and laissez-faire (market 
mechanism) on the other (Price & Verhulst, 2005; Priest, 1997; Rubinstein, 2010; 
Sinclair, 1997). Self-regulation falls somewhere in the middle and, depending on 
the level of government intervention, it will sit more towards one end or the other. 
To be able to discriminate between the different forms of ‘self-regulation’, Rees 
suggested three types: 1) Pure self-regulation, without government interference in 
the writing, monitoring, and enforcing of regulation; 2) Mandated self-regulation, 
whereby the government requires businesses or industry to establish controls over 
own behaviour. However, details and enforcement are left up to the industry, 
subject to government approval and oversight. Finally; 3) mandated partial self-
regulation, whereby businesses are responsible either for some of the rules or the 
enforcement, but with over-riding regulatory specifications being mandated by 
the government (Rees, 1988). 
Another classification is adopted by the Australian Government, and the 
regulatory spectrum between ‘no regulation’ and ‘legislation’ includes: 1) Self-
regulation, whereby the industry of sector itself sets up and enforces rules to 
regulate the behaviour of business; 2) Quasi-regulation, which “covers a wide 
range of rules or arrangements that are not part of explicit government 
regulation, but nevertheless seek to influence the behaviour of businesses”, this 
includes industry codes that are co-developed with government; and 3) Co-
regulation, which is defined as: “a solution where industry develops and 
administers its own arrangement and government provides the underpinning 
legislation to enforce it. Such legislation can set out mandatory standards, but 
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may provide for enforcement through a code overseen by the industry” (PM&C, 
2014, p. 28). 
The sections below describe reasons for governments and industries to adopt 
hybrid forms of regulation, and the conditions for success and best practice of 
effective regulation. Note that plenty of reports and papers included below refer to 
the non-legislative options with industry involvement as ‘self-regulation’. 
3.2.2.1 Reasons for adopting non-legislative options 
In theory, these decentred non-legislative options offer greater speed, flexibility, 
sensitivity, and efficiency than explicit government regulation (Black, 2001). 
Industry engagement could lead to the development of more practical standards 
because they are tailor-based on knowledge and expertise in the field (Michael, 
1995). Additionally, codes of practice would be consistent with the business’ 
goals; hence compliance would be less costly (Michael, 1995). Self-regulation is 
said to utilise peer pressure for companies to comply with the rules and to 
internalise responsible conduct, which could raise ethical standards (Gunningham 
& Rees, 1997).  
For the government, alternative regulatory approaches can be attractive as they 
are perceived as a cheaper and quicker to establish, or as they can guide 
development of future legislation (Bryden, Petticrew, Mays, Eastmure, & Knai, 
2013). Additionally, it can also be the result of industry pressure on the 
government (Bryden et al., 2013). On the other hand, reasons for adopting self-
regulatory codes by an industry could be: 1) a mandate by the state; 2) an attempt 
to avoid government regulation; 3) to supplement or implement legislation; or 4) 
because of concerns raised by the public (Campbell, 1999). A more recent OECD 




of: 1) expected reputational benefits with government or public; and 2) the level 
playing field (competition) it can provide (OECD, 2015a). 
Similarly, alcohol and tobacco research found that self-regulation of marketing 
has been adopted as part of a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategy to 
delay or avoid effective statutory regulation by elevating their reputation and 
credibility to one of a responsible industry (Noel, Lazzarini, Robaina, & 
Vendrame, 2017b; Yoon & Lam, 2013). CSR gives these industries access to 
politicians and policymakers and increases opportunities to steer policies towards 
industry-desirable policies (Fooks et al., 2011). 
While decentred options are preferred by the Australian Government (PM&C, 
2014) and in theory may have many benefits over sluggish explicit government 
regulation. In practice, however, the effectiveness of self-regulation varies greatly 
between industries and has the reputation that it serves the industry rather than the 
public’s interest (Gunningham et al., 1998). Additionally, critics say that self-
regulation generally lacks transparency, credibility, and accountability 
(Rubinstein, 2010) and that self-regulatory standards are often weak, as is their 
enforcement with mild punishments carried out in secret (Gunningham & Rees, 
1997). 
3.2.2.2 Conditions for success of non-legislative options 
Despite the bad reputation of self-regulation, it can work in policy areas where 
goals of government, industry, and consumers are aligned (OECD, 2015a). 
Successful examples are the Forest Stewardship Council and the Marine Fisheries 
Council, which were both established because sustainable levels of these natural 
resources support business in the long term (Sharma, Teret, & Brownell, 2010). 
However, when there is a gap between public and private interest, Gunningham & 
Grabosky argue it is naïve to rely on private sectors to take steps towards the 
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public interest voluntarily, unless there is a strong outside pressure such as 
government intervention or concerns around credibility (Gunningham et al., 
1998). Other researchers recommend that to be able to implement self-regulation 
successfully an industry must have the expertise to monitor itself and to enforce 
and review decisions (Michael, 1995). Further, a code of practice should consist 
of relatively narrow rules related to output-based standards and decisions made 
must be reported on in a transparent manner (Michael, 1995). 
The Australian Government also recommends best practices for industry self-
regulation (Taskforce on Industry Self-regulation, 2000). Suggested elements of 
good practice include: 1) consultation between industry, consumers and 
government to help ensure that specific problems and social policy objectives are 
identified and addressed; 2) clarity in the schemes documentation to help industry 
understand their obligations and assist dispute schemes to interpret legal rights; 3) 
consumer awareness of schemes to ensure that consumers know where to lodge 
complaints; 4) an administrative body that identifies issues, collects data, 
monitors the scheme, enhances credibility and ensures that compliance costs are 
at an effective minimum level; 5) a complaints handling and dispute resolution 
mechanism to address breaches of standards; and 6) reviews and annual reporting 
to monitor the scheme and provide transparency. 
With public health and industry goals often not aligned, it is even more difficult to 
achieve effective interventions (Moodie et al., 2013). Sharma et al. propose a list 
of conditions for success (Table 3) based on self-regulatory successes and failures 
in the food industry and other industries (Sharma et al., 2010). Additionally, self-
regulation will fail to be effective when leading companies do not take part and 






Proposed standards for self-regulatory activities of the food industry 
Aim Standard 
Transparency • Transparent self-regulatory standards created by a 
combination of scientists (not paid by industry) and 
representatives of leading nongovernmental 
organizations, parties involved in global governance (e.g., 
World Health Organization, United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization), and industry. 





• Specific codes of acceptable behaviours based on 
scientifically justified criteria  




• Mandatory public reporting of adherence to codes, 
including progress toward achievement of full compliance 
with pledges and attainment of key benchmarks 
• Built-in and transparent procedures for outside parties to 
register objections to self-regulatory standards or their 
enforcement 
• Objective evaluation of self-regulatory benchmarks by 
credible outside groups not funded by industry to assess 
health, economic, and social outcomes 
• Periodic assessments/audits to determine compliance and 
outcomes 
Oversight • Possible oversight by an appropriate global regulatory or 
health body (e.g., World Health Organization) 
Note. Reprinted from Sharma, L. L., Teret, S. P., & Brownell, K. D. (2010). The food 
industry and self-regulation: Standards to promote success and to avoid public health 
failures. American Journal of Public Health, 100(2), 241.  
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In sum, there are many options and hybrids of regulation that are used as an 
alternative to explicit government regulation, and at the same time have more 
government controls in place than pure self-regulation. When designing 
regulation, it is, however, important to consider the underlying reasons for 
industry and government to adopt non-legislative decentred regulatory options 
and the conditions for success. The next section will demonstrate that it is also 
vital to consider business’ characteristics that can affect compliance with rules. 
3.3 Business compliance 
Regulation is based on the assumption that businesses can be made to comply and 
that regulation is effective at achieving its stated policy purposes (Parker & 
Nielsen, 2011). However, according to Parker & Nielsen, there are at least three 
factors that affect, interact, and can explain compliance: 1) the different motives 
of companies to respond to regulation in different ways; 2) the internal 
characteristics and capacities of business firms as organisations to respond to 
regulation; 3) and the influence of different regulatory enforcement strategies and 
styles on how firms respond to regulation. Information around these concepts can 
assist the design of regulation and help to identify appropriate monitoring 
techniques and enforcement strategies (Parker & Nielsen, 2017). All three 
concepts will now be explained in detail. 
3.3.1 Motivations for compliance 
The alcohol marketing literature often describes the non-cooperation and non-
compliance of the industry as a rational choice and a result of economic motives, 
the drive to earn more money and the responsibilities towards its shareholders 
(Donovan, Anwar McHenry, & Vines, 2014). According to the compliance 




committed to maximizing its own economic or material utility, that is, to expand 
the business, make (and sell) more products and services, earn more money and 
return a greater profit to its owners” (Parker & Nielsen, 2011, p. 10). When only 
economic motives are at play, Winter & May hypothesise that three factors have a 
role in bringing about compliance: 1) the likelihood of detection, compliance 
increases with the increased likelihood of detection of the violation; 2) the 
likelihood of fine, compliance increases when a stronger likelihood of receiving a 
fine for a violation is felt; and 3) the cost of compliance, compliance decreases as 
the costs of compliance increases (Winter & May, 2001). Other economic motives 
for non-compliance are sometimes seen at an individual level; e.g. Simpson and 
Piquero have shown that managers were more likely to break the rules when they 
perceived individual career benefits (Simpson & Piquero, 2002).  
However, there are additional compliance motives, such as social and normative 
motives. Social motives are described by Parker & Nielsen as “the extent to 
which the firm is committed to earning the approval and respect of significant 
people with whom an actor interacts including other businesses, trading partners, 
employees, customers, local communities, the wider public, family and friends” 
(Parker & Nielsen, 2011, p. 11). As social expectations are important precursors 
in this process and can be shaped by the regulators, regular interaction between 
regulator and regulatee is important (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). Maintaining the 
image of being a Corporate Social Responsible (CSR) industry or company and 
avoiding reputational damage could be additional ‘social’ motivators to comply 
with current alcohol marketing regulation (van Erp, 2011).  
Normative motives have been described as “the extent to which the individual or 
business accepts the specific policy goal of the specific regulatory regime and 
obligation under consideration. That is, they can see that it is aimed at effectively 
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addressing an issue that they agree would be a problem if it were not regulated” 
(Parker & Nielsen, 2017, p. 223). It can also refer to the perceived legitimacy of 
the law and enforcement authority (Tyler, 2006) or perceived level of crime 
seriousness that influences the company’s choice to break the law (Simpson & 
Rorie, 2011). For example, protecting human life is likely to be prioritised over 
bureaucratic rules (Simpson & Rorie, 2011). Where social motives are pursued 
because others see them as desirable, normative motives are accepted and 
internalised (Parker & Nielsen, 2011). 
According to Parker & Nielsen, when determining regulatory policy and 
enforcement mechanism, it is important to establish the main drivers of 
compliance. If normative motives are at play and certain acts of non-compliance 
are regarded as unethical, businesses or industries might voluntarily comply with 
the rules, and economic considerations become irrelevant (Simpson & Rorie, 
2011). However, if economic motivations have the upper hand, then large fines 
might be necessary to ensure compliance; whereas with social motivations, the 
threat of public discredit following breaching the law might be enough (Parker & 
Nielsen, 2011). 
3.3.2 Organisational capacity to comply 
The next condition that can explain or affect compliance is the capacity for an 
organisation to do so. Low levels of compliance can in some cases be related to a 
lack of interaction with the regulator (Gray & Silbey, 2011) or to a lack of 
internal expertise or knowledge, which might be remedied by training or 
replacing employees, managers or board members (Braithwaite, Healy, & Dwan, 
2005). Sometimes the level of economic resources determines the capacity to 




larger businesses are better able to implement compliance systems and to promote 
these systems through management. 
3.3.3 Enforcement styles and compliance 
Enforcement of regulation is essential in generating and assuring compliance as it 
communicates regulatory norms, which over time could lead to acceptance and 
internalisation of these norms by the industry or company (Kagan, Gunningham, 
& Thornton, 2011). The authors suggest that if there is a sufficient level of 
monitoring and legal sanctions, enforcement will increase compliance through the 
fear of penalties. However, when the company already has a pre-existing 
internalised commitment to comply, enforcement can function as a reminder. This 
function is meaningful as enforcement officials find that most regulatory 
violations emanate from inattention or errors rather than deception or negligence 
(Kagan et al., 2011). Enforcement often has a reassurance function for the 
majority of rule-abiding businesses (Thornton, Gunningham, & Kagan, 2005). 
They acknowledge that rules have sanctions and will be enforced, and therefore 
enforcement reassures that competitors, who have not invested in compliance and 
therefore will have a competitive advantage, will be caught (Thornton et al., 
2005). The effectiveness of the regulatory enforcement is affected by other 
contextual factors, such as the visibility of violations to the public (Kagan, 1989). 
3.4 Responsive Regulation Theory 
Regulation and governance researchers are interested in how to design regulation 
most effectively in order to achieve public goals. One well-known and influential 
example is the Responsive Regulation theory (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992), which 
was developed as a practical pathway for social justice and social change in an era 
of deregulation (Parker, 2013). The authors were unimpressed by the results from 
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going back and forwards between the views of two regulatory streams (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992): Top-down approach by ‘old governance’ systems and the 
radical deregulation approach by ‘new governance’ systems – and their 
accompanying enforcement styles (Abbott & Snidal, 2013). The first sees 
regulatees as ‘rational actors’ that need to be punished for their non-compliance, 
which is called the deterrence approach (Murphy, 2004). The second stream is the 
accommodative or compliance style, which sees regulatees as ‘social actors’ who 
can be persuaded, partly because of their belief in the law and partly for long-term 
self-interest. During long economic booms, there is usually more persuasion, 
while in times of crisis punitivists gets the upper hand (Ayres & Braithwaite, 
1992).  
Research shows that punishment and the feeling of unreasonable regulator 
behaviour can foster resistance among the regulatees and a culture of knowledge 
sharing between businesses regarding legal resistance (Bardach & Kagan, 1982). 
In addition, this approach, whereby a lot of inspections and legal actions are 
required, is costly for both regulator and regulatee (Kagan et al., 2011). 
Accommodative approaches and persuasion, on the other hand, have been found 
to be relatively inexpensive, because the regulatee is more cooperative and 
compliance is more likely to improve (Braithwaite & Makkai, 1994). Ayres and 
Braithwaite acknowledged, however, that it would be naïve to think that all 
individuals and industry bodies are honest and that a purely accommodative 
approach would work (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). Therefore, the authors 
proposed an approach that is a hybrid of both ‘command-and-control’ and 





The problem of when to punish and when to persuade was addressed by the 
development of two hierarchal enforcement pyramids: A Pyramid of Regulatory 
Strategies and a Pyramid of Sanctions (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). The 
regulatory pyramid presents several regulatory instruments with an increasing 
degree of state involvement and was aimed at the regulation of an entire industry 
(see Figure 3). The pyramid of sanctions can be used when enforcing rules in 
single companies. This pyramid has been expanded by Braithwaite and colleagues 
into a model with two complementary pyramids, one of supports (to expand on 
companies’ strengths) and one of sanctions (Dukes, Braithwaite, & Moloney, 
2014) (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 3. Pyramid of regulatory strategies. From Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
deregulation debate (p. 39), by Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, Oxford University Press, USA. 
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Figure 4. Enforcement pyramids of supports and sanctions. From Pharmaceuticals, corporate 
crime and public health (p. 289), by Dukes, G., Braithwaite, J., & Moloney, J. P., 2014, 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 
The authors suggest always to start at the bottom of both these pyramids, as this is 
the cheaper and more respectful option which needs to be tried initially in order to 
save money and to preserve a certain amount of freedom. The more legitimate 
and fair regulation is perceived to be, the more likely it is that people and 
organisations are compliant (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). However, when it is 
clear the current form of regulation fails, this should result in moving up in the 
‘regulatory pyramid’ towards harsher sanctions or regulatory strategies with more 
government ‘interventionism’ and oversight. 
The theory holds that the regulator needs to be perceived by the regulatee as a 
‘benign big gun’; The regulator projects an image of an invincible regulator, who 




(Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite et al., 2005). The prospects of more 
intervention will more likely lead to compliance at the lower levels of regulation. 
Nonetheless, in particular when dealing with companies that are motivated by 
economic gain, it is crucial that threats are followed by action, as they will exploit 
the system’s weaknesses in the absence of enforcement (Sparrow, 2000). 
Similarly, Parker comments that while Responsive Regulation is about fairness 
and forgiveness, a regulator should not be too complacent and should only settle 
when offenders show remorse and a real commitment to repair (Parker, 2006). 
The enforcement pyramids (more so the pyramid of sanctions) is the most well-
known aspect and most cited element of the Responsive Regulation theory 
(Parker, 2013). It has been implemented worldwide and has been applied in 
various private and public governance areas in many areas (Ivec & Braithwaite, 
2015). For some examples, please refer to Appendix B. 
However, the theory includes other important tools to achieve effective 
regulation, such as ‘enforced self-regulation’, whereby the state oversees 
businesses and business associations in regulating themselves. Enforced self-
regulation was developed as a measure against industry abuse of the privilege of 
self-regulation (Braithwaite, 2017), and has been further developed by other 
regulatory scholars into, for example, meta-regulation (Grabosky, 1995; Parker, 
2002a). Meta-regulation is regulation of self-regulation; while the government 
does not set specific prescriptive rules, it scrutinises the companies’ internal 
control and management systems and determines if they have the capacity to meet 
the regulatory objectives (Grabosky, 2017; Parker, 2002a). This can, for example, 
be achieved through ‘triple loop’ evaluation (Figure 5) in which companies are 
forced to evaluate and report on their own outcomes and to review and revise 
management practices, which then feeds back into the overarching goals and 
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regulatory strategies (Parker, 2002a). Parker also emphasises the need for 
inclusion of third-party regulators in meta-regulation. 
 
Figure 5. ‘Triple loop’ evaluation of self-regulation. From Meta-regulation: The regulation 
of self-regulation (p. 278), by C. Parker (Ed.), The Open Corporation: Effective Self-
regulation and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Similarly, Ayers and Braithwaite recommended the inclusion of third parties to 
hold the regulatory partners to account and to avoid regulatory capture and 
corruption, which they called ‘tripartism’ (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; 
Braithwaite, 2011). Braithwaite suggests that public interest groups should be 
given a seat at the policy table and a monitoring role (Braithwaite, 2011). 
3.4.1 Critiques and responses to Responsive Regulation 
While the Responsive Regulation theory has been widely applied by scholars and 
practitioners, and has assisted them to look further than the dichotomy of 
deterrence and compliance approaches and to find creative policy solutions 
(Parker, 2013), the theory has also received many critiques over the years, of 
which the most prominent ones are discussed here. However, some of these 
critiques came forth from a focus on the pyramid and the disregard of the other 




Some scholars have argued that the Responsive Regulation theory is built on the 
assumption that the state is strong and resourceful and that it has the ability to 
move up to the apex of the pyramid and implement and enforce legislation to 
secure the desired regulatory outcomes (Scott, 2004). According to Scott, the 
regulatory law is rarely within the control of a single regulatory unit, and other 
non-state interest groups, especially powerful businesses, may influence the 
interpretation and application of regulatory legislation. Thus, he argued, 
Responsive Regulation would not work where weak regulators operate. 
Smart regulation was developed in 1998 with the aim to find a solution for this 
problem and to make it more ‘holistic’ by increasing focus on third-party 
regulators (Gunningham et al., 1998). Like Scott, the authors argued that the 
Responsive Regulation pyramid is too ‘state-centric’ and does not accommodate 
enough for the current growth of non-state actor involvement in regulation and 
the withdrawal of that state. Hence, they suggested a pyramid that is built up of 
three sides of regulators: 1) first-party, which is the government; 2) second-
parties, which are businesses as self-regulators; and 3) third-parties, which 
includes both commercial and non-commercial organisations. Escalation of 
enforcement could go up one of each side or around to a different side or 
regulator (Gunningham et al., 1998). However, with more non-state actors 
involved, the risk of lack of accountability rises (Grabosky, 2013) and evaluation 
will become more complicated (Baldwin & Black, 2008).  
In the original theory of responsive regulation, Ayers & Braithwaite emphasised 
that non-state regulators are important regulators in their own right and that third-
parties should have input in regulation (tripartism) (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). 
The Responsive Regulation theory has more recently evolved to incorporated 
‘networked’ responsiveness (Braithwaite, 2017), which was developed by Drahos 
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(Drahos, 2004) (see Appendix C). This allows for lateral movement in the 
pyramid and incorporates partners (e.g. civil society) in creative regulatory 
solutions before moving up the pyramid (Braithwaite, 2008). 
The intention of Responsive Regulation was to provide practical solutions for 
regulators, but at the same time to be sensitive to social justice issues by holding 
both regulator and regulatee to account (Parker, 2013). Some regulatory scholars 
have argued that in practice, the focus has been on compliance, technical aspects 
and design of regulation (Mascini, 2013; Vincent-Jones, 2002). They assert that 
therefore the bigger picture of normative issues is ignored and that the theory 
should be more responsive to social contexts. Braithwaite has also acknowledged 
that in practice this has happened and calls it the ‘normative narrowing of 
responsive regulation’ (Braithwaite, 2013a, p. 128). He warns that this selective 
implementation of his theory is dangerous, as it can give an impetus to 
deregulation. Therefore, it is important that social values inform the regulatory 
design (Vincent-Jones, 2002), which can be ensured by including a wide range of 
stakeholders (Parker, 2002b). 
Baldwin and Black also build upon the Responsive Regulation theory but criticise 
it for its focus on ensuring compliance instead of finding out why compliance 
falls short of objectives (Baldwin & Black, 2008). Their ‘Really Responsive 
Regulation’ theory suggests that regulators should not only be responsive to the 
compliance performance of the regulatee, but also to the ‘attitudinal settings’ and 
broader contexts that shape companies’ responses. For example, regulators should 
take into account motivational postures (social signs), like the commitment to the 
regulatory objectives, capitulation to the regulatory authority, resistance, game 
playing, and disengagement (Baldwin & Black, 2008). Additionally, the authors 




performance in achieving objectives, and that regulatory strategies have to be 
adapted according to failure and changes in regulatory priorities, circumstances, 
and objective (Baldwin & Black, 2008). Since then, Braithwaite has suggested 
that the Responsive Regulation theory aims to be reflective and to improve on a 
system continuously by evaluating what worked well and what aspect failed, and 
why (Braithwaite, 2011). Baldwin and Black have also argued that step-by-step 
escalation up the pyramid may not be appropriate in every situation (Baldwin & 
Black, 2008), such as when potentially catastrophic risks are being controlled 
(e.g. nuclear plant). The Responsive Regulation theory also acknowledges that in 
case of extreme urgency, moving straight to the top is justified (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992). 
3.5 NPHT regulatory pyramid for alcohol 
In 2008, the National Preventative Health Taskforce was given the task by the 
Minister for Health and Ageing to develop the National Preventative Health 
Strategy, focusing initially on obesity, tobacco and excessive consumption of 
alcohol, “with the direct intention of reaching the goal of Australia being the 
healthiest nation by 2020” (NPHT, 2009a, p. v). The Strategy was directed at 
primary prevention and placed substantial emphasis on the use of Responsive 
Regulation to strengthen alcohol marketing regulation. The reports stated that 
with the use of the proposed pyramid (see Figure 1), “the effectiveness of the 
voluntary codes that are in place can now be monitored and shifted to ‘harder’ 
mechanisms if they are found to be ineffective” (p. 58). 
The pyramid consisted of four layers, moving up when external monitoring shows 
no significant improvements in compliance. At the bottom of the pyramid market 
mechanisms are found, which was translated as: no restrictions on marketing 
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promotions, other than existing laws and codes. The second level up is self-
regulation, which consists of voluntary participation, no or minimal penalties and 
some benchmarking. The next level up is co-regulation (or regulated self-
regulation), which is a co-designed system, that requires mandatory participation, 
target and benchmark setting and monitoring and reporting. The last proposed 
level is full government regulation and enforcement. Tobacco marketing 
regulation is, for example, at this level. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this era of neoliberal ideology and regulatory capitalism, regulating 
(rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement) is less often done just by government, 
but is now often decentred and can involve a variety or a combination of groups, 
such as governments, business, and third-party or civil regulators (e.g. NGOs). 
Additionally, scholars show that business’ compliance with regulation can be 
affected by economic, social, and normative motivations; the capacity of 
businesses in terms of finances or expertise; and monitoring techniques (e.g. pro-
active, reactive, or interactive) and enforcement styles (compliance and deterrence 
styles) used by regulators. 
Ayres and Braithwaite recognised the challenge of fragmented and complex 
regulatory designs to achieve public goals and developed the Responsive 
Regulation theory to address this. Its hierarchal regulatory pyramid offers 
regulators alternative solutions to keep regulating at a distance (according to their 
deregulatory agenda), and at the same time, it enables them to increase industries’ 
accountability and compliance with regulatory standards and the public’s 
interests. The authors recommend starting at the bottom of the pyramid, as this is 




down the track. However, the regulator must portray an image of a ‘big benign 
gun’, and those regulated must believe in the ‘inexorability of sanctions’. Threats 
should be followed by escalation up the pyramid with increased levels of 
government intervention in case of failure of the system; otherwise, the industry 
will exploit the system’s weaknesses. The Responsive Regulation theory also 
includes regulatory strategies to prevent or reduce regulatory capture, such as 
‘enforced self-regulation’ (later developed into meta-regulation) and ‘tripartism’ 
(or third party involvement) in policy making, monitoring, and inducing 
compliance. 
The National Preventative Health Taskforce (NPHT) 2009 reports highlighted the 
failure of the mostly self-regulated alcohol marketing codes in Australia. The 
NPHT proposed the use of the Responsive Regulation theory and an 
accompanying regulatory pyramid to strengthen alcohol marketing regulation and 
as a more palatable regulatory option for government. The taskforce suggested 
increasing external monitoring and escalating up the regulatory pyramid 
incrementally when regulation fails to meet set benchmarks. The Responsive 
Regulation theory has not been applied to alcohol marketing in practice yet. This 
thesis will use the NPHT pyramid as a starting point for modifying and testing the 
applicability of Responsive Regulation in marketing regulation in Australia to 
reduce the psychological and social availability of alcohol. 
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Chapter 4 Research Design 
4.1 Introduction 
The evidence presented in Chapter 2 reported how alcohol marketing exposure is 
a significant contributing factor to harmful alcohol consumption in various 
populations. It also showed that marketing regulation has the potential to reduce 
alcohol’s social availability (or the degree of normative support for harmful 
drinking) and psychological availability (expectancies about alcohol use, drinker 
identity, lifestyle, response to marketing) (Babor et al., 2015; Robaina & Babor, 
2017) and can lead to gradual denormalisation of excessive alcohol consumption 
(Anderson et al., 2018; Nyborg et al., 2016). 
4.2 Research aim and objectives 
In this thesis, I aimed to explore the application and the refinement of the 
Responsive Regulation theory and the NPHT regulatory pyramid in the Australian 
alcohol marketing space regarding their effectiveness7 in reducing marketing 
impact, as part of efforts to reduce the psychological and social availability of 
alcohol and to prevent harmful consumption of alcohol in the population. 
I addressed the primary research question: To what extent can Responsive 
Regulation be applied as an alternative model to regulate alcohol marketing 
regulation in Australia to increase its effectiveness, as interpreted from a public 
health perspective?”.  
                                                
7 From here on, ‘Effective’ alcohol marketing regulation is defined as regulation that protects the public or 
certain sub-populations from the impact of alcohol marketing as part of efforts to prevent harmful 




Subsequently, I broke this down into distinct research objectives (RO): 
RO1: Identify stakeholders of alcohol marketing regulation and their roles in policy 
development; 
RO2 Explore overarching goals of alcohol marketing regulation and identify criteria 
for failing regulatory levels (e.g. benchmarks of direct and indirect outcomes); 
RO3 Identify the basic requirements for a responsive pyramid to induce effective 
alcohol marketing regulation; 
RO4 Investigate whether the regulatory levels of the pyramid proposed by the 
NPHT are appropriate for alcohol marketing regulation, and identify the 
regulatory design characteristics for each of the regulatory pyramid levels 
between ‘free market’ and ‘explicit government regulation’ (i.e. stakeholders’ 
roles and responsibilities, and compliance mechanisms); 
RO5 Identify barriers to the uptake of effective alcohol marketing regulation by the 
Australian Government; 
RO6 Propose a refined Responsive Regulation model of alcohol marketing for the 
Australian context. 
4.3 Research design 
4.3.1 Ontology, epistemology, and research paradigm 
Ontology refers to the nature of the world we investigate and the assumptions we 
make about reality, and epistemology refers to the creation of knowledge and 
what we consider acceptable knowledge (Neuman, 2014). I adopted a ‘critical 
realist ontology’ approach, which combines ontological realism (which accepts 
that there is a real world that exists beyond and independent of our perceptions 
and constructions) with epistemological constructivism (which suggests that facts 
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are constructed by people, rather than based on absolute facts) (Maxwell & 
Mittapalli, 2012). 
More specifically, I aligned this research with the ‘critical social science’ 
paradigm, which sets out to uncover underlying structures and distortions in 
social practices to empower people to create social change (Neuman, 2014; 
Schwandt, 2015). The intention behind this research was to reveal power 
structures between government and alcohol industry and to provide a tool to 
improve on the effectiveness of alcohol marketing regulation as a part of multiple 
efforts to reduce the social and psychological availability of alcohol in Australia.  
4.3.2 Purpose of research 
This research was of both exploratory and descriptive nature (Neuman, 2014). 
The problems of alcohol marketing impact and ineffective regulation are well 
defined in the literature. The purpose of this thesis was to increase knowledge 
about the application of Responsive Regulation in alcohol marketing in Australia. 
I achieved this by describing how the current regulatory framework can be 
improved, by exploring the fundamental conditions and characteristics for a 
refined regulatory pyramid, and by identifying barriers to policy change. 
4.3.3 Research strategy 
Based on prior research and in consultation with my supervisory team, I 
considered a qualitative research design to be most appropriate in this research 
because it allows for in-depth exploration of research questions, flexible data 
collection and analysis, and it assists in understanding multiple stakeholder views 
and developing theories (Mason, 2002). As the focus of the research questions 
was on a complex, contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 2014), and as there was a 




formation (Flyvbjerg, 2006), this thesis adopted an in-depth single case study 
design. There are multiple strengths of this type of study; for example, it can 
capture details of complex issues and at the same time identify which concepts are 
essential and which are not (Neuman, 2014). It can also provide a holistic 
perception of the case investigated and reveal social processes and mechanisms of 
influence (Neuman, 2014). Finally, case studies can be useful when constructing 
concepts (Neuman, 2014), and aids revision of theories on essential points 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). Some researchers have suggested that there are limitations to 
case study research (that are also inherent to qualitative research), such as the 
difficulty to replicate the research and generalise findings to other settings, which 
prevents the development of predictive theories (Dogan & Pelassy, 1990). 
However, Flyvbjerg challenges this by suggesting that in social inquiry, case 
study research is more valuable, as the social reality is fluid and context-
dependent (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 224). 
The selection of methods was problem driven, rather than prioritised by 
methodology (Brewer & Hunter, 2011). Additionally, it was influenced by limited 
access to data sources and time restrictions inherent to the nature of a PhD 
candidature. To obtain information about a complex issue with multiple players, 
such as alcohol marketing regulation, and within the time frame a PhD allows for, 
I chose to conduct ‘expert interviews’ in Study 1. Expert interviews have 
previously been described as ‘crystallisation points’ for knowledge, which offers 
researchers a means to quickly obtain high-quality results (Bogner, Littig, & 
Menz, 2009, p. 2). A focus group of experts was also considered, however, the 
time constraints that busy people usually face ruled out this approach. To be able 
to compare alcohol industry responses in Study 1, I selected an additional data 
source for Study 2, publicly available industry submissions to the government 
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agency ANPHA, and conducted a thematic analysis. Public health researchers see 
these industry submissions as a form of Corporate Political Activity (CPA), which 
is used by the alcohol industry to influence policy in favour of corporations 
(Hillman et al., 2004; Jernigan, 2011).  
Figure 6 provides an overview of how the two methods related to research 
objectives (RO) 1 to 5, and how they assisted in answering the primary research 
question and in the development of a refined pyramid model of alcohol marketing 
(RO6), which is discussed and presented in Chapter 7. 
 






























In Study 1, I investigated RO1 to RO5 by conducting semi-structured expert 
interviews. The study explored themes around stakeholder involvement and 
interaction during alcohol marketing policy development and the design of the 
regulatory pyramid (RO1). It also explored topics around responsibility and 
accountability of the stakeholders and discussed the objectives of alcohol 
marketing regulation (RO2 and RO3). Further, this study delved into the 
applicability of Responsive Regulation in this area and aimed to identify essential 
governance characteristics for each pyramid level (RO4). Finally, Study 1 tried to 
pinpoint barriers to uptake (RO5). The results and discussion of these research 
objectives will be presented in Chapter 5. 
In Study 2 I selected additional industry sources as many potential interviewees 
in this group declined participation in Study 1 and data saturation was not 
reached. A thematic analysis of written submissions by Australian alcohol 
companies and organisations to ANPHA’s ‘Issues Paper into the effectiveness of 
alcohol advertising regulation’ was conducted to examine the Australian alcohol 
industry claims regarding marketing regulation. This study mainly contributed to 
RO5 ‘Identify barriers to the uptake of effective alcohol marketing regulation by 
the Australian Government’ and the last part of RO1, namely to ‘…determine 
their [stakeholders’] roles in policy development’. 
This study has been published in the PLoS One journal (Martino, Miller, 
Coomber, Hancock, & Kypri, 2017) and will be presented in Chapter 6 (please 
refer to Appendix D for the authorship statement).  
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4.4 Methodological strengths and limitations 
In qualitative research, the researcher is an instrument in data collection and 
analysis, as data collection is an interactive process and judgements about 
analysis (e.g. in coding) have to be made. Therefore, the study cannot be 
replicated (Neuman, 2014). Compared to quantitative research, qualitative studies 
also use different sampling approaches, sampling sizes, and have different 
research objectives, and research paradigms. The conventional methodological 
concepts that determine quality in quantitative research (such as reliability and 
validity) are, therefore, generally not deemed useful in qualitative research. 
(Golafshani, 2003; Kitto, Chesters, & Grbich, 2008). Trustworthiness, instead, is 
crucial in qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003), and can be determined by the 
level of rigour (theoretical, evaluative, and procedural), credibility (well-
presented findings that are meaningful), conceptual generalisability and 
transferability of outcomes (by providing ‘thick’ descriptions, so others can judge 
transferability to other cases), and the use of multiple studies (Kitto et al., 2008; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Several reporting guidelines for qualitative studies have been developed to 
increase transparency, to facilitate judgements around trustworthiness and 
transferability of the findings, to enable comparison between published studies, 
and to improve the overall quality of the study design (Altman & Simera, 2014). 
For reporting on Study 1, I completed the COnsolidated criteria for REporting 
Qualitative research (COREQ), a 32-item checklist, specifically for in-depth 
interviews (Tong, Sainsbury, & Craig, 2007) (see Appendix E). For Study 2, I 
followed the Standards for Reporting Qualitative Research (SRQR) (O’Brien, 
Harris, Beckman, Reed, & Cook, 2014), which contain general guidelines on 




Chapter 5 Study 1: Expert interviews 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will start by describing the method selected for Study 1, namely 
expert interviews, and I will provide a detailed description of the research 
instruments used. Subsequently, I will present the results, discussion and, finally, 
the conclusion of Study 1. 
5.2 Method 
Bogner and Menz (2009) argue that there is no such thing as the expert interview, 
as there are no unified or standardised methods to conduct the interviews (Bogner 
et al., 2009). Subsequently, some researchers view expert interviews as 
inadequate because – they argue –it is, therefore, impossible to quantify 
information. On the other hand, expert interviews are also criticised for not being 
‘pure’ qualitative research, as the interviewer needs to steer discussions actively, 
rather than letting it unfold (Bogner & Menz, 2009). Bogner and Menz decided, 
therefore, to increase clarity around the methodology and identified three main 
types of expert interviews that can be used to collect different types of knowledge 
(Bogner & Menz, 2009). First, there is the exploratory expert interview, which 
should mainly be used for problem orientation and development of hypotheses or 
to develop an interview or questionnaire. This type of interview should be 
conducted openly, while guided by the topic of interest. The second type is the 
systematising expert interview and is the most commonly used expert interview. 
Its main goal is to retrieve facts or ‘objective’ information systematically. An 
elaborate topic guide is required to steer the interview and to facilitate 
aggregation and comparison of interview data. The theory-generating expert 
interview is the third type and can be used when the research focus is on inductive 
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theory formulation and the subjective dimensions of expert knowledge (Bogner & 
Menz, 2009). Questions often focus on the motives and beliefs of experts, for 
example, around the functioning of systems. Study 1 used both systematising and 
theory-generating expert interview questions to obtain objective information on 
how specific regulatory processes work and expert opinions on how to improve 
the regulatory framework. 
Importantly, there is also a limited consensus around a unified concept of the 
‘expert’. It can, for example, be a construct of the researcher’s interests or more 
like a social construct, such as someone in a prestigious position. Experts can also 
be defined as people with knowledge or expertise in a particular area (Baker, 
Lovell, & Harris, 2006; Bogner & Menz, 2009). In Study 1, the expert is someone 
with specialised knowledge (technical, process, and explanatory knowledge (Van 
Audenhove, 2017)) about varying dimensions of alcohol marketing regulation, 
that is not accessible to the researcher. This expert can additionally be a 
representative for their sector.  
It is worth noting that when doing expert interviews, data are generated as part of 
the interaction between the interviewer and interviewee and that this is seen as 
something positive, rather than a distortion of the data (Bogner & Menz, 2009). 
Bogner & Menz identified six interactions situations – the interviewer as a co-
expert, expert from a different knowledge culture, lay-person, authority, 
accomplice (with the same normative orientation), and critic – which all lead to 
varying interview- and question styles and all potentially have their advantages 
and disadvantages (Bogner & Menz, 2009; Van Audenhove, 2017). In this study, 
the interviewer's position depended on the expert (sector) interviewed. It varied 
between co-expert, with the benefit of increased discussions and information 




advantage of high levels of explanation; accomplice, with a high level of trust and 
access to confidential information; and critic, which is associated with distrust 
and disrupted dialogue. 
5.3 Research instruments 
A one-to-one semi-structured interview format was adopted, as this combines 
standardised open-ended questions and the flexibility to ask additional questions. 
This combination is beneficial when obtaining expert knowledge (systematising 
and theory-generating). 
5.3.1 Sample recruitment 
A preliminary stakeholder analysis (Brugha & Varvasovszky, 2000) was 
conducted, using our existing knowledge and connections, public resources – 
such as existing literature and documents in the research area –, and web searches. 
This was the basis for purposeful sampling, a technique that is widely used in 
qualitative research (Palinkas et al., 2015). Subsequently, snowball sampling (2) 
was used to identify other potential participants, utilising interviewees’ 
professional networks. Snowball sampling can be an effective method when 
experts are difficult to identify or to gain access to (Lewis-Beck, Bryman, & 
Futing Liao, 2004). The aim was to continue sampling until data saturation was 
reached for each of the expert groups (Fusch & Ness, 2015). 
Potential participants were identified for: 1) their ability to provide detailed 
insights into the current alcohol marketing framework in Australia; 2) their 
exclusive experience in regulatory partnerships with the alcohol industry; 3) their 
rich knowledge of marketing or public health governance. This resulted in a 
selection of (former) politicians, policymakers, alcohol industry representatives 
(of industry trade organisations, producers and retailers), health advocates, public 
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health researchers, marketing academics, and academics that collaborate with the 
alcohol industry on public health matters, e.g. through DrinkWise (in this thesis 
referred to as ‘industry-aligned academics’), all working in Australia.  
The final sample consisted of 28 experts from eight different professional 
disciplines; response rates varied between the different sectors (see Table 4). The 
response rates were reasonably high for the public health advocates (n=7, 88%), 
public health researchers (n=4, 67%), marketing researchers (n=3, 100%), 
industry-aligned academics (n=2, 100%), and public servants (n=6, 75%). 
Whereas, the response rates for the alcohol industry (n=2, 20%) and the 
politicians (n=2, 20%) were low. 
Table 4 
Breakdown of interview respondents by sector 





Public health advocates 7 1 0 8 
Public health researchers 4 1 1 6 
Marketing researchers 3 0 0 3 
Alcohol industry representatives 2 2 6 10 
ABAC -adjudication panel members 2 0 1 3 
Industry-aligned academics 2 0 0 2 
Public servants (state and federal) 6 1 1 8 
Politicians or former politicians 2 3 5 10 
Total 28 8 14 50 
 
Some of the potential interviewees did not respond, but most declined to 
participate. Some of the industry representatives’ official reasons for declining 




research topic will be provided”; the researcher’s “association with Deakin 
University and its other alcohol researchers”; and lack of time. Politicians’ 
official reasons for refusing to participate were either lack of time or not having 
enough knowledge about this subject, which in some cases led to a 
recommendation to talk to a specific public servant in their department. 
In the cases of alcohol industry representatives and politicians, recruitment 
happened until the sources were exhausted. However, because the interviewees 
from the public service sector were also able to voice the government’s 
perspectives, this study gained sufficient understanding of the government’s 
regulatory motives and insights into regulatory processes, and data saturation was 
reached. While the two industry representatives presented a deep understanding of 
the ABAC scheme and perspectives on its current functioning, the study did not 
reach data saturation regarding research questions around improvements of 
alcohol marketing regulation and the applicability of Responsive Regulation. To 
combat this limitation, Study 2 was undertaken. 
5.3.2 Procedure 
Approval for the conduct of this study was granted by Deakin University Human 
Ethics Committee in October 2011 (HEAG-H 108_ 2011, see Appendix G). 
Potential participants were invited to participate in the study through the means of 
an introductory email, including a Plain Language Statement and a Consent Form. 
Unless the participant indicated he/she did not want to be contacted, a reminder 
email was sent one week after, and a follow-up phone call was made again one 
week later, in which a time for an interview was scheduled. Interviews were 
mainly conducted face-to-face, preferably at the expert’s workplace or a neutral, 
quiet public space. However, phone or Skype interview was conducted in case 
that budgets for interstate travelling by the interviewer were not available. 
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Three days before the interview, the experts were re-sent an electronic copy of the 
Plain Language Statement and Consent Form (see Appendix H). Before 
commencement of the interview, the experts were asked if they had any questions 
regarding the study and agreed to have the interview audio-taped, reminded that 
their identity was confidential and that they could refuse to answer any questions. 
Subsequently, participants would sign the consent form. In case of a phone 
interview, participants were asked for verbal consent before the start of the 
interview and to email or send the signed Consent Form. 
The interviews were conducted between November 2013 and August 2015. Each 
interview took between 45 minutes and 1.5 hours, depending on the amount of 
knowledge the expert was able or willing to share and the conciseness of answers. 
The audio-taped interviews were subsequently transcribed semi-verbatim, by FM 
and by a transcription services company. The participants were offered the 
opportunity to correct transcripts; however, none of the participants did. Finally, 
the transcripts were all checked for accuracy before analysis.  
Data were de-identified, and participants’ names were not used in audio files, 
transcripts, analysis and write up. Instead, the interviewees were given a unique 
identifier code combined with a generic description of their role. Re-identifying 
data records are kept in a separate file, in case that participants decide to retract 
their consent. All files were stored on a secure Deakin server and will be kept for 




5.3.3 Interview schedule 
The interview schedule was primarily based on the research aim and objectives. It 
was developed collaboratively with the primary supervisor, using a seven-step 
qualitative interview planning framework designed by Mason (Mason, 2002, p. 
72). As ongoing reflexivity is an essential process when shaping qualitative 
studies and clarifying purpose (Agee, 2009), the interview guide was pilot tested 
and refined throughout the interview period using field notes, memos, and 
preliminary thematic analyses to identify gaps. 
The interview was introduced with the Taskforce’s proposal, including a visual of 
the pyramid (see Appendix I) Interviewees who were contacted by phone or 
Skype had been emailed the pyramid prior to the interview and were at this stage 
prompted by the interviewer to take a look at it. Next, the aims of the interview 
were explained, and the research paradigm was clarified. The latter was deemed 
necessary as claims of neutrality might have looked like an attempt to conceal the 
researcher’s position and could have led to distrust by the interviewee and 
possibly a cut-short interview (Bogner & Menz, 2009). 
The first part of the interview guide started with questions that were specifically 
designed for that individual experts. For example, public servants involved in the 
regulation of alcohol marketing were asked about the specifics of government 
involvement in ABAC; whereas industry representatives were asked questions 
around specific ABAC processes. Marketing experts were questioned on the 
regulation of marketing in general, and an industry-aligned academic was asked 
to comment on their expertise in regulatory arrangements with industry. 
The second part of the interview guide contained the same questions for all 
experts and addressed five main points of interest. First, general thoughts on the 
need for alcohol marketing regulation, including objectives and an alcohol 
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marketing code. Second, the functioning of the current self-regulatory scheme, in 
particular, ABAC, and specific criteria for improved self-regulation. Third, 
criteria for efficient operation on a co-regulation level. Fourth, benchmarks, 
indicators of performance, and evaluation methods of an alcohol marketing 
scheme and timing of reviews, and, finally, barriers to the uptake of the 
Responsive Regulation pyramid by governments. Some interviewees were unable 
to answer certain questions from the general part of the interview schedule as they 
were experts in particular areas of interest. For example, the marketing academics 
were unfamiliar with particular details of current alcohol marketing self-
regulation. However, their input around marketing strategies and requirements of 
a comprehensive alcohol marketing code was valuable. 
5.3.4 Thematic analysis 
Qualitative analysis software (NVivo for Mac v.11.4.2, QSR International Pty 
Ltd, 2017) was used to manage data effectively, and to conduct a thematic 
analysis of the interview transcripts (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). Thematic 
analysis is a method for analysing, identifying, describing, interpreting, organising 
and reporting themes within datasets (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It is a useful 
approach to identify key topics in large datasets, to highlight different 
perspectives presented by interviewees, and to develop new insights (Nowell, 
Norris, White, & Moules, 2017). Because the researcher becomes an instrument 
for data analysis, it is the researcher's responsibility to establish a trustworthy 
analysis process. Trustworthiness in analysis can be increased by high levels of 
familiarisation with the data, sound data management, use of reflective journals, 
researcher triangulation, use of a coding framework, and reviewing of themes 
(Nowell et al., 2017). Because the interviews and analysis were performed by the 




was further increased by taking field notes, and by reading of all transcripts 
before the start of the coding process (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Additionally, the 
researcher kept a journal for each separate node (using NVivo memos) throughout 
the analysis process (Neuman, 2014). It was used to track the development of 
insights and ideas, to link concepts back to the data, and to retrieve ideas when 
writing up the findings (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). It can also serve as auditable 
evidence to increase trust in the research (Nowell et al., 2017).  
Preliminary data analysis of the transcripts was done in an ongoing matter (Agee, 
2009). Initial coding of the interviews was deductively derived (Miles, Huberman, 
& Saldaña, 2014), using a hierarchical node structure based on concepts derived 
from the literature review and the interview structure. This structure was amended 
and updated continuously, as new ideas and themes emerged from the text during 
analysis (data-driven or emergent coding) (Boyatzis, 1998; Gibbs, 2007). To 
increase interpretative rigour (Kitto et al., 2008), a second researcher double-
coded two interview transcripts early on in the analysis process, and subsequently, 
the researchers discussed the identified inconsistencies. The value of double-
coding is that it can assist in the development of the coding framework (Kitto et 
al., 2008). A full inter-coder reliability test is not required in thematic analyses, as 
it would only establish if two people can apply the same subjective perspective 
(the codes) to the text (Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013).  
Once all text was coded, major themes were identified. This involved some re-
coding of raw data and resulted in omitting, adding, collapsing, and breaking 
down codes into themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The supervision team regularly 
discussed the evolving thematic structure (Nowell et al., 2017), which was 
finalised at the end of the analysis process (see Appendix J for final codebook). 
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Quotes and excerpts were edited to increase readability, for example by re-
punctuation and removal of repetition, and to maintain the interviewees’ identities 
confidential. Quotations were identified using generic terms for interviewees’ 
most relevant profession or role, such as ‘public health researcher' or ‘federal 
politician'. 
5.4 Results 
In the result section, I will present the main themes identified in the analysis of 
the expert interview transcripts and discuss differences and overlap between 
groups. Quotes are used to demonstrate or explain certain points of view. 
First, in section 5.5, I will present the fundamental conditions for an effective 
responsive regulatory framework. This includes roles of government and 
stakeholders, overarching objectives and aligned alcohol marketing code, an 
evaluation framework, formalising of stakeholder engagement, high levels of 
transparency, and a threat by the government to upregulate in case the regulatory 
framework fails to reach its objectives within the set time frame.  
Next, in section 5.6, I will present themes around governance and design of 
effective self-regulation and co-regulation separately, including participation 
levels, and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Then, in section 5.7, I will 
present barriers to the uptake of effective regulation, both at industry and 
government end. Finally, in section 5.8, I will present themes around the 
applicability of the responsive pyramid to alcohol marketing regulation, such as 
incremental change and concern around the lower levels of the pyramid. Figure 7 





Figure 7. A visual overview of the result sections feeding into the development of the 
pyramid 
5.5 Fundamental conditions  
‘Fundamental conditions’ was a large emerging thematic category that describes 
components of the regulatory framework that should be in place regardless of the 
level of regulation (whether that is, for example, self-regulation or co-regulation). 
Interviewees suggested that the success of the regulatory model would be 
dependent on having certain underlying principles in place. These fundamental 
conditions are presented below under subheadings ‘Who are the required 



















5.5.1 Who are the required stakeholders?  
This section reports on interviewees’ discussion of stakeholder involvement in the 
policy development of an overarching pyramid structure. 
5.5.1.1 Government-driven 
Interviewees from all sectors indicated that the development of the pyramid 
should be government-driven for change to occur. Notably, the industry 
representatives agreed that it would be the government who would decide to 
move regulation up to a next pyramid level. One of them commented: 
The industry fundamentally understands that if we do not comply with the 
industry code, the government will say “Well, you’re not complying, we will 
move to [increased] regulation”. And that is the ability of the government …, 
that is the ‘teeth’ in the process (Alcohol industry representative, #28). 
Some interviewees suggested that having an impartial government leading and 
mediating policy development processes would result in stakeholders having a 
higher level of confidence and trust in the procedures and outcomes. 
5.5.1.2 Stakeholder involvement 
Interviewees discussed which stakeholders should be involved in the consultation 
processes led by the government, and at what capacity, but a consensus was not 
reached. Many interviewees reported that public health experts, the alcohol 
industry, and the community should be consulted, for example: 
You would have to have the public health community involved, and you would 
have to have government involved, and you know, you’d have industry 
involved, and you would have basically those key stakeholders. And 




Yet, some of the interviewees from the public health sectors expressed concern 
about including industry in policy development and setting of objectives. They 
suggested that this stakeholder should only be involved in the regulatory 
implementation stages instead, for example:  
I think industry should be involved in how to make it work for them, but I 
don't think they should be involved in developing what the objectives are 
(Public health advocate, #7). 
In contrast, others reported that agreement on objectives between all stakeholders 
is essential for the success of a PPP. This is exemplified in the following excerpt: 
The reality is that if we’re about to bring change we would need ownership 
and acceptance from a pretty wide range of interests. But to have an 
approach that, say, balances industry and consumers and public health 
interest; that would be the best way to do it (Public servant, #17).  
However, interviews also suggested that reaching agreement on objectives, 
standards, and outcome measures would be a complicated process, as there is a 
fundamental disagreement between the alcohol industry who has commercial 
interests as a priority, and the public health community who has disease 
prevention as a first concern. One interviewee remarked: 
Each of the groups, who have an interest in advertising self-regulation, have 
quite different views about what we want advertising regulation to do. That 
goes to the root problem of how the codes are expressed. Because there's 
dissatisfaction from public health and alcohol policy people about the codes 
not having exposure limits. But then, if you take it from the industry or the 
advertiser's perspective, that's not the intention (Public health advocate, 
#10). 
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Some interviewees suggested having transparent and formalised negations in 
place to manage opposing interests (presented below in section 5.5.3.1). 
5.5.2 What needs to be in place? 
This section presents findings on what needs be in place for the effective 
functioning of the regulatory level (or partnership arrangement). The sections 
below will report in detail on the following main findings: 1) there is a need for 
having the same overarching objectives, KPIs, and benchmarks regardless of the 
regulatory level; 2) these parameters need to be clearly defined and meaningful; 
3) there is a need for an evidence-based evaluation tool; and 4) a single 
comprehensive marketing code.  
5.5.2.1 Overarching objectives 
Interviewees overwhelmingly agreed that every level of regulation in the pyramid 
should have the same objectives, KPIs and benchmarks in place in order to review 
performance consistently. The different levels of regulation were generally seen 
as a different approach or instrument to reach those objectives.  
It certainly makes sense to keep the objectives the same, assuming that the 
failure is seen around enforcement, rather than what the objectives were 
(Public servant, #22). 
Interviewees from all groups noted it is important to have an alcohol marketing 
code that is closely aligned with community standards. Yet, some interviewees 
from public health and public service sectors stipulated that the code reflects the 





Instead of chasing the lowest common denominator of community in term of 
standards, to go for the highest common denominator. But that would be a 
significant change in the advertising industry (Public servant, #18). 
Interviewees from most sectors expressed the need for denormalisation of 
excessive consumption of alcohol and to have this as an overarching objective of 
the regulatory framework. One expert compares this to tobacco policy:  
I think it is similar to what we’ve argued with tobacco [marketing 
regulation], and that is to help denormalise regular drinking, to help 
denormalise that drinking is glamorous, particularly in terms of children, but 
also young adults (Public Servant, #17).  
Contrarily, one of the alcohol industry representatives proposed that cultural 
change starts with individual change instead, and suggested researchers ask 
questions like: 
What factors are at play that make people misuse alcohol? And what 
behavioural changes do we need to inflict, or to influence, or to add into our 
culture about changing alcohol misuse? (Alcohol industry representative, 
#27). 
Limiting alcohol marketing exposure to children (under 18 years of age) in order 
to reduce their awareness of marketing was another overarching objective 
identified by interviewees from all sectors. A common argument was that a 
product that by law can only be bought by adults should not be promoted to 
minors. A politician explained their opinion: 
My main issue is exposure to young children of any alcohol advertising …. 
My view at the moment is that it is a product [alcohol] that is not sold to 
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children under 18, and you need to be 18 to consume it, and therefore, you 
shouldn’t be exposed to advertising (Politician - Fed, #16). 
An industry representative supported the view that alcohol is a product for adults 
and that, therefore, marketing freedoms should be limited, but at the same time 
they emphasised that any restrictions should “be evidence-based and 
proportionate to the problems” (Alcohol industry representative, #27). 
Furthermore, interviewees from the public health sectors highlighted the need to 
limit all alcohol marketing to protect minors, as well as other vulnerable groups, 
such as young adults and pregnant women. Marketing academics described that in 
the context of a lack of resources for social marketing messages, reducing the 
volume of all alcohol marketing would weaken the one-sided, positive stories 
about alcohol consumption.  
Some of the public health experts stated they were proponents of banning alcohol 
advertising altogether, nevertheless none of them viewed a ban as a realistic 
scenario: 
As a health advocate, my clear benchmark would be no alcohol advertising. 
So, then the whole regulation framework is irrelevant … However, I don’t 
foresee that happening anywhere in the near future (Public health academic, 
#13). 
In sum, the interviewees identified four main overarching objectives of the 
responsive regulatory framework. The first objective was the alignment of alcohol 
marketing policy with community standards, which was endorsed by all sectors. 
However, there was less consensus around how to determine these standards. The 
second identified objective was to denormalise binge-drinking by changing social 




industry representatives, who contended that social change should start with 
behaviour change in individuals. The third suggested objective was to limit 
alcohol marketing exposure to minors specifically, which all sectors 
recommended. Contrastingly, the fourth identified objective was to limit the 
volume of all alcohol marketing to protect a broader range of vulnerable people, a 
view mostly endorsed by public health researchers and advocates. 
5.5.2.2 Key performance indicators and benchmarks 
Interviewees reported the importance of having narrowly-defined and meaningful 
objectives, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), and benchmarks in place. For 
example: 
I think the yardsticks with which you are measuring if something is working 
or not, need to be more clearly set out and reported on, publicly. So, it’s not 
just “We are good chaps, and we are performing” (Industry-aligned 
academic, # 24). 
Interviewees further provided two types of KPIs that can be used in deciding 
when to move up to a higher level of regulation: 1) output indicators of 
immediate or short-term results of alcohol marketing policies, such as exposure 
levels; and 2) process indicators of policies and regulatory mechanisms, such as 
the number of complaints. 
Regarding output indicators, interviewees suggested measuring the exposure 
levels of marketing in different media outlets by, e.g. comparing industry data on 
broadcasting with the public’s viewing habits. Some interviewees also 
recommended looking at children’s attitudes towards drinking. However, others 
reported that because it is difficult to establish a causal link between attitudes 
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towards alcohol and the exposure to marketing, ‘attitude’ is, therefore, not a 
suitable indicator to move up the pyramid. 
Many interviewees, including those from the alcohol industry, also suggested 
focusing on process indicators as measurements of success, such as a low 
proportion of complaints upheld by the adjudication panel. One interviewee 
elaborates in the following excerpt: 
You can look at the number of public complaints, but sometimes if there is 
more awareness, more people complain. You could assess the number of 
complaints, and you could assess how many were upheld, how many weren't. 
You could assess the pre-vetting system, so if some complaints were upheld, it 
obviously would display a weakness in the pre-vetting (Public health 
advocate, #6). 
Additionally, interviewees (including an alcohol representative) suggested the 
need for indicators capturing the level of compliance with Panels’ decisions and 
timeliness of removing ads by industry. Finally, some interviewees reported the 
need to include KPIs that assess the effectiveness of the governance of a scheme, 
for example: 
Are they publishing an annual report in a timely manner and things? … Is 
this system operating effectively? I suppose, is the management committee 
regularly and genuinely reviewing the content of the rules? (Public health 
academic, #12). 
Interviewees from several sectors reported on the importance of setting 
benchmarks in order to measure achievements. They further explained that 
benchmarks should be simple to measure, should not be open to misinterpretation, 




proposed that having pre-established benchmarks could lead to increased 
confidence in the data and the framework among stakeholders. As one 
interviewee explains: 
I think it has to be clearly about the efficacy of the data and the belief in that 
data …. I think you need that up-front agreement (Public servant, #21). 
5.5.2.3 Evaluation framework 
Next, interviewees reported on the lack of independent and regular reviewing 
processes around the regulatory framework and alcohol marketing codes. They 
generally agreed there is a need for an evidence-based evaluation tool to evaluate 
and improve on existing schemes. One interviewee stated somewhat surprised: 
I would have thought; the better thing was to have set up an evaluation 
framework right at the beginning, so you have some kind of continuous 
improvement approach (industry-aligned academic, #23). 
Others agreed that having an evaluation tool in place at baseline could lead to 
increased efficiency, consistency, and transparency of the evaluation processes, 
and a heightened level of confidence in the whole system. 
Interviewees provided specific examples of evaluation measures, including 
placement of alcohol marketing, exposure levels, and recall of marketing 
communications by consumers. Furthermore, many interviewees reported the 
need to evaluate industry data around allocation of marketing expenditures. Some 
interviewees suggested requiring it directly from industry. However, interviewees 
mainly from the public service sector were of the opinion that this would be 
unfeasible, because of the data’s commercially sensitive nature. Others, 
researchers and public health advocates, said it would not be appropriate and 
could not trust industry data. Both these groups of interviewees proposed to use 
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market research companies instead. However, they also warned about the high 
costs of ongoing active monitoring and thus recommended to do this periodically. 
Further, experts indicated the need for regular policy evaluation, and regular 
reviews and updates of a marketing code, in order to keep up to date with recent 
developments in marketing mechanisms, changing media environment, and 
community attitudes. One of the industry representatives agreed: 
Some things that we might need to consider is doing that [community 
research] every three or four years, you know, to ensure that we are 
consistently meeting community standards (Alcohol industry representative, 
#27). 
Finally, there was a consensus among interviewees that the evaluation should be 
done by a government established body and that data collection should be 
conducted independently of the industry. For example: 
Collecting the data and collecting information on the benchmarks and the 
targets and facilitating the process for the discussion, there is a clear role for 
government in that space (Public servant, #21). 
Some interviewees provided examples of former and currently existing statutory 
bodies in areas of health, communications, or consumer affairs that could be 
considered for taking on the evaluator’s role. These included: 1) ACMA, because 
it already administers marketing regulations and thus has expertise in this area; 2) 
ACCC, because marketing breaches could potentially be classified as a consumer 
rights issue; and 3) a body similar to ANPHA, so public health, rather than 




5.5.2.4 Effective alcohol marketing code 
The next fundamental condition of the regulatory pyramid was a new and robust 
marketing code. They suggested that leaving the design of the marketing code to 
the industry has generated weak standards, with which companies can easily 
comply. Additionally, it was suggested that there is a need for a single marketing 
code that replaces the current coexistence of multiple codes with various 
responsible industry bodies (e.g. ABAC, ASB, OMA, CTS, FreeTV), as this has 
led to confusion among the public about where to complain. As one interviewee 
explained: 
You have to do a lot of research before you even find out which code you 
want to complain under. That's a barrier for people; a lot of people would be 
turned off by that straight away (Public health advocate, #10). 
They reported further that the new single code should address three concerns 
about the current ABAC Code: 1) its narrow definition of ‘marketing’; 2) its weak 
content rules; and 3) its lack of placement restrictions in terms of media outlets 
and broadcasting times. These are discussed in detail below.  
5.5.2.4.1 Definition of marketing 
Many interviewees reported concerns about the narrow marketing definition in 
the ABAC Code,8 i.e. that the code does not cover all types of advertising, 
including sponsorship and product placement. As one interviewee expressed: 
                                                
8 ABAC Code 2014: Marketing Communications means marketing communications in Australia generated 
by or within the reasonable control of a Marketer (apart from the exceptions listed in Section 2(b)), including 
but not limited to brand advertising (including trade advertising), competitions, digital communications 
(including in mobile and social media), product names and packaging, advertorials, alcohol brand extensions 
to non-alcohol beverage products, point of sale materials, retailer advertising and Marketing Collateral. 
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I think we want ultimately all forms of alcohol advertising and promotion and 
marketing and sponsorship, very broadly defined, to be covered by these 
regulatory processes and codes (Public Health Advocate, #8). 
Marketing experts added that it is important to note that advertising is often only 
one part of a larger campaign of so-called ‘Integrated marketing 
communications’9, and that one should aim to regulate all aspects of it in order for 
marketing regulation to be effective. They explained it should even include 
unpaid marketing communications, such as news coverage of alcohol 
consumption (e.g. during ‘Schoolies’10). Contrary to these concerns, one of the 
alcohol industry representatives stated that the ABAC scheme aims to cover all 
forms of advertising. 
Non-industry interviewees highlighted three gaps in the marketing definition of 
the ABAC Code at the time of the interviews. First, many interviewees expressed 
concerns about the lack of regulation of alcohol marketing on digital platforms, 
although there was a general consensus that these spaces are hard to regulate. One 
interviewee stated:  
Obviously, digital media is most likely to be non-compliant. A lot of 
advertisement there isn’t under the control of even the Australian 
Government. So, yeah that would be harder. And [in particular] if you would 
                                                
9 “Integrated marketing is an approach to creating a unified and seamless experience for consumers to 
interact with the brand/enterprise; it attempts to meld all aspects of marketing communication such as 
advertising, sales promotion, public relations, direct marketing, and social media, through their respective 
mix of tactics, methods, channels, media, and activities, so that all work together as a unified force. It is a 
process designed to ensure that all messaging and communications strategies are consistent across all 
channels and are centered on the customer.” https://thedma.org/membership/member-groups-
communities/integrated-marketing-community/integrated-marketing-definitions. 
10 Schoolies refers to the Australian tradition of high-school graduates having week-long holidays following 
the end of their final exams in late November and early December. Widely considered a week-long alcohol 




talk about advertising from foreign entities, and user-generated content 
(Public Servant, #22). 
Some interviewees (public health and public service sectors) suggested that 
because of the global characteristics of digital platforms and the quickly evolving 
technologies in this space, digital alcohol marketing might be better regulated by 
the industry, as these global companies cross between countries’ jurisdictions. 
Secondly, interviewees from various sectors reported concerns on the fact that the 
ABAC Code excludes sponsorship11 (of sporting or cultural events or activities) 
from its marketing definition, which has resulted in an inability for the Panel to 
consider public complaints about sponsorship. Further, lack of time and 
placement restrictions of alcohol sponsorship has led to high exposure levels of 
alcohol brands to minors. An interviewee explained why sponsorship is a form of 
marketing: 
I think sponsorship is very problematic. There is a distinction between 
sponsorship and advertising and I think what they really do is advertising, 
putting VB on jerseys and football fields, that’s just advertising, it’s not 
sponsorship (ABAC Adjudication Panel Member, #26). 
Thirdly, some interviewees were concerned about the fact that product placement 
(paid for appearances of branded alcohol in films, TV, or music videos) is not 
included in the ABAC Code and, therefore, it is unregulated. Nevertheless, a large 
amount of the marketing budget can be spent on product placement, like in a 
recent James Bond film: 
                                                
11
 Sponsorship means any agreement or part of an agreement involving payment or other consideration in 
lieu of payment by a Marketer to support a sporting or cultural property, event or activity, in return for which 
the sponsored party agrees to be associated with or promote the sponsor’s Alcohol Beverage or outlet. 
Sponsorship also includes naming rights of events or teams and the inclusion of a brand name and/or logo at 
an event venue or on uniforms of participants (excluding branded merchandise) (ABAC responsible 
marketing code, 2017). 
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Carlsberg paid 60 million, apparently (Public health academic, #14). 
5.5.2.4.2 Content 
There was a general consensus that the ABAC rules are ‘lacking strength’ and are 
‘feeble’, and that, therefore, alcohol companies can easily adhere to them, which 
has resulted in high levels of compliance. A typical response was: 
They [Alcohol industry] might be sticking to the rules as they're written, but 
they [rules] are crap (Public health advocate, #7). 
However, only a few interviewees reported on specific areas where improvements 
could be made regarding the content regulation of the ABAC scheme. Some 
suggested that ABAC could learn from the other self-regulatory codes around the 
world as the Alcohol Advertising Review Board (AARB) has done. But mainly, 
these interviewees’ view was that by talking about advertising content and the 
compliance rates by industry, one engages in the wrong discussion, as it does not 
focus on measures that lead to a reduction in alcohol marketing exposure. One 
interviewee clarifies: 
What happens is, we get tied up in knots around how you slice and dice 
marketing campaigns. It's a bit of furphy; it leads you off down a garden path 
because you're talking about process rather than outcomes (Public health 
advocate, #4). 
Those interviewees with a detailed understanding of the ABAC Code – such as 
Adjudication Panel members, and some public health advocates and researchers – 
reported their concerns with one of the ABAC Code’s standards: a Marketing 
Communication must NOT have Strong or Evident’ Appeal to Minors 




to protect minors, it turns out that in most complaint cases this standard cannot be 
applied. An ABAC panel member explains: 
Even [if] an ad has a strong appeal to under 18s, if it also has a strong 
appeal to over 18s, the ad doesn’t breach [the Code] (ABAC Adjudication 
Panel Member, #26). 
However, one alcohol industry representative reports that this problem is mostly 
overcome by other ABAC Code provisions, such as the requirement only to 
employ actors over the age of 25. At the same time this interviewee reports that 
without the words ‘strong and evident’, there would not be much left to advertise: 
If you say “Any appeal to a child, without being strong or evident”, then 
effectively alcohol would have very limited capacity to advertise (Alcohol 
Industry representative, #27). 
Some interviewees suggested that this standard allows ABAC to reach 
adolescents while protecting children by sifting out the clear-cut cases (e.g. use of 
cartoon characters). 
5.5.2.4.3 Placement 
The need to include placement restrictions, or addressing alcohol marketing 
exposure, was one of the main areas identified by the interviewees from all non-
industry sectors. At the time of the interviews, the ABAC Code only regulated the 
content of advertising. Interviewees reported that, consequently, children’s 
exposure to alcohol advertising was hardly addressed by the regulatory processes 
and that the cumulative impact of marketing campaigns was neglected. Moreover, 
interviewees commented that placement rules would lead to objective decision 
making in contrast to the current subjective nature of adjudication of content 
complaints. Many of the interviewees highlighted a specific gap whereby a 
	 105 
placement exception was written into the Commercial Television Industry Code of 
Practice (CTICP) that allows alcohol sponsorship to be broadcasted during 
sporting events, even during children’s viewing times.12 The following excerpt 
exemplifies this: 
The exemption for live sports advertising is an anomaly. It doesn’t make 
policy sense…. Because you can’t have an objective not to have children 
exposed and then make it a big glaring truck hole wide for children to be 
exposed. Either you believe in the concept and the merit of that proposal, or 
you don’t (Public servant, #19). 
Interviewees from public health sectors were sceptical about ABAC ever 
including placement restrictions, and some questioned if any self-regulatory 
alcohol marketing scheme could effectively regulate placement without proper 
enforcement tools. The alcohol industry representatives confirmed this and stated 
that current placement regulations are effectively dealt with by the media 
authorities (ACMA).  
In sum, interviewees identified three main areas of concern regarding the current 
ABAC Code: 1) the need for a broad definition of the word ‘marketing’, which 
includes all parts of an ‘integrative marketing campaign’, including unpaid 
marketing. In particular, they identified gaps around digital marketing, 
sponsorship, and product placement in the code; 2) weak content codes that are 
therefore easy to adhere to, without making a real impact. Specifically, 
interviewees reported on the standard that allows children and youth being 
exposed to alcohol marketing, as long as it does not appeal to them exclusively; 
and 3) the limited function of the alcohol marketing code as it did not include 
                                                
12 In 2015, this was changed from broadcasting of alcohol sponsorship only during ‘live’ sporting events, 




placement restrictions. Broadcasting of alcohol sponsored sports during children’s 
viewing times was often mentioned as an example of the failure of the ABAC 
system. 
5.5.3 How to manage regulatory processes? 
The interviewees reported on requirements for managing the policy development 
processes. They indicated a need for four fundamental conditions, which are 
discussed below in detail: 1) formalising negotiations between stakeholders; 2) a 
high level of transparency; 3) setting timeframes to assess the effectiveness of a 
regulatory scheme; and 4) a threat of increased regulation. 
5.5.3.1 Formalising negotiations 
Interviewees from the public health sectors emphasised that everyone should be 
able to scrutinise the consultation and negotiating processes of developing 
regulation. Therefore, they recommended having public records of these 
processes available. For example: 
So, I think as soon as you take the negotiation process offline, to use a cliché, 
I think that’s when it becomes a problem for how robust the policy 
development and participation process is. So, if there’s a way to have it open, 
and for there to be public scrutiny of how there has been a negotiation on 
issues – and an ability to expose negotiations that have not been in good faith 
– then that can be an incentive for people to actually behave. People – I 
mean companies, corporations, co-regulatory partners (Public health 
advocate, #10). 
Additionally, many interviewees reported the need for formalised consultation to 
manage opposing interests. Interviewees from public health (advocates and 
researchers) and government sectors (politicians and public servants) suggested 
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that the government could consult with stakeholders via written submissions or 
roundtable discussions and public hearings – which are both commonly-used 
policy development mechanisms in governments. Some interviewees suggested 
the use of a parliamentary committee, as it is a “truly independent but 
representative model” (Public health academic, #13). Others suggested creating 
official guidelines of interaction, based on article 5.3 of the Framework 
Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC) because it acknowledges “there is an 
obvious conflict of interest, and public health should always be [put] first” 
(Public health advocate, #9).  
However, interviewees from the government sectors indicated there was no need 
for a formalisation of this process, as consulting with parties with conflicting 
interests is part of government officials’ daily job: “It is pretty straightforward, 
governments do this all the time” (Politician - Fed, #16). 
5.5.3.2 Transparency: communication and reporting  
Interviewees repeatedly reported on issues around transparency in three main 
areas. First, around the time of the interviews, ABAC performed a review of the 
ABAC Code in the form of community consultation. Interviewees, mainly from 
the public health advocate and public service sectors who were aware of this 
review, commented on a lack of communication and transparency, and a need to 
include stakeholders in this particular process. This is exemplified in the 
following account: 
Maybe there is community consultation, but it's impossible to tell that from 
the information that they publish on the website …. I think there's a long way 
to go in terms of transparency of the ABAC Code at the moment (Public 




Second, interviewees from public health sectors reported a lack of transparency 
around ABAC’s current pre-vetting13 process in terms of the identity of the pre-
vetters and what the pre-vetting process entails. Some public health sector 
interviewees questioned whom the pre-vetting system is actually assisting: the 
public or the marketers? As one interviewee describes: 
It's not used as a gatekeeping function to stop ads getting through that are 
not compliant with the ABAC. It's something for members - it's almost like an 
insurance system for members so that they can avert the costs, perhaps, of a 
risky campaign (Public health advocate, #10). 
On the other hand, one of the AI representatives suggested there is a high level of 
transparency around this process: 
 I have a person who works for me three days a week whose role it is to go 
and get some history of the ad, look at all the details, absolute details…the 
transparency…I mean, we have three independent people who pre-vet our 
ads before they go on television and we can’t put them on television unless 
they are assessed (Alcohol industry representative, #28). 
Third, interviewees from all sectors emphasised the need for high transparency 
levels around reporting of complaints and breaches of the ABAC Code. While 
interviewees from the alcohol industry and the adjudication panel commended the 
                                                
13 ABAC website: “The Alcohol Advertising Pre-vetting Service (AAPS) is available to all marketers of 
alcohol products and offers confidential user pays advice on whether an alcohol beverage marketing 
communication complies with ABAC standards” “It provides a valuable, confidential user-pays service to 
alcohol companies by assessing proposed advertisements and packaging against the ABAC Responsible 
Alcohol Marketing Code at an early stage of development. This provides some level of assurance, but no 
guarantee, against the possibility (and costs) of an advertisement or packaging being later ordered out of the 
marketplace – via the independent ABAC complaint processes.” 
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high levels of transparency around ABAC’s current guidelines and reporting on 
adjudication of complaints; one industry representative confirmed the other 
interviewees’ suggestion that there was room for improvement, which was also 
one of the recommendations from the community consultation review. 
Noteworthy, one of the public health advocates suggested that the level of 
reporting on complaints is currently sufficient, but will need to be increased with 
more monitoring: 
I think the fact that the determinations are published is good…You would 
expect more reporting if they [ABAC] did more monitoring. So, I think based 
on the level of monitoring that they currently undertake, the current reporting 
is probably sufficient (Public health advocate, #10).          
Interviewees from the public service sector agreed that increased (active) 
monitoring would require regular updates, such as quarterly reports. Additionally, 
interviewees suggested the need for prompt online reporting of adjudication 
decisions. Many interviewees proposed improving transparency around industry 
activity by reporting on exposure rates and marketing spending. Some public 
servants explained that this level of openness could be an issue concerning section 
45 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 14 and that alcohol companies 
would be reluctant to share this information between them.  
In sum, transparency was regarded by interviewees as a fundamental condition of 
the success of the regulatory pyramid. Transparency was a reoccurring theme 
throughout the interviews, especially in relationship to the current regulatory 
system, such as: 1) an identified lack of inclusion and communication within the 
                                                
14 Section 45 prohibits making or giving effect to a contract, arrangement or understanding (or a provision of 
a contract, arrangement or understanding) if it has the purpose, or is likely to have the effect, of substantially 





ABAC Code’s recent reviewing process; 2) the reported need to improve 
transparency around pre-vetting processes, and pre-vetters’ roles and their 
relationships with the marketers; and 3) the need for regular reporting and the 
inclusion of more data. 
5.5.3.3 Setting time frames for pyramid level change 
Next, interviewees highlighted the need for having set timeframes for an overall 
review of a regulatory scheme. Overall, there was a consensus among the 
interviewees from the public health and public service sectors that the timeframe 
for final evaluation of a regulatory level needed to be between two and five years. 
This suggestion was based on either practical grounds, such as allowing for 
implementation time, a precedent in other fields, or for political reasons. The 
latter is further explained by an interviewee: 
[It] is probably also less scary for politicians, you know, three years is less 
scary than one year. Besides if you were to get politicians to focus on 
something just one year after one made a decision .... I’ll go for something 
like a 3-year trial period (PH academic, #11). 
However, some interviewees reported that it might take longer than five years, 
because of the slow nature of government policy development. Importantly, 
timeframes were considered to be dependent on the objectives, the scope of the 
initiatives, and the types of outcomes (short-term vs. long-term) to be evaluated.  
I think that depends on the extent of the issue and the extent of the 
intervention. The bigger the intervention, the more time you’d like to give it 
(Public servant, #21). 
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Because the current self-regulation scheme has been around for many years, some 
interviewees believed that the decision to move to co-regulation required a much 
shorter timeframe than the evaluation of a whole new regulatory level. 
Despite the Taskforce report, and the government’s response to that, there 
hasn’t ever really been a clear process that would have given certainty to 
industry around the process. I think you probably have to do that, but you 
wouldn’t give it five years [like with CR], you’d be looking at two-three. 
Given that self-regulation already has been given a pretty good go (Public 
servant, #22). 
5.5.3.4 Threat of regulation 
Lastly, interviewees from all non-industry sectors reported the need for imposing 
an explicit threat from the government to move up the pyramid in case a 
regulatory level fails. This threat would push the industry to improve their 
regulatory scheme and induce compliance because the last thing industry wants 
“is what they describe as heavy-handed regulation” (Politician - Fed, #16). 
However, according to industry representatives and a public servant, current 
government involvement in the ABAC’s Management Committee acts as a threat 
in itself and induces industry compliance: 
I must clarify here that there isn’t any actual threat [currently], like there 
isn’t a government saying that. But, obviously, their thinking is – in the same 
way that there was very, very quick sudden regulation to gambling 
advertising – if the public is concerned enough, if the government gets 





5.5.4 Summary of fundamental conditions 
The interviewees provided two general viewpoints on the type of fundamental 
conditions or requirements for a successful and effective regulatory system. One 
with a vested financial interest and advocated for maintaining the status quo and 
minimal government involvement. The other viewpoint had the interest of the 
community at heart and advocated for a change of the regulatory system, and was 
a more dominantly represented by interviewees. The fundamental conditions for 
effective alcohol marketing regulation from the perspective of the latter viewpoint 




Summary of fundamental conditions for effective alcohol marketing regulation 
Who are the required stakeholders? 
• Government leadership and commitment to drive change 
• Government consults with stakeholders, such as industry, community, public 
health advocates, academics 
What needs to be in place? 
• Overarching objectives, KPIs, and benchmarks regardless of the regulatory 
level (e.g. self- and co-regulation) 
• Clearly defined and meaningful parameters developed independently of 
industry; KPIs should have a focus on process and output indicators, and 
benchmarks need to be easy to measure and not open to interpretation  
• Recommended objectives were opposed:  
o First, should the Code align with community standards or higher 
standards that change community norms around alcohol consumption? 
o Second, should the objectives focus on youth under 18 or the whole 
community, which captures all vulnerable groups? 
• Evidence-based evaluation tool 
• Single robust marketing code, which should: include a broad definition of the 
word ‘marketing’; apply to all marketing communications that appeal to 
children; and include placement restrictions 
How to manage the regulatory processes? 
• Formalise interaction between stakeholders to manage conflict of interest 
• Increase transparency to increase trust among stakeholders  
• Set timelines (2-to-5 years) for assessing overall performance 
• Communicate threat of regulation and implement Responsive Regulation 





5.6 Pyramid levels 
As established above, the regulatory pyramid needs many fundamental conditions 
in place for it to be effective. The following sections discuss the components that 
are likely to differ per level of the regulatory pyramid, such as design and 
governance, participation levels, and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
The characteristics of the bottom and top levels of the pyramid (market 
mechanisms and explicit government regulation) are quite straightforward, 
whereas the levels in between are not clearly defined yet. Therefore, the ideal 
characteristics and criteria of the self- and co-regulatory levels will be discussed 
below.  
5.6.1 Effective self-regulatory criteria 
Many interviewees were apprehensive when making suggestions for an improved 
self-regulatory scheme, as they reported they did not believe that self-regulation 
of alcohol marketing would work (in Australia) regardless of its ‘packaging’. This 
will be further discussed in section 5.8 (Applicability of the Pyramid). However, 
the interviewees also thought that discussing current regulation and its flaws was 
important to improve the regulation of alcohol marketing. 
5.6.1.1 Governance and design 
Interviewees with a high level of experience or expertise in the day-to-day 
running of the ABAC scheme were asked to discuss the management of the 
current self-regulatory scheme and its current evaluation processes, to establish 
the level of involvement and roles required when designing and running effective 
self-regulation. 
The ABAC management committee currently consists of an independent chair, 
four industry representatives, and one federal government representative. At the 
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time of the interviews, the State/Territory governments were represented by the 
Inter-Governmental Committee on Drugs15 (IGCD), who advised on alcohol and 
drug policy to the Health ministers. However, according to an interviewee from 
the public service sector (#22), the IGCD had been less involved than the federal 
government in ABAC, due to its belief that this current self-regulatory system is 
ineffective in protecting children from exposure of alcohol marketing. According 
to that same interviewee, the role of the government representative on the ABAC 
Management Committee is to collaborate with the Committee to improve on the 
ABAC scheme and to encourage companies (producers and retailers of alcohol) to 
sign up as signatories to the Code. However, the interviewee also remarked that 
the representative is restricted to work “within the structures as they currently 
exist” (Public Servant, #22), which implies a limitation to the extent of their 
influence. 
Currently, the ABAC Management Committee decides on how and when the 
scheme should be reviewed. Interviewees reported on the following gaps within 
the ABACs reviewing processes: First, interviewees indicated that currently, there 
are no official mechanisms of review or any pre-established evaluation 
frameworks in place for the evaluation of the ABAC scheme. An industry 
representative confirmed that previous reviews had been performed in a more ad-
hoc fashion: 
We made the decision a number of years ago that we wanted a review, but 
prior to reviewing the code, we wanted to assess the current Code against 
community expectations (Alcohol industry representative, #27). 
                                                
15 IGCD is replaced by the National Drug Strategy Committee which supports the Ministerial Drug and 
Alcohol Forum (MDAF) which consists of Ministers from across Australia with responsibility for alcohol 




Secondly, ABAC recently (2013 & 2017) commissioned evaluations from a 
market research agency to determine if community standards were aligned with 
regulatory decisions made by the Adjudication Panel. Interviewees from public 
health and public service sectors commented on the lack of consultation with 
representatives of other stakeholder groups, such as the public health community, 
and using ‘convenience sampling’ to get positive outcomes. This is exemplified in 
the following account: 
They sought opinion from a few stakeholder groups that they felt they would 
go to, rather than doing it [the review] more broadly (Public servant, #20). 
And finally, interviewees from the ABAC panel and public health sectors 
reported the need for open feedback channels between the Adjudication Panel 
and the Management Committee in order to be able to improve the self-regulatory 
scheme, such as having regular meetings set up between the Committee and the 
Panel where concerns around the ABAC Code and adjudication processes can be 
discussed. Yet, an alcohol industry representative report it is necessary to keep a 
distance between the Panel and the Management Committee and should be seen 
as an indicator of the Panel’s independence from the industry. 
Furthermore, an interview explained that changes to the ABAC Code following 
these reviews are mostly driven by the government representative, rather than the 
industry members of the Management Committee: 
Since the time that the government has been involved, the scheme has been 
extended to the internet, to the digital and social media …. we do tend to look 
at what’s going on and be one step ahead I suppose. So that was certainly 
something that we encouraged. During the recent [2014] review of the Code, 
we strongly pushed on having broader definitions on appeal to children, 
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which were changed from the previous code, so that was achieved (Public 
Servant, #22). 
5.6.1.2 Mandatory or voluntary participation of industry 
There was a consensus among interviewees that having all alcohol producers and 
retailers signed up and participating in a self-regulation framework would 
enhance its effectiveness. Currently, alcohol producers and retailers can sign up 
voluntarily to the ABAC scheme. According to the alcohol industry 
representatives, there is a high level of voluntary participation among alcohol 
producers and since recently, the larger retailers. One of them explained why this 
is sufficient: 
Look, I think it would be fantastic if every company was [signed up], we have 
certainly undertaken a major recruitment drive with a focus predominantly 
on Woolworths and Coles as major advertisers, and that certainly has paid 
off. Ultimately, we have now around about 95% of the core people who 
market alcohol encompassed under the code. So, there are only a small 
number of operators outside the system (Alcohol industry representative, 
#27). 
Yet, interviewees from other sectors, such as public health and public service, 
reported the need for everyone to sign up to attain a level playing field, which 
would only be feasible when making participation mandatory. One interviewee 
explained: “Theoretically, you can get that [100% participation rate] under self-
regulation, but it doesn’t happen in practice” (Public Servant, #22). 
On the other hand, interviewees such as industry-aligned academics, and 
interviewees from the public service and marketing sectors reported that 




Whereas forcing companies to participate might lead to a “cat and mouse game” 
(Marketing academic, #1) in which members actively circumvent the rules.  
Well, the good thing about voluntary is people own it, and the bad thing 
about compulsory is people don’t own it. So, as soon as you go to mandatory 
kind of thing, you need to calculate the risks and benefits of forcing people 
this kind of stuff, because they’ll be less likely to do it (Public servant, #18). 
5.6.1.3 Monitoring compliance 
This section is about monitoring compliance to the ABAC Code, which includes 
topics such as prevention of broadcasting or publishing inappropriate marketing 
content; prevention of improper marketing placement; and the handling of public 
complaints in relation to advertising content and placement. 
Currently, ABAC has a public complaint system and a pre-vetting scheme in 
place. According to the interviewees from the alcohol industry, there is no need 
for extended monitoring practices, as they argued that the low level of public 
complaints is an indication that the system is functioning well. They did not 
comment any further on how to improve on current monitoring. On the other 
hand, interviewees from the other sectors expressed the need for broadening the 
current monitoring framework extensively, and “applying a lens to all marketing 
initiatives in a pro-active way, rather than it is applied post-hoc if somebody 
makes a complaint” (Public health advocate, #4). While self-regulation generally 
means that industry regulates itself, interviewees from the public health sectors 
reported that monitoring should be done by an independent body to make it 
‘robust’ and ‘comprehensive’, because of the alcohol industry’s inherent conflict 
of interest in this space. 
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Interviewees from all sectors, except the alcohol industry, reported on possible 
improvements of monitoring within a self-regulation model. They suggested that 
an effective monitoring system within a self-regulatory scheme would have to 
incorporate at least the following three mechanisms, which are discussed in more 
detail below: 1) pre-vetting of most marketing communications; 2) having a 
public complaint system in place; and 3) active monitoring of breaches. 
5.6.1.3.1 Pre-vetting 
Currently, there is a pre-vetting system (AAPS) in place and requires ABAC 
signatories to pre-vet advertisement campaigns for TV, cinema, radio, outdoor 
media. For other forms of media such as digital media, pre-vetting is optional. 
There was a consensus among the interviewees that the significant advantage of a 
pre-vetting scheme is that it can prevent marketing communications that breach 
the Code from getting out in the public domain. According to some interviewees, 
mainly from the Adjudication panel, the current pre-vetting system is effective 
because it prevents at least the publication or broadcasting of the most outrageous 
ads. Other interviewees, from the public health sectors, regarded the fact that the 
public complaint system still identifies breaches, as an indicator that the pre-
vetting system is not working: 
We're supposed to have a pre-vetting process that should filter out ads that 
don't comply with the code and clearly it isn't working (Public health 
advocate, #7).  
Interviewees identified three major gaps in the current pre-vetting system: 1) it 
only requires signatories of ABAC – not every alcohol marketer – to submit their 
AMCs; 2) it is only required for the major marketing campaigns; and 3) this is 




and print. Notably, these are usually also the campaigns with a long ‘shelf-life’ 
and therefore broader impact. Interviewees from the adjudication panel and public 
service sector reported that it is not realistic/practical to pre-vet every marketing 
communication out there and that the emphasis should indeed be on campaigns in 
media with the biggest reach. Currently, pre-vetting of new product names and 
packaging is not required by ABAC, and many interviewees considered this as 
problematic because once a product is out there, it becomes a difficult, lengthily 
process to recall them from the stores.  
5.6.1.3.2 Public complaint system 
Most interviewees agreed that a public complaint system is an important 
mechanism to keep, as it can serve in gauging community sentiment around the 
issue. However, they also reported that it should be part of a broader monitoring 
scheme, as it solely relies on the public to complain and is a ‘reactive system’ that 
only deals with published advertisements to which the public already is exposed. 
Interviewees identified three issues with the current lodging of complaints by the 
public. First, they reported that large proportions of the public are unaware that 
they can complain about alcohol advertising. Interviewees from all sectors, 
including alcohol industry representatives, suggested the need to improve this low 
level of awareness by promoting the system broadly. Second, interviewees 
reported that there is confusion among the public around where to complain as 
“the responsibility is shared by too many different groups” (Public health 
advocate, #8), and that the submission process could be simplified: 
In that, they can simply make complaints. It should be an email system, but it 
should also be acceptable to write or call or any of those (Public health 
advocate, #10). 
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Because of these hurdles, interviewees reported people would require a high level 
of motivation to complain. An interviewee clarified: 
The other thing is people have to be pretty motivated. What I sometimes think 
about those complaint systems is you actually get the people who feel 
extremely strongly …. But most members of the public, even if they feel a bit 
concerned about an ad, just don't have the time or energy to do it (Public 
health academic, #12). 
Additionally, interviewees from the adjudication panel and public health sectors 
reported their concerns about the timeliness of adjudication of complaints, which 
is currently 30 days. Many smaller alcohol marketing campaigns, such as digital 
marketing, do not even last 30 days and by the time the Panel comes to a decision, 
the campaign is likely to have ended, while the impact on consumers has been 
established. 
5.6.1.3.3 Pro-active monitoring 
Interviewees from nearly all sectors reported the need for pro-active monitoring 
on top of the current reactive public complaint system.  
Relying on a member of the public to both be aware and motivated [to 
complain] and so on, yeah, sure, things are going to get through. That [active 
monitoring] would certainly be something that would strengthen any scheme 
(Public Servant, #22). 
An industry representative explained some forms of active monitoring were 
already happening on a company level and a voluntary basis, such as monitoring 
of user-generated content in social media, – and indicated this was not a difficult 




There are ways upon which the industry system can look at monitoring that 
would be fairly cost-effective. I know for examples that companies who are 
delving into digital marketing, they have people who monitor the sites of 
user-generated content on a 24/7 basis. So, some of that monitoring already 
exists on an internal company level and to ensure that any posts are 
moderated (Alcohol industry representative, #27). 
However, many interviewees reported that the ABAC should also actively 
monitor advertisements published or broadcasted in traditional media and should 
flag potential breaches instead of relying on the existing public complaints 
system.  
Overall, interviewees from the alcohol industry reported there was no need for 
extended monitoring practices, whereas interviewees from other sectors reported 
the need for broadening the current monitoring framework extensively. Some 
interviewees from the public health sectors suggested that monitoring within a 
self-regulatory scheme should be handled independently of the industry. 
In sum, interviewees from most sectors reported that a comprehensive monitoring 
system should include: 1) pre-vetting, with the prerequisites that it contains 
compulsory pre-vetting for all alcohol companies, not just the signatories, and all 
advertisements; 2) a public complaint system with a high level of awareness 
among the public and simple access to the complaint process; and 3) pro-active 
monitoring of breaches, instead of just relying on the existing reactive public 
complaints system.  
5.6.1.4 Enforcement strategies 
This section reports on a range of enforcement mechanisms to ensure company 
compliance with the Code. It includes interviewees’ views of enforcement of the 
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current ABAC code and that of an improved self-regulatory system (with clear 
public health objectives and an effective alcohol marketing code). 
The current enforcement strategies within ABAC consist of asking a company to 
either adapt its marketing communication in case of a pre-vetter identifying a 
breach or to withdraw its advertisement after the Adjudication Panel has made its 
decision. The interviewees representing the alcohol industry reported that these 
measures, in combination with the perceived threat of increased regulation from 
the government, are sufficient in ensuring a high level of compliance by the 
companies. One of them responded: 
I know the Health lobby say it’s a toothless tiger because it has no 
restrictions in place. We just fundamentally don’t agree with that, because 
quite simply, the chair on the ABAC board, he will review anybody’s 
complaint of any of our ads. He will review them against the Code, and we 
will uphold his findings without question. And that is not only my experience 
with [my company], [but] across all major alcohol players in the market 
(Alcohol industry representative, #28). 
This perception was supported by an interviewee from the public service sector: 
Ultimately, most of them feel that they need to keep their own house in order 
or government will step in and do it for them (Public servant, #22). 
The alcohol industry representatives did not comment any further on how to 
improve on current enforcement mechanisms. However, many interviewees from 
the other sectors reported that current enforcement strategies are ‘weak’ and that 
there is a need for having meaningful enforcement in place for the regulatory 




One deterrence strategy identified at the lower end of regulation was ‘naming and 
shaming’. Within the current system, there is already an element of naming and 
shaming: marketers’ names and ads that are identified by the Panel to breach the 
Code are made public in the ABAC’s annual reports and on ABAC’s website. 
However, as many people are unaware of ABAC and its website, interviewees 
reported the need for increasing the level of awareness of ABAC among the 
public for naming and shaming to be effective. Additionally, some interviewees 
suggested that that reputational consequences should also be felt by the industry 
when dealing with the government. 
Another often proposed enforcement strategy was to impose fines on those 
companies that breach the code to change behaviour. One interviewee suggested 
replicating the ‘Medicine Australia model’: 
Medicine Australia represents all the medicine companies, huge multi-billion 
industry has a code of conduct around marketing and advertising, and they 
have significant fines. It is a self-regulation code, and they impose fines on 
members, and we’re talking hundreds of thousands of dollars. So, it can be 
done, and it is done in other sectors (Public servant, #19). 
Interviewees also discussed alternatives to the traditional enforcement 
mechanisms, for example forcing industry to pay for public health social 
marketing campaigns or alcohol research, imposing periodic bans on advertising 
by the company that was found to be in breach of the code, or rewarding 
companies who are compliant through for example positive publicity and 
discounts on membership fees. 
Some interviewees proposed having corporate contracts in place to be able to 
follow through these strategies. As one interviewee explains: 
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Now, if everybody would sign up to it, and there is a legally binding 
agreement, I guess that could work you know. If ABAC became a body and 
you signed up, and you said if I get a negative finding, I agree to pay the fine 
that is levied. I guess that there are legally binding self-regulation things that 
could work (Public health academic, #13). 
However, according to an interviewee from the public service sector, this would 
not be possible within self-regulation as the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
prohibits anti-competitive agreements16 in Australia. Some interviewees suggested 
registering the code with a government agency instead. 
5.6.1.5 Summary self-regulation level 
Interviewees discussed issues around the current regulation of alcohol marketing 
(ABAC) to inform future development of regulation. Additionally, they provided 
suggestions for the design and governance of an effective self-regulatory system, 
and options for monitoring systems and enforcement strategies at this level.  
Design and governance 
Despite federal government representation on the ABAC Management Committee 
and the changes to the ABAC Code that they pushed through, non-industry 
interviewees deemed the ABAC scheme ineffective regarding reducing exposure 
to children or other vulnerable groups. These interviewees suggested several ways 
to improve the governance and design of self-regulation of alcohol marketing by 
addressing the following flaws: 1) the non-existence of official mechanisms of 
review; 2) a lack of inclusion of a wide arrange of stakeholders during reviewing 
                                                
16 Section 45 prohibits making or giving effect to a contract, arrangement or understanding (or a provision of 
a contract, arrangement or understanding) if it has the purpose, or is likely to have the effect, of substantially 




processes; and 3) the lack of official feedback channels around the functioning of 
the ABAC Code between the Adjudication Panel and the Management 
Committee.  
Participation 
Interviewees agreed that a self-regulatory scheme can only be effective when it 
covers a substantial percentage of alcohol retailers and producers, and that these 
signatories should be, at a minimum, all the major alcohol producers and retailers. 
Many interviewees indicated the importance of everyone to sign up (100% 
coverage).  
Monitoring Compliance 
Interviewees from the alcohol industry reported there was no need for extended 
monitoring practices. In contrast, interviewees from the other sectors urged 
improving on the current monitoring framework extensively by pro-active 
monitoring of breaches, by simplifying the public complaint systems, and by pre-
vetting additional forms of marketing. Interviewees from the public health sectors 
suggested monitoring should be done independently of the alcohol industry. 
Enforcement 
The current enforcement strategy of requesting withdrawal of marketing 
communications was not regarded sufficient by non-industry interviewees, in case 
of stricter marketing policies come into effect. They reported a need for a 
combination of deterrence and compliance style enforcement strategies, including 
naming and shaming, fines, temporary advertising bans, paying for public health 
ads, and rewarding compliant companies. To be able to impose these mechanisms 
effectively, several interviewees suggested the use of legal contracts. 
Suggestions beyond self-regulation 
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During the interview, interviewees other-than-alcohol industry, but in particular 
from public health sectors, suggested improvements to self-regulation that would 
be better suited at a higher level of regulation, such as co-regulation. These 
included: signing off and registering a comprehensive alcohol marketing code 
with a government body; imposing mandatory participation on industry; and 
monitoring of compliance by an independent organisation. 
5.6.2 Effective co-regulatory criteria 
The following sections describe interviewees’ comments on the components that 
are required for effective co-regulation of alcohol marketing, including 
governance and design, voluntary vs. mandatory participation of the alcohol 
industry, mechanisms to monitor breaches of the code, and enforcement strategies 
that induce compliance by individual companies. Many characteristics of self-
regulation were found to be also relevant for co-regulation, and only a few 
specific features were added. Therefore, the sections below will be concise and 
should be considered within the context of previous material above (5.6.1 
Effective self-regulatory criteria). Representatives of the alcohol industry chose 
not to discuss co-regulation during the interviews, hence their voice is not 




5.6.2.1 Governance and design 
There was a low level of consensus among the interviewees around who should 
be involved in the design of the co-regulation level and at what capacity this 
should happen. Some interviewees, mostly public servants and industry-aligned 
academics, reported the need for close to equal partnership between industry and 
government. Whereas others (mostly from public health sectors) recommended 
managing the alcohol industry carefully, for example: 
With co-regulation, I think it probably would be okay if industry were given a 
say, as in they could share their views in the development of policies and 
things, but they should not be involved in the decision-making. They can 
inform the process, but they should not have the control of it (Public health 
advocate, #8). 
Similar to the self-regulatory requirements, interviewees recommended having 
official mechanisms of review in place and including of a wide arrange of 
stakeholders in these processes. Interviewees from the public service sector 
suggested maintaining the self-regulation’s flexibility to adopt policies and 
procedures in short time-frames. As one interviewee explains: 
One of the plusses of self-regulation, as it runs currently, is that it does mean 
that the Code can be reviewed and changed very, very quickly if it needs to 
be. So, ideally, you would maintain some of that flexibility a co-regulatory 
scheme …. I know certainly of one case where the code was basically 
changed overnight in response to an advertisement that raised a gap that was 
never thought of before, and it was changed ‘bang!’ just like that. Which you 
couldn’t do with legislation (Public Servant, #22). 
Currently, the government co-regulates some of the alcohol marketing placement; 
The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) has signed off on 
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codes designed by media groups, such as the Commercial Television Industry 
Code of Practice (CTICP). However, many interviewees reported that this co-
regulatory arrangement is ineffective in protecting children from alcohol 
marketing exposure, in particular since ACMA’s approval of a highly-contested 
exception in the CTICP that allows alcohol marketing during sports broadcasting 
on weekends and public holidays at any time of day. These interviewees 
suggested that this was allowed to happen because of ACMA’s prioritisation of 
economics over health. 
5.6.2.2 Mandatory or voluntary participation of industry 
There was a consensus among interviewees that signatories should consist of 
alcohol producers and retailers, as they have the final responsibility around what, 
how, and to whom they market their product or brand. The majority of the 
interviewees, but in particular from the public health and service sectors, agreed 
that there is a need for mandatory participation in a co-regulatory scheme. Some 
public servants even saw this as the primary distinction between self- and co-
regulation, whereas others (a public servant and a politician) were unsure if 
mandatory participation is legally possible outside of the legislative sphere. 
5.6.2.3 Monitoring compliance 
The monitoring mechanisms proposed by interviewees were the same as for self-
regulation, however, made mandatory: Pre-vetting of alcohol marketing 
communications, having a public complaint system in place, and pro-active 
monitoring. Additionally, some interviewees reported that the government should 





5.6.2.4 Enforcement strategies 
Interviewees mostly agreed that the co-regulated industry body should do most of 
the enforcement. They also considered having the alcohol marketing code 
registered with a government body as an essential feature of co-regulation. 
Interviewees described that this could function as a legal backstop when 
compliance fails, it can enhance ‘procedural fairness’ and provides the right to 
appeal in court. Some interviewees from the public service sector proposed 
developing legislation in the form of a standalone Alcohol Advertising Act, 
modelled on the Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act. However, one politician 
indicated this would not be appropriate and necessary at a co-regulation level as 
long as the government communicates a threat of increased regulation. 
Interviewees reported the need for a responsive approach and commented that the 
level of the penalty should be proportionate to the size of the campaign and 
advertisers past behaviour; and suggested that softer options, including education, 
should be tried before imposing heavy-handed responses. As one interviewee 
explains:  
I think governments and industry are more comfortable with that sort of: you 
get a warning, a second warning and a third warning, and then we're going 
to hit you by taking away your licence or your privilege to do this for a while. 
And also, there would be some sort of corrective education part of it as well, 
so that industry is told ‘we're giving you a slap, but we're also telling you 
how you can improve your performance’ (Public health advocate, #7). 
Most interviewees considered the mechanisms of enforcement for self-regulation 
also relevant for a co-regulatory level, such as naming and shaming, fines, paying 
for public health ads, and temporary advertising bans. Interviewees did not 
elaborate on these mechanisms, except that it is easier to impose monetary 
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penalties and restrictions on the ability to market a company’s products when 
having a regulatory backstop in place. 
5.6.2.5 Summary co-regulation 
As the two regulatory levels exist on a continuum, the reported features contained 
a large degree of overlap. The primary distinction was the level of government 
involvement when designing, reviewing, monitoring, and enforcing the system. 
Note that representatives from the alcohol industry did not comment on co-
regulation or its components, and therefore their view was not presented in this 
section. Co-regulation was often seen as an official ‘partnership’ between industry 
and government. However, public health interviewees warned to manage the 
alcohol industry in this process actively. Broad stakeholder involvement was 
generally strongly encouraged, and industry participation was considered 
mandatory by most. Overall, interviewees reported the need for the same three 
monitoring strategies at co-regulation as for self-regulation, namely: 1) pre-
vetting; 2) a public complaint system; and 3) pro-active monitoring, with 
government appointing independent panels. The interviewees still agreed that the 
co-regulated industry body should do most of the enforcement, using enforcement 
strategies, such as naming and shaming, paying for public health ads, temporary 
advertising bans and fines. Interviewees recommended the use of a responsive 
approach when reprimanding offenders, and to start with softer approaches, rather 
than heavy-handed regulation. However, the ability to take offenders to court by 
having a code registered with a government body was seen as the primary 




5.7 Barriers to the uptake of Responsive Regulation 
pyramid  
Australian governments have been reluctant to increase alcohol marketing 
regulation, which warranted further investigation. Themes identified covered both 
industry and government barriers to the uptake of the responsive regulation 
pyramid. 
5.7.1 Industry barriers 
The first sections will discuss industry representatives’ claims against increased 
regulation under the frames of ‘regulatory redundancy’ and ‘insufficient 
evidence’. Subsequent sections will discuss industry strategies to block effective 
regulation, such as having voluntary industry codes in place, lobbying with 
governments, and practising ‘corporate social responsibility’. 
5.7.1.1 Claims 
This section reports on arguments against increased regulation that are directly 
drawn from interviews with industry representatives, rather than third parties.  
5.7.1.1.1 Regulatory redundancy 
Interviewees from the alcohol industry reported that further regulation in the 
alcohol marketing space is redundant for several reasons. First, they stated that 
the current ABAC scheme is satisfactory, for example: 
The system is designed to ensure that we as producers are meeting standards 
that we believe are appropriate because of the type of product that we are 
marketing (Alcohol industry representative, #27). 
Secondly, these interviewees said that the alcohol industry adheres to own codes 
and that compliance levels to panels’ decisions are high. Third, they claimed that 
because the government supports the ABAC scheme in the form of representation 
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on the ABAC management Committee, it did not need improvement. The fourth 
reason not to increase regulation was that the current self-regulation standards are 
in line with community expectations and standards, which is reflected by the low 
number of public complaints. 
[If] we’d have a significant number of complaints in comparison to other 
products, then that would be an argument for a more comprehensive 
monitoring system that needs to be in place (Alcohol industry representative, 
#27). 
Fifth, one industry representative claimed that the Australian people are well-
informed, that drinking is a personal responsibility, and that the public does not 
“need somebody sitting in their ivory tower telling me what I may and may not 
do” (Alcohol industry representative, #28).  
The sixth argument was that the alcohol industry is aware that CSR is important 
to their customers and that companies have a reputation to uphold, which makes 
them adhere to internal and industry codes. Seventh, one of the interviewees 
argued that moderate alcohol consumption could be part of a healthy lifestyle, 
unlike smoking: 
This is a big difference between alcohol and tobacco; moderate consumption 
of alcohol is fine (Alcohol industry representative, #28). 
Eight, both interviewees from the alcohol industry claimed that the industry only 
advertises their products to adults, and one of them explained they would never 
target children: 
Do you honestly believe that people who work for these companies – who are 
Australians all with children – wanna do those things? Do you think they go 




offensive; there is a conspiracy view of the industry, it’s just extraordinary 
(Alcohol industry representative, #28). 
And finally, both interviewees from the alcohol industry suggested alternative 
causes and policy strategies of harmful consumption, which is exemplified in the 
following excerpt: 
But that is the actual influence, the influence from the parents in the process, 
it’s the education. Again, you’re looking at what are the causes of harmful 
consumption and how can you minimise the harmful consumption .... Alcohol 
violence is triggered by socio-economic factors derived from the childhood at 
the age of seven, not because he saw a Carlton Draught Banner on the side 
of the football field, you know. And I think it is extraordinarily naïve, and 
disappointing maybe if that is the level of sophistication of our health policy 
and harm minimisation strategy in this country. You know, we’re going to 
achieve absolutely nothing (Alcohol industry representative, #28). 
5.7.1.1.2 Insufficient evidence 
Interviewees from the alcohol industry reported that it had not been proven that 
alcohol marketing leads to increased consumption, misuse, and thus alcohol-
related harm outcomes and that any increase in marketing restrictions will need to 
be evidence-based. For example:  
There is simply no evidence to suggest that alcohol advertising on its own is 
leading to misuse…, there is no evidence – and ANPHA has said this 
themselves – that actually justifies banning advertising or totally regulating 
alcohol advertising (Alcohol industry representative, #27). 
The interviewees reported that marketing does not lead to increased consumption 
and that its primary aim is to make consumers switch products (e.g. from beer to 
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cider) and brands. Additionally, interviewees reported that the decline in alcohol 
consumption in Australia, together with increased marketing budgets, proofs that 
there is no relationship between the two and that this is thus another reason for 
regulatory redundancy. And finally, one industry representative argued multiple 
times that public health advocates and researchers have vested interests and are 
not objective in this debate, and advocate for ineffective strategies to reduce 
harm. 
While we’re getting accused of having vested interests, there are equally as 
many vested interests from the other side of the fence and with very strong 
neo-prohibitionist agendas …. I just don’t think they [public health actors] 
are objective. If they are receiving government funding, they need to be 
objective in their advising. I think they’re not doing their jobs properly, 
especially if they are receiving taxpayer’s money (Alcohol industry 
representative, #28). 
5.7.1.2 Strategies 
This section reports on responses from all interviewees that had experienced or 
had knowledge of industry strategies that potentially could impact on the uptake 
of effective regulation. Interviewees generally indicated that the alcohol industry 
has learned from the history of tobacco legislation and is using similar strategies 
to stop or delay alcohol legislation. 
We’re dealing with an industry that learned from tobacco how to get around 
it (Public health academic, #14). 
First, there was a consensus among non-industry interviewees that industry codes 
have been put in place to avoid or delay further effective marketing regulation, 




self-regulatory schemes enhance the reputations of a responsible industry and that 
this is then used to delay regulation. For example: 
If you’re talking about self-regulatory codes, they are really put there, so 
they look like they [industry] are doing something (Marketing academic, #1).  
Second, interviewees from several sectors reported that lobbying of politicians 
and policy advisors by the alcohol industry affects the uptake of effective public 
health policies significantly. The success of the industry lobby was attributed to 
frequent access to members of parliament, while proponents of public health 
regulation do not have the financial capacity to operate with the same level of 
access. As one interviewee explained: 
Those lobby groups are very active inside parliament, so they don’t just work 
in electorates targeting local members in an active political campaign. 
They’re always in and out of parliamentarians’ doors, they’re always 
knocking on doors, they are very powerful; they have access to members of 
parliament, and they are constantly making the argument as to why 
regulation would be a bad thing. And so, they – the supporters of regulation 
– just don’t have the power and influence. They don’t have the money to 
invest in full-time lobbyists, not in the way the industry does. And so, 
politicians aren’t hearing the arguments in the same way as they are hearing 
it from industry (Politician - Fed, #16). 
Another reason for industry’s successful lobbying was attributed to the 
communication of one clear, unified message by the whole alcohol industry, and 
their engagement with other sectors that make money from alcohol marketing 
(e.g. the media) to voice that same message. Therefore, – many interviewees 
reported – there is a need to give politicians support to challenge the powerful 
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lobby of the alcohol industry, by providing them with clear evidence-based policy 
solutions. 
Finally, some interviewees reported that corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
activities are used as strategies to delay increased alcohol marketing regulation, as 
a positive CSR image can enhance their reputation as a responsible industry that 
does not require further restrictions. Interviewees provided examples of CSR 
activities, such as self-regulation of alcohol marketing, funding of alcohol 
research, and implementation of voluntary health warning labels on alcoholic 
beverages by the Australian alcohol industry group DrinkWise. As one 
interviewee reported: 
There is a group called DrinkWise, where the industry puts money in, – and 
there again my cynical nature comes in – when they put it in DrinkWise, they 
say “We’re putting money into alcohol research and alcoholism prevention, 
what more do you want us to do?”. So, they say “We’re supporting research, 
leave us alone” (Marketing academic, #1). 
5.7.2 Governments’ reluctance to regulate 
Interviewees, such as public servants and politicians, reported there are no 
indications that governments are ready to change the self-regulatory scheme and 
move to increased regulation of alcohol marketing. 
Governments need to step up and get involved in the space, and at the 
moment there is just no appetite to do it (Politician - Fed, #16). 
Interviewees contended that policies are pursued because of the political impact it 
has in terms of elections and career prospects, rather than ideology or conviction, 
and that the fear of losing votes is partly the reason that the Australian 




Interviewees from public health and public service sectors reported that the 
second reason for lack of political will is the whole-of-government deregulation 
agenda, and subsequently, “any proposal to up-regulate in any form, needs to be 
accompanied by at least a cost-benefit analysis of de-regulation, in terms of 
dollar values, and that is dollar value to industry of the cost of regulation” 
(Public Servant, #19). 
Others commented, however, that while there is officially a deregulation agenda, 
this does not mean that regulation is completely disregarded as an option. 
Third, interviewees from the public service sector reported that the shared 
political responsibilities, due to the governments’ federal nature, is one of the 
reasons that there is no coherent national approach in this area, despite having a 
National Drug Strategy in place. Public servants and politicians remarked that the 
States and Territories are reluctant to do anything in the area of alcohol marketing 
regulation without a clear national approach. However, some also commented that 
States can still play a significant role by regulating areas within their jurisdiction 
(e.g. point-of-sale promotions) and by urging the Commonwealth to take action 
on the matter. 
Some interviewees concluded that having self-regulation in place is not only 
convenient for industry who uses this to avoid further regulation, but also for the 
federal government who now does not have to act. This is exemplified in the 
following excerpt:  
I think the current government’s expectations, and probably the previous one, 
are that the current self-regulatory system is enough to enable them to stave 
off any calls for action. So, I don’t think they have any significant 
expectations that it will do anything to curb alcohol promotion, I think they 
probably think it may prevent some of the worst possible excesses. And 
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enabling them to ignore calls for further action, so an excuse for no action 
(Public health academic, #11). 
5.7.3 Summary of barriers  
Interviewees identified that both industry and government act as barriers to the 
uptake of increased regulation. Reported claims against increased regulation by 
industry representatives were: 1) the current self-regulatory scheme is working 
well; 2) industry adheres to own codes, and compliance levels are very high; 3) 
the government supports the regulatory scheme; 4) the ABAC Code is in line with 
community expectations; 5) drinking is a personal choice by people who are well-
informed about the detrimental consequences of excess consumption; 6) the 
industry has a good reputation to uphold and would not jeopardise this; 7), the 
industry encourages responsible use of alcohol which does not include minors; 8) 
moderate consumption can be part of a healthy lifestyle; and 9) excessive 
consumption is caused by other factors than marketing and therefore harm 
minimisation strategies should be focussed on individuals, such as education. 
Additionally, these interviewees reported the need for more evidence to warrant 
increased regulation. Non-industry interviewees identified two industry 
strategies that are used effectively to delay or avoid increased alcohol marketing 
regulation: lobbying and corporate social responsibility.  
Interviewees confirmed the reluctance by the government to increase alcohol 
marketing regulation and stated that there is no indication that governments are 
moving towards regulating. Reported reasons for this were: 1) possible negative 
political impacts on election outcomes due to unpopular policies; 2) the 
government’s deregulation agenda; and 3) the complexities and shared political 




5.8 Applicability of Responsive Regulation pyramid 
This final section of the results will report on interviewees’ more general views 
on the applicability of the regulatory pyramid in alcohol marketing regulation. On 
the one hand, many interviewees saw potential in advocating for incremental 
change and the use of the pyramid. Alternately, some interviewees were 
concerned about advocating for a pyramid that includes ineffective layers of 
regulation. Industry representatives’ opposing comments have been discussed in 
section 5.7.1.1, and will not be revisited here.  
5.8.1 Incremental approach 
Interviewees from all sectors supported RR for its incremental approach, mainly 
because of the perceived government reluctance to introduce alcohol marketing 
legislation (see section 5.7.2). Some interviewees reported that regulation of 
alcohol marketing will always move up incrementally, as it is not associated with 
an immediate and severe threat to humankind (like a nuclear bomb), and because 
the industry influence on public health policy will lead to the watering down of 
health advocates’ proposed changes. Further, interviewees described advocating 
for the use of the pyramid as a ‘pragmatic response’ and ‘thinking of regulation as 
a strategic game’, which can be used as a tool to realise the implementation of 
legislation in the future. This is exemplified in the following account: 
Speaking hypothetically, if you determine that at a particular time it will not 
be possible to get regulation, then you might suggest some steps along the 
way that would take you there (Public health academic, #11). 
Some interviewees pointed out that tobacco legislation was achieved step-by-step. 
However, others referred to the failure of the ‘Health star rating system’, which 
was co-designed between the Australian Government, food industry 
representatives, and civil society actors. Further, some interviewees explained that 
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the responsive regulatory pyramid could be an attractive policy model for 
governments that do not want to be perceived as paternalistic; incremental 
changes can slowly ease people into accepting the path to legislation and can 
prevent backlash from the community. As the following excerpt explains: 
It’s usually easier to – from a policy point of view – to get incremental 
change as a supposed to say big bang change. We have seen that in Tobacco, 
we’ve seen it step by step, and if one measure is taken, then gradually other 
measures become more, acceptable to politicians and community and 
decision makers and opinion leaders and media and so on (Public servant, 
#17). 
5.8.2 Entry level of an alcohol marketing pyramid 
Notably, there were also many interviewees that did not support the idea that self-
regulation could ever be useful in the area of alcohol marketing. As it is part of 
the NPHT’s regulatory pyramid, some interviewees from the public health 
advocates sector were therefore critical of the overall applicability of the 
responsive regulatory framework. Interviewees from most sectors reported that 
self-regulation of alcohol marketing does not work, because the underlying 
requirements are not in place (as outlined in sections 5.5 and 5.6.1). They also 
reported that, in theory, self-regulation might be able to be improved upon, but 
that the inherent conflict of interest and lack of government involvement in a self-
regulatory scheme will stand in the way of a genuine attempt to protect the 
vulnerable populations’ health, as that would impact negatively on their profits. 
As one interviewee declared: “It’s the classic theme of the wolf looking after the 




Following on from this theme, interviewees discussed appropriate regulatory 
entry levels into the pyramid. Contrasting views were held: Most interviewees -
from the public health and public service sectors were of the opinion that the 
entry level should be at co-regulation level or above, as the self-regulatory 
scheme was deemed ineffective despite being in place for many years. However, 
some industry-aligned interviewees and interviewees from public service reported 
a need to further explore the spectrum between self- and co-regulation and official 
reviews before moving up. 
The next section will interpret the main findings from the expert interviews in 
light of existing research to guide the development of an alternative model to 
regulate alcohol marketing regulation effectively, as interpreted from a critical 
social science and public health perspective and as part of efforts to decrease the 




The discussion follows a similar structure as that of the results. First, I will 
discuss this study’s main finding around the barriers to policy change; then I will 
argue the need for fundamental conditions to prevent regulatory capture by the 
industry. Finally, I will establish clear definitions of the regulatory levels in the 
pyramid and discuss their characteristics. 
5.10 Barriers to policy change 
While tightening of alcohol marketing regulation is advocated for by public health 
actors and the World Health Organization (WHO, 2010), and supported by 
population surveys, the government is reluctant and the industry is opposed to 
change. This section will discuss specific barriers to policy change to further the 
understanding of political dimensions in public health policy. This knowledge can 
aid the design of better policy solutions (Oliver, 2006) and can subsequently be 
used to more strategically and successfully advocate for change (Cullerton, 
Donnet, Lee, & Gallegos, 2015). 
5.10.1 Industry claims 
Claims against increased regulation were frequently presented by the alcohol 
industry representatives when responding to any questions around improvements 
to the existing ABAC Code and criteria for co-regulation. The two industry 
representative interviewees provided consistently two frames of argument: the 
redundancy of improvements to current alcohol marketing regulation; and lack of 
evidence for the effects of marketing on consumption. The observed consistency 
of these claims confirms research that shows that the alcohol industry is highly 
organised (Pierce & Stafford, 2017), and aims to speak with a “united voice” 




manner” (McCambridge, Mialon, & Hawkins, 2018, p. 12). Claims that were 
made by these interviewees all have been identified in previous studies, and most 
of them have shown to act as barriers against uptake of effective alcohol 
regulation. Other interviewees also identified industry strategies to delay effective 
regulation, which will be discussed further below. 
5.10.1.1 Redundancy of increased marketing regulation 
Industry representatives asserted that the current self-regulatory scheme is 
working well and that participation and compliance levels are very high, partly 
because they have a public reputation to uphold. ABAC’s signatory list shows 
that it has a high voluntary participation rate (ABAC, 2018d). However, the 
support from the industry may reflect the weak standards of the Code that are 
easy to adhere to, while improving perceived CSR image (Munro, 2004). 
Having government representatives on the ABAC management committee was 
claimed to be another indication of success. In contrast, public servants revealed 
that the government is involved in order to monitor and push for changes, rather 
than endorse ABAC. Unfortunately, these kinds of regulatory arrangements with 
industry have been shown detrimental in improving population health policy 
(Durand et al., 2015), and more specifically, alcohol policy (Knai, Petticrew, 
Durand, Eastmure, & Mays, 2015). Research shows that such regulatory 
arrangements shape regulation in favour of corporate profits because it increases 
public trust in the industry (Cullerton, Donnet, Lee, & Gallegos, 2016). 
The next claim was that drinking is a personal choice of rational people, who are 
well-informed about the detrimental consequences of excess consumption, and 
therefore no further marketing restrictions were needed. Room concluded that this 
argument comes forth from a neo-liberalistic view which regards individuals as 
empowered consumers (Room, 2011). The research is however clear that harmful 
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consumption is driven by many factors that bypass rational thinking, such as 
marketing (Argyriou & Melewar, 2011; Meier, 2011). The industry further puts 
the onus on the individual by their promotion of ineffective health messages, such 
as ‘drink responsibly’ (Coomber, Hayley, & Miller, 2017; Coomber, Martino, 
Barbour, Mayshak, & Miller, 2015), which are in reality part of industry’s CSR 
strategies (Maani Hessari & Petticrew, 2017). People’s cognitive biases around 
drinking and the supply of inaccurate and incomplete information on the 
consequences of alcohol consumption make it difficult to make a real informed 
choice (Hoek, 2015).   
Moreover, the industry claims moderate consumption can be part of a healthy 
lifestyle (Fogarty & Chapman, 2012). However, the most recent independent 
meta-analyses showed that there is no safe level of consumption of alcohol in 
relation to cancer (Connor, 2017), raising the question of whether any messages 
of health benefits of alcohol are appropriate. Finally, the industry representatives 
reported another common industry strategy, which is the promotion of policies 
known to be ineffective in reducing alcohol-related harm, such as education 
campaigns (Miller et al., 2011) and campaigning against evidence-based policies 
that regulate the environment alcohol is sold in, such as stricter marketing 
regulation (Anderson, Chisholm, & Fuhr, 2009a).  
5.10.1.2 Insufficient evidence 
The second way arguments were framed was that there is insufficient evidence for 
a causal link between alcohol marketing and consumption patterns and that there 
is more research needed before regulation should be considered. Rosenberg and 
Lee found that in public health this was one of the “favorite delay tactics” by 
vested interests, which poses a real risk to evidence-based policy (Rosenstock & 




more likely influenced by peers and parents, rather than advertising; that 
marketing only promotes one brand over the other; and that the declining levels of 
consumption together with increased alcohol marketing spending in Australia 
support the argument that there is no correlation between the two. However, 
systematic reviews of longitudinal studies show that alcohol marketing has 
detrimental effects on alcohol consumption among youth (Gordon, Hastings, & 
Moodie, 2010; Jernigan et al., 2017a) and very likely also among other vulnerable 
population groups (Babor et al., 2017b). This was also demonstrated for tobacco 
(Lovato, Watts, & Stead, 2011) and food marketing (Hastings et al., 2003). White 
et al. found that the declining trends of alcohol use in adolescents in Australia are 
likely to be due to the stricter trading hour and drink-driving policies, restricted 
youth access to alcohol, and negative news stories about alcohol, rather than 
current self-regulatory marketing restrictions (White et al., 2018). When 
policymakers or politicians are convinced that there is not enough proof around 
causality, these epidemiological studies at least suggest that preventative action 
should be taken and that the burden of proof should be shifted to the proponents 
of a potentially harmful action (Babor et al., 2010; Connor, 2017; Kriebel & 
Tickner, 2001). An interviewee agrees: “Well, maybe the answer is we’ve gotta 
be on the side of caution, be conservative about it” (Politician - Fed, #16). 
5.10.2 Industry strategies 
Interviewees identified several industry strategies that can act as barriers to the 
implementation of effective alcohol marketing regulation, the first of which is the 
implementation of voluntary industry-designed marketing codes. Although self-
regulatory codes are also popular with the government because of their flexible 
nature, high levels of compliance and low costs, tobacco research has shown that 
these kinds of ineffective voluntary policies lead to a reduction of implementation 
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of effective government policies in the future (Hammond, 2011). Yoon et al. 
identified this type voluntarism as a pre-emptive CSR strategy in order to avoid 
future alcohol control policies by the government (Yoon & Lam, 2013). 
The current study identified a second strategy to avoid further regulation of a 
‘responsible industry’, which was the establishment of front-groups or ‘social 
aspects/public relations’ organisations (SAPROs). An example of an Australian 
alcohol industry SAPRO is DrinkWise, which claims that their “primary focus is 
to help bring about a healthier and safer drinking culture in Australia” 
(DrinkWise, 2018). However, previous studies have demonstrated that these 
industry groups have been set up with the aims to frame alcohol-related problems 
in the political and public debates as one of personal responsibility, rather than 
corporate misconduct (Yoon & Lam, 2013), and to promote ineffective 
interventions, and advocate against effective ones in order to maintain their 
profits (Miller et al., 2011). Fooks et al. found that the tobacco industry CSR 
efforts facilitated access to government officials and enhanced their lobbying 
efforts (Fooks et al., 2011).  
Finally, this study identified industry lobbying as a strategy to avoid further 
regulation. Lobbying is employed by the alcohol industry to build long-term 
relationships with policymakers (Kypri et al., 2018), which consequently gives 
them a status of legitimate stakeholder with access to every stage of public health 
policy making (Hawkins & Holden, 2014). To further influence policy, alcohol 
industry organisations collaborate to communicate a united position (Holden & 
Hawkins, 2013; Holden, Hawkins, & McCambridge, 2012). Moreover, the current 
study found that because of the public health sector’s lack of lobbying resources, 




lobbyists. This has been identified as a major barrier to nutrition policy change as 
well (Cullerton et al., 2016). 
5.10.3 Government barriers 
At the time of the interviews, there was no indication that the Commonwealth 
government was going to increase the regulation of alcohol marketing. One clear 
example of the government’s unwillingness to take action has been their refusal to 
release a condemning ANPHA report which contained 30 recommendations in 
regards to improving the current alcohol marketing regulatory framework. The 
report had to be retrieved with a freedom of information request (Jones, 2015). 
This study found multiple reasons for this lack of political will to make 
meaningful changes. First, it was expressed that politicians are scared of losing 
votes and are not interested in pursuing matters for which there may be public 
distaste, despite it being in the public interest. Politicians like to avoid 
‘accusations’ of being paternalistic (Hoek, 2015), and policymakers will always 
choose policies that are least coercive or intrusive (Allender et al., 2012; De 
Leeuw, Clavier, & Breton, 2014). Therefore, having industry regulation in place 
is convenient for the government as it provides a reason not to act (Hawkins, 
2016). A systematic review of the literature on barriers in nutrition policy 
supports findings that potential public backlash and lack of ‘public will’ are 
reasons for governments’ reluctance to regulate (Cullerton et al., 2016). 
Secondly, this study found that the government’s overall deregulation agenda 
contributes to the lack of political will and capacity to regulate alcohol marketing. 
As section 2.4 explained, this was a result of the significant influence of 
‘Thatcherism’ and ‘neo-liberalism’ in Australian politics (Robinson, 2013,  April 
11). And while pure neoliberalism was never pursued in Australia (and regulation 
by third parties paradoxically expanded) (Levi-Faur, 2005), the neoliberalist 
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rhetoric of deregulation continues. This is further enhanced by populist arguments 
by the alcohol industry that tightening regulation is an act of a ‘nanny state’ that 
interferes with companies’ ability to trade and limits peoples’ personal choices 
(Hoek, 2015).  
The Department of Finance and Deregulation ensures that government regulation 
is only used as a means of last resort (PM&C, 2014). The instructions, aimed at 
policymakers, prescribe that any significant policy changes proposed by a federal 
government agency need to be subject to a Regulation Impact Statement (RIS). 
This should be accompanied by a cost-benefit analysis of a number of policy 
options (including no regulation), that demonstrates that “the benefits of the 
proposal to the community outweigh the costs [to businesses, businesses, 
community organisations or individuals]” (Department of Finance and 
Deregulation, 2013, p. 27 & 55). However, in the case of complex public health 
issues like tackling alcohol-related harms, only multi-prong policy proposals 
would predict large community benefits. While a single policy, such as phasing 
out alcohol sponsorship might be more politically palatable, it would most likely 
not pass the RIS process (Gielen & Green, 2015; OECD, 2015b). Hence, there is 
a good argument for the government to change these policy development 
processes, which should instead reflect a greater emphasis on protecting the 
population from harmful consumptions.  
Thirdly, this study found that ‘federalism’ was perceived as a barrier to policy 
change, due to shared responsibilities by the Federal and State/Territory 
governments and the complexities around involvement of so many departments 
and agencies (Buse, Tanaka, & Hawkes, 2017). This has led to a reluctance by 
individual governments to take the lead to create a consistent national approach 




in regulating obesity prevention (Crammond et al., 2013). However, the 
complexity of regulation could potentially work in the public health sector’s 
advantage. For example, if a federal government is reluctant to act, then one of 
the States might be willing to take action (e.g. restrictions around point-of-sale 
alcohol marketing), which in turn can lead to ‘policy-transfer’ between states and 
ultimately federal government (Baker, Gill, Friel, Carey, & Kay, 2017). 
Australia did have a National Drug Strategy and an aligned National Alcohol 
Strategy until 2011 (with a low priority for marketing restrictions), in which 
federal and state and territory governments had input (Ministerial Council on 
Drug Strategy, 2006). The National Alcohol Strategy recognised the need to work 
and collaborate across portfolios, jurisdiction and communities, such as health 
care, education, social services, liquor regulators, law enforcement, the justice 
system and local government. This might not be sufficient, as it does not cut 
across business, trade and communications regulators. A whole-of-government 
commitment to reducing alcohol harm (Yeatman, 2008) or, similarly, a ‘health in 
all policies’ approach might be required instead (Ståhl, Wismar, Ollila, Lahtinen, 
& Leppo, 2006). 
In order to give individual nations a stronger position or a push to implement 
alcohol legislation, many leading researchers and journals have proposed the 
development of binding international agreements for alcohol, based on the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Casswell, 2012; Room, Schmidt, 
Rehm, & Mäkelä, 2008; The Lancet, 2007), or non-binding global codes (Landon 
et al., 2017). Alternatively, governments could integrate human rights law in 
national alcohol policy, such as Right to Health or The Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (Chapman, 2017; Ferguson, Tarantola, Hoffmann, & Gruskin, 2017; 
PAHO, 2017). While underexplored in non-communicable diseases, this has been 
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successful in the governance of infectious diseases, as it assisted the development 
of robust standards and capitalised on the existing accountability mechanisms, 
like human rights treaty bodies (Buse et al., 2017; Ferguson et al., 2017; Gruskin, 
Ferguson, & Beaglehole, 2014). Subsequently, judicial action can be taken to 
argue that the government’s inaction around alcohol marketing policy has failed, 
for example, to protect children from economic exploitation17 and hence could 
force regulatory change (PAHO, 2017). Similarly, in 2015, the Dutch court held 
that the government’s stance of climate change was unlawful on the basis of 
human rights and climate change treaties, and was ordered to cut greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 25% by 2020 (Walls, 2018). 
An additional barrier identified by other studies is that one of financial 
dependency. The government benefits directly from alcohol sales through several 
tax revenue streams and is reluctant to implement effective harm reduction 
programs that pose a threat to their steady income (Adams, Buetow, & Rossen, 
2010). Further, the political parties rely on donations for adequate financing to 
campaign and informing the public (Leong, Hazelton, & Townley, 2013). The 
alcohol industry is a major political funder of both the liberal and labour parties in 
Australia (Kypri et al., 2018). Biting the hand that feeds you by introducing 
regulation that reduces industry profits seems, therefore, undesirable. 
Finally, the costs associated with increased evaluation and oversight, compared to 
the relatively cheap self-regulatory scheme and banning alcohol marketing by 
law, can be seen as a barrier by governments. However, as argued above, this is a 
more palatable option for governments over legislation and the increase in costs 
should be considered in light of its potential to lower society’s costs of alcohol-
                                                




related harm. To relieve governments of some of its financial burdens, costs could 
be shared between regulator and industry, an existing regulatory body's roles 
could be expanded to include overseeing and evaluating alcohol marketing (e.g. 
ACMA or ACCC), and governments could request aggregated alcohol industry 
marketing data for evaluation use. Alternatively, evaluations could be funded by 
an earmarked levy18 on alcohol marketing expenditure. 
5.11 Fundamental requirements for effective alcohol 
marketing regulation 
There was a general consensus among non-industry interviewees that the industry 
does not regulate alcohol marketing for altruistic reasons and that the industry 
goals and public health goals do not align. However, some of the academics 
working with the alcohol industry did think that there was common ground to be 
found in order to get effective regulation in place. Additionally, interviewees from 
the public health sectors reported a lack of trust in governments to hold industry 
to account. In order to increase the effectiveness of alcohol marketing regulation, 
and to increase credibility and trust in the system, this study’s findings suggest 
having certain fundamental requirements in place before designing and 
implementing a regulatory pyramid. The following sections discuss these 
fundamental requirements in detail (see Figure 8 for an outline of this section). 
                                                
18 A levy is a temporary tax collected by federal, state or local governments and used for a stated public 
purpose. In comparison, a tax is usually a general contribution imposed on individuals, properties or 





Figure 8. Outline of the ‘Fundamental Conditions’ discussion sections 
5.11.1 Government leadership and stakeholder engagement 
The current study revealed a major concern from interviewees in the public health 
sector around regulatory arrangements with industry and their involvement in the 
design of health policy. Many studies have shown that this has led to watered 
down objectives in the past (Jones et al., 2016), which reflects their legal 
obligation to shareholders to make profits is considered (Stuckler & Nestle, 
2012). Instead, partnerships with industry are found to be more likely corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) exercises (Petticrew et al., 2017a). In an open letter 
published in The Lancet, 61 public health researchers and organisations have 
recently urged the WHO that there is no place for commercial industries in the 
governance of prevention and treatment of chronic diseases, as these have a clear 
conflict of interest in the outcomes (Brown, Rundall, Lobstein, Mwatsana, & 
Jeffery, 2017). Yet, the alcohol industry has positioned itself as a key partner in 
policy formation (McCambridge et al., 2018), which has been welcomed and 












stakeholders having an ‘equal’ voice (Adams et al., 2010). This seems to be a 
generally accepted position worldwide, – even when tackling public health issues 
such as harmful use of alcohol19 – as is illustrated by the United Nations’ 
Sustainable Development Goal 17: “Revitalize the global partnership for 
sustainable development, because a successful sustainable development agenda 
requires partnerships between governments, the private sector and civil society”. 
The UN does emphasise that there is a need for monitoring frameworks, 
regulation and national oversight (United Nations, 2018).  
While interviewees recognised that in order for regulatory arrangements to be 
effective it is important to reach agreement between stakeholders around the 
goals, it was also predicted that this process could be very difficult, it could delay 
implementation and would likely degrade objectives. Similarly, Donovan et al. 
warned that aligned goals are often absent in public health policy formation 
processes and that public-private partnerships in this area will lead to water-
downed policies (Donovan et al., 2014). The misalignment of public health and 
industry goals could reflect an underlying tension between the neoliberal 
definition of freedom as non-interference and the neo-republican definition of 
freedom as non-domination which supports having legal frameworks that prevent 
individuals from being dominated by others (individuals, business, and 
government) (Pettit, 2015). These definitions represent two opposing ways of 
ethically framing the discussions: first, industry actors assert the need to 
encourage individual responsibility and limited government interference; and, 
secondly, public health actors assert the need for control of hazards, prevention of 
harm, and burden sharing (Beauchamp, 1976; Weishaar et al., 2016). Importantly, 
                                                
19 Target of UN Goal 3: “Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages” 
(http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/health/) 
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policymakers are often unaware of framing of problem definitions and that this 
framing has a large influence on policy formation (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016).  
This study found that for changes to be meaningful in terms of reducing social 
and psychological availability, it is essential that the government is the driver for 
change and that it sets clear and measurable objectives. This supports the findings 
of a recent evaluation of the Australian ‘Food and Health Dialogue’20 that 
revealed that strong government leadership is essential in achieving public health 
objectives (Jones et al., 2016). Crammond et al. highlighted that leadership should 
be defined as a political commitment and prioritisation, rather than support and 
commitment from bureaucrats (Crammond et al., 2013), as power has shifted 
away from bureaucracy towards politicians since the 1970s in Australia 
(Bowornwathana & Poocharoen, 2010; Campbell & Halligan, 1992).  
This study further recognised the importance of including other stakeholders, such 
as civil society (public health organisations), when developing objectives and 
designing a new regulatory framework. Because of conflict of interests, the 
alcohol industry should not be part of these processes that are crucial in achieving 
health objectives (Donovan et al., 2014). However, there is still a need to prevent 
regulatory capture21 and corruption due to the high level of interaction between 
regulator and regulatee (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992), and CPA efforts. In order to 
maintain a focus on health in policy formation and to prevent it being hijacked by 
                                                
20   Healthy Food Partnership was established in 2015 by the Australian Government, a successor of the Food 
and Health Dialogue was established in 2009.  Their primary activity was: “voluntary reformulation across 
commonly consumed food products with the aim of reducing levels of saturated fat, added sugar, sodium and 
energy and increasing fibre, wholegrain, fruit and vegetable content” (Jones et al., 2016). 
21 Regulatory capture happens when “a regulatory agency, created to act in the public interest, instead 
advances the commercial or political concerns of special interest groups that dominate the industry or sector 
it is charged with regulating. When regulatory capture occurs, the interests of firms or political groups are 




commercial interests, Adams et al. proposed developing alternative stakeholder 
engagement models that maintain inclusiveness, but can put governments in a 
stronger leadership position, and manages interaction between industry and public 
health strictly (Adams et al., 2010). Further, there is a need for mechanisms to be 
in place which ensure and maintain transparency, accountability, and 
governments’ autonomy (Lencucha et al., 2018).  
The current study also found that interaction between stakeholders should be 
transparent and formalised, in order to scrutinise the policy development 
processes, and that conflict of interests should be managed. One strategy to 
increase transparency, suggested by Ayres and Braithwaite, is having tripartite 
regulation in place that empowers public interest groups by giving them the same 
rights as a regulator to question practices and allow full access to all data and 
inspection reports (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). A second strategy to manage 
conflict of interest is to increase the number of stakeholder groups represented in 
the working group (such as community, public health advocates, academics), as 
this can overcome a democratic deficit and existing power disparities (Ottersen et 
al., 2014). 
A third strategy proposed by some interviewees was to develop official guidelines 
of stakeholder interaction. Likewise, the WHO developed comprehensive 
guidelines in 2016: the ‘Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors’ 
(FENSA)22 (WHO, 2016). The first overarching principle states that any WHO 
engagement with non-state stakeholders must demonstrate a clear benefit to 
public health. FENSA further outlines standards on: management of conflict of 
                                                
22 “The Framework endeavours to strengthen WHO engagement with non-State actors (NGOs, private sector 
entities, philanthropic foundations, and academic institutions) while protecting its work from potential risks 
such as conflict of interest, reputational risks, and undue influence”. 
http://www.who.int/about/collaborations/non-state-actors/en/ 
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interest, i.e. conducting ‘due diligence’ and risk assessments; acceptance of 
funding; non-state actor participation in various types of meetings; and 
transparency, including a publicly available ‘WHO Register of non-State actors’ 
(WHO, 2017). 
Yet, some interviewees from public service sectors disagreed guidelines on 
stakeholder involvement were necessary as they argued that public servants are 
used to managing opposing interest. While this might be true, their response could 
also be an indication that they are indeed unaware of the influence framing of 
issues has on policy development (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). Official 
stakeholder engagement guidelines might lead to increased awareness and, thus, 
reduce regulatory capture. 
5.11.2 Overarching and measurable public health objectives 
This study found that there is a need to set overarching public health objectives 
that sit above the regulatory pyramid and are independent of the governance 
levels. These pyramid levels were seen by interviewees as different approaches to 
reach the objectives. This is similar to the European Commission’s Better 
Regulation guidelines, which describe self- and co-regulation as “alternative 
policy instruments” to achieve the same objectives (European Commission, 2015, 
p. 23). Further, this study identified that objectives and KPIs need to be clearly 
defined, measurable, and meaningful, which makes it possible to review 
performance of the governance levels consistently. This is supported by previous 
research which concludes that it is problematic to evaluate unquantifiable 
objectives, and a way to improve effectiveness of regulatory arrangements with 
industry is to have clear measurable targets in place (e.g. with a SMART design) 
(Bryden et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2016; OECD, 2015a; Swinburn et al., 2015). 




developed transparently (Buse et al., 2017), and developed independently of 
industry (Kraak, Swinburn, Lawrence, & Harrison, 2014). 
Interviewees proposed that an important public health aim of alcohol marketing 
regulation should be to denormalise excessive alcohol consumption in order to 
reduce harm by implementing more stringent alcohol marketing restrictions. This 
has been suggested previously by alcohol researchers (Anderson et al., 2018; 
Nyborg et al., 2016) and has been successful in other public health areas, such as 
tobacco marketing, seat belt, and drunk-driving legislation (Gielen & Green, 
2015). However, interviewees from all groups, – and in particular from the 
alcohol industry – also indicated it is important to have an alcohol marketing code 
that is closely aligned with community standards. In a country where binge-
drinking is normalised in many parts of society, partly because of ubiquitous 
alcohol marketing, aligning marketing standards with those of the community in 
order to change norms seems somewhat contradictory. However, it does make 
sense from a compliance literature’s perspective: because if laws and regulation 
do not reflect social norms at all, they are unlikely to change norms, whereas 
gradual tightening of regulation will more likely result in changing social norms 
(Acemoglu & Jackson, 2017). Hence, this thesis proposes that governments assess 
community standards around alcohol marketing and consumption, and use these 
as a baseline to develop an incremental (progressive) pathway towards an 
ambitious long-term goal to shift community standards gradually and denormalise 
harmful consumption of alcohol. 
Many interviewees prioritised limiting alcohol marketing exposure to minors 
(<18), because of their particular vulnerability (see section 2.5.3). This is also 
generally seen as a starting point and a feasible approach to strengthen alcohol 
marketing regulation (WHO, 2010), because of the prevention aspect in future 
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consumption behaviour, and because child vulnerability is clearly a point of 
concern for the public (ANPHA, 2014). The current ABAC Code has failed for 
decades to protect minors because of weak standards that allow for loopholes and 
exceptions (Munro, 2004; Noel et al., 2017b). However, it is debatable whether it 
is even possible to protect those under-18 while advertising to those 18+. Perhaps 
this is theoretically possible in the digital media space where audience 
segmentation is very advanced and marketing is data-driven (Carah, Meurk, 
Males, & Brown, 2018). However, in traditional media, content and placement 
restrictions will most likely fail because of spill-over effects of marketing to 
adults; adolescents are attracted to similar content as young adults (Atkinson, 
Ross-Houle, Begley, & Sumnall, 2017) and exposed to the same levels of alcohol 
marketing as they watch the same shows and partake in similar events (Jernigan, 
Padon, Ross, & Borzekowski, 2017b).  
Therefore, many interviewees from public health sectors suggested reducing the 
overall volume of Alcohol Marketing Communications (AMCs), as it reduces that 
spill-over effect affecting minors and, at the same time, protects other vulnerable 
groups, such as problematic drinkers, pregnant women, and ethnic minorities. 
This is in line with previous calls from public health researchers and associations 
(Australian Medical Association, 2012; Babor et al., 2017b; Wilson & Till, 2012), 
and aligns with the government’s broader focus on reducing health disparities 
across socioeconomic and racial groups (PM&C, 2018). Moreover, other studies 
have found that it is very likely that alcohol marketing exposure not only affects 
‘vulnerable’ populations’ consumption behaviour, but adults in general as well 
(Argyriou & Melewar, 2011; Brown et al., 2017; Meier, 2011). Esser and 
Jernigan explain that nearly everyone is now specifically targeted by the few 




techniques and to segment audience data into small subsets of customer groups, 
which has also led to an increase in alcohol marketing exposure at population 
levels (Esser & Jernigan, 2018). 
In order to protect the whole population from alcohol marketing exposure, some 
public health researchers have called for a complete alcohol advertising ban 
(Anderson, 2009; Parry, Burnhams, & London, 2012), which has previously been 
predicted to be more effective than partial bans in preventing pre-mature mortality 
(Hollingworth et al., 2006). It is also supported by Australian and Danish cost-
effectiveness analysis that showed that a comprehensive ban should be given 
highest priority by governments as most cost-saving intervention – together with 
tax changes (Cobiac et al., 2009; Holm, Veerman, Cobiac, Ekholm, & 
Diderichsen, 2014). However, most interviewees from the current study found 
that an alcohol advertising ban in Australia is not realistic at this point in time, 
because of the government’s reluctance to legislate. 
5.11.3 Transparency and accountability 
The lack of transparency in the processes of the current ABAC scheme was a 
recurring theme throughout the interviews, which is consistent with concerns 
expressed in the wider dangerous consumptions literature (Palazzo & Richter, 
2005; Sharma et al., 2010). While the alcohol industry representatives reported 
there was already a high level of transparency and openness in the ABAC 
scheme, the concept of transparency was important to all interviewees. It was 
seen as an important requirement for the success of the regulatory pyramid, which 
is also supported by an ACMA report on optimal conditions for effective self- and 
co-regulatory arrangements in the Australian media and communications context 
(ACMA, 2015), as it can affect the legitimacy, credibility and public acceptance 
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of the regulatory arrangements (Bryden et al., 2013; Harker, 2003; Madelin, 2006; 
Taskforce on Industry Self-regulation, 2000).  
The first concern by interviewees was regarding a lack of transparency around the 
ABAC Code’s recent reviewing processes (Colmar Brunton, 2013). Partial details 
around the evaluation’s design and processes were only made available in the 
final report, which ‘positive’ findings were widely disseminated through ABAC’s 
media releases (ABAC, 2015b, 2017a). 
Secondly, interviewees reported a lack of transparency around the Alcohol 
Advertising Pre-vetting Service: its processes, the identity of pre-vetters, and the 
level of interaction with service users. Further, interviewees questioned if the pre-
vetting service’s goal is to protect audiences from inappropriate marketing 
content by functioning as a gatekeeper, – which was asserted by one of the 
interviewees from the industry – or to act as an ‘insurance system’ in which 
advertisers avert the costs of a risky campaign. The ABAC website indicates the 
latter: “This [service] provides some level of assurance, but no guarantee, against 
the possibility (and costs) of products or marketing being later ordered out of the 
marketplace – via the independent ABAC complaint processes” (ABAC, 2018b).  
Final suggestions to improve transparency were real-time and online reporting of 
all complaints (not only the ones that are adjudicated), and frequent reporting on a 
broader range of performance indicators and alcohol marketing related outcomes. 
For example, interim reports can be modelled on the AARB’s Quarterly Reports 
(AARB, 2012b), and could include compliance data at company level and how 
was acted upon failure (Jones et al., 2016). Annual reports could contain an 
aggregation of this data and include specific information around progress towards 
agreed goals and targets (Jones et al., 2016). An additional benefit is that a high 




compliance (Thornton et al., 2005). Others have recommended ensuring high 
levels of transparency around the development of policies by having open 
meetings and publicly available minutes (Jones et al., 2016) and disclosing all 
interaction between industry and government (Swinburn et al., 2015).  
Closely related to transparency – but not identical – is accountability. 
Transparency is a pre-requisite of accountability and does not include official 
scrutiny (Bovens, 2007). The current study identified the need to increase 
transparency in order to increase trust in the system, but also the need to have 
accountability mechanisms in place, such as an evaluation tool. Because, as Swift 
explains: “trust is not regarded as a sufficient condition for the effective social 
control of business behaviour as managerial opportunism will always prevail” 
(Swift, 2001, p. 24). Bovens describes corporate accountability as: “a 
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation 
to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens, 2007, p. 450). In 
many countries, PPPs between governments and (transnational) corporations are 
in place, but independent, transparent accountability mechanisms are generally 
not in place, which has been shown to reduce the effectiveness of regulation 
(Buse et al., 2017; Moodie et al., 2013). Instead, there is often a public discussion 
around responsibility and who is to blame (individual or society) (Swinburn et al., 
2015). Swinburn et al. argue the need to move from a responsibility rhetoric to 
one of accountability, in order to design and enforce effective PPP approaches 
(Swinburn et al., 2015).  
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5.11.4 Evaluation tool  
An important accountability mechanism is an evaluation tool (Jones et al., 2016; 
Kraak et al., 2014; Sharma et al., 2010), which some interviewees suggested 
should be established at baseline as this should improve efficiency, consistency, 
and transparency of evaluation. The evaluation tool needs to track and review 
progress towards objectives, KPIs, and benchmarks regularly, in order to assess 
the success of the regulatory level, to allow for policy revisions, and ultimately, to 
inform decisions about change in the level of regulation required (NPHT, 2009a; 
WHO, 2012). Additionally, evaluation is vital when building the evidence-base 
around interventions, which could lead to other jurisdictions emulating successful 
ones (Gielen & Green, 2015). There was also a consensus that overarching 
evaluation should be done independently of industry by a government-established 
body, which has been recommended previously by the Taskforce (NPHT, 2009a) 
and many prominent public health researchers (Bryden et al., 2013; Moodie et al., 
2013).  
According to the European Commission independent evaluators: “(i) carry out 
their tasks without influence or pressure from the organisation; (ii) are given full 
access to all relevant information required; and (iii) have full autonomy in 
conducting and reporting their findings” (European Commission, 2015, p. 53). 
This study suggests several options for agencies suitable for the evaluator role: 
the consumer protection agency ACCC, as alcohol marketing regulation can be 
linked to consumer rights issues; the media authority ACMA, because it currently 
has advertising co-regulation in its portfolio and thus has the required expertise 
and knowledge; or a public health government agency like the former ANPHA. 
Worldwide there are examples of similar agencies involved in the evaluation of 




of the ACCC) monitors industry compliance with the voluntary alcohol marketing 
codes (Federal Trade Commission, 2014). In Sweden, the Swedish Consumer 
Agency is the responsible for national supervision in alcohol marketing area, and 
actively monitors compliance of self-regulatory codes and the Alcohol Act, which 
partially bans alcohol marketing (EUCAM, 2018c). Health departments often 
have a final responsibility when alcohol marketing is regulated by law, for 
example in Thailand, Finland and Norway (Alcohol Control Act 2008 (Royal Thai 
Government) B.E. 2551; EUCAM, 2018a, 2018b). Others have also 
recommended holding government and industry to account by having independent 
monitoring of health outcomes, risk factors, and effectiveness of governance 
arrangements by civil society organisations (Buse et al., 2017; Lobstein & 
Brinsden, 2014; Ottersen et al., 2014; PAHO, 2017). This aligns with the 
Responsive Regulation theory’s tripartism model and networked governance 
solution to prevent regulatory capture of public servants or politicians (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2017). 
5.11.4.1 Key performance indicators 
This study found that an effective alcohol marketing evaluation framework should 
include process indicators around development, implementation, and 
sustainability of policies (e.g. existence of an effective and accessible public 
complaint system), and short-term indicators of alcohol marketing policies that 
prescribe the evaluation of marketing exposure data, such as frequencies, rates, 
and industry marketing spending. Researchers warn that it is complicated to 
evaluate consumer exposure and ‘engagement’ on digital platforms (e.g. 
Facebook) as marketing content is often published on private accounts (Carah et 
al., 2018). Others have suggested including the assessment of unintended 
consequences of regulation (Bryden et al., 2013), to review the performance of all 
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stakeholders (Kraak et al., 2014), to scrutinise the suitability of the partnership 
model (Jones et al., 2016), and to evaluate public policy support (Parry et al., 
2018). 
Long-term outcome indicators of the policy were, on the other hand, considered 
poor indicators of success by interviewees. The reasons for this is that it is 
unlikely to observe measurable changes (such as a change in consumption 
patterns) because of the short timeframes that the reviews require and because of 
the multifaceted influences on alcohol consumption (Jilcott, Ammerman, 
Sommers, & Glasgow, 2007). However, interviewees still regarded tracking and 
reporting on long-term outcomes as valuable, and recommended to adjust the 
code and alcohol marketing policies accordingly. Other studies have suggested 
taking also into account mediating variables of harmful alcohol consumption, 
such as marketing receptivity and engagement with marketing (e.g. brand 
alliance, drinker identity) (McClure et al., 2013; McClure et al., 2016), alcohol 
expectancies (Patrick et al., 2009), and social norms (Petticrew et al., 2017b). 
For further development of a comprehensive alcohol marketing evaluation 
framework, the RE-AIM framework could be used (Jones et al., 2016). It 
measures policies’ reach, effectiveness, adoption, implementation, and 
maintenance and is specifically designed and validated for planning and 
evaluation of public health initiatives (Gaglio, Shoup, & Glasgow, 2013; 




5.11.4.2 Data sources 
Comprehensive monitoring data collected by the industry body (e.g. ABAC), – 
such as information around public complaints, pre-vetting, breaches, and 
sanctions – could be provided to the regulatory agency and incorporated in the 
annual evaluation (for further discussion of monitoring, please refer to section 
5.12.2.2). Yet, some interviewees, in particular from the public health sector, 
perceived industry-derived data as untrustworthy and proposed periodic 
monitoring by experienced market research companies instead. Other jurisdictions 
have tasked NGOs to do this, for example, the Dutch Institute for Alcohol Policy 
(STAP) was funded by the government to monitor alcohol marketing 
independently from industry between 2002-2012 (STAP, n.d.). This externally 
collected data could be compared to industry data to evaluate accuracy and 
trustworthiness. 
Finally, interviewees from government sectors envisaged marketing spending data 
to be provided by individual companies, whereas others assumed that the industry 
would refuse to give up such data that is commercial-in-confidence. However, the 
Australian Government has the option to legally empower a regulatory agency to 
request industry data, similar to the Federal Trade Commission in America. They 
monitor alcohol marketing by subpoenaing ‘special orders’ from major alcohol 
trade associations and report only on aggregated company data in an anonymous 
fashion to prevent disclosure of sensitive information (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2014). 
5.11.5 Setting of timelines 
The next identified fundamental condition for the success of the regulatory 
pyramid in alcohol regulation is setting time frames for pyramid level change. 
There was a consensus that a decision to move up the regulatory pyramid would 
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be appropriate to make within two-to-five years of a regulatory scheme’s running, 
depending on objectives and KPIs that are put in place. Similarly, others have also 
concluded that objectives need to be time-bound for regulatory arrangements with 
industry to work (Bryden et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2016), and that subsequently it 
should be determined if there is a need to upregulate (Magnusson & Reeve, 2015; 
Moodie et al., 2013; Swinburn et al., 2015).  
5.11.6 Threat of regulation 
Finally, interviewees reported the need for a clear threat of regulating by the 
government. This is in line with the Responsive Regulation theory which explains 
that in order to induce compliance there is a need for a “clear communication in 
advance of willingness by the state to escalate up the pyramid” to project an 
image of an invincible regulator, and display a hierarchy of regulatory strategies 
(Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 38). Without political support, the regulatory 
agency will not be seen by industry as the ‘Big Benign Gun’ and will not be able 
to regulate effectively (Parker, 2006). Whilst there is currently no indication of 
political support for the moral seriousness of alcohol marketing contributed harm, 
in the past, there has been political support: as one interviewee explained, in the 
early 2000s health ministers “shamed the industry into better performance” 
(Public servant, #18). A National Committee for the Review of Alcohol 
Advertising (NCRAA) was established, and their recommendations led to major 
changes to the ABAC scheme out of fear of legislation, such as: having a 
government representative on the Management Committee; having a public health 
person included in the Adjudication Panel, and involved in every adjudication of a 
complaint; having a speedier turn-around of complaint adjudication, i.e. within 30 
days; providing an annual report; providing adjudication decisions of complaints 




mandatory pre-vetting of e.g. outdoor media (National Committee for the Review 
of Alcohol Advertising, 2003). 
Hence, in order to have a meaningful regulatory scheme in place and to bring 
about industry compliance without legislating, there is a need for a government to 
communicate a threat of escalation of regulation. Otherwise, the industry will 
benefit from the regulatory arrangements as if it were a public relations exercise, 
while circumventing the standards and undermining the credibility of the system 
(Jones et al., 2016). Whereas “keeping a socialist spectre seriously alive in the 
imagination of the peak of a pyramid can motivate them [regulatee] to make 
capitalism work more ethically” (Braithwaite, 2013b). 
5.11.7  Comprehensive marketing code 
There was a consensus among interviewees that having an industry designed 
marketing code in place has led to weak standards that are easy to comply with, 
that do not harm the industry’s sales, and do not protect vulnerable groups. This is 
a common criticism of alcohol marketing self-regulatory codes globally (Noel et 
al., 2017a). This study found there is a need for a new single comprehensive 
marketing code, which in tobacco regulation has shown to reduce self-reported 
marketing exposure in smokers significantly (Kasza et al., 2011). Interviewees 
identified three basic requirements in order to avoid designing standards 
containing loopholes and exceptions. 
First, the word ‘marketing’ needs to be broadly defined. At the time of the 
interview, of particular concern were under-regulation of digital marketing and 
exclusion of sponsorship and product placement from the ABAC definition of 
‘marketing’. With the recent changes in the ABAC Code, digital marketing and 
product placement are now covered by the content standards (ABAC, 2017b). 
However, enforcement is still problematic, especially in the digital environment, 
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which will be expanded on below (section 5.11.7.2), and sponsorship and price 
promotions are still not included as a marketing strategy. Therefore, this thesis 
recommends covering all marketing techniques and strategies, even unpaid 
marketing (e.g. news stories), CSR activities (Pantani et al., 2017), and product 
development. An example of such an all-encompassing definition is that of the 
WHO: “Any form of commercial communication or message that is designed to 
increase, or has the effect of increasing, the recognition, appeal and/or 
consumption of particular products and services. It could comprise anything that 
acts to advertise or otherwise promote a product or service” (WHO, 2010).  
Experience in the past shows that when definitions are not comprehensive 
enough, the alcohol industry will take advantage of loopholes. For example, in 
1951, advertising of aniseed-based alcoholic drinks was banned in France, with a 
few exceptions such as pub displays, ‘Ricard’ responded by designing eye-
catching point-of-sale items, such as jugs, ashtrays, and clocks, which propelled 
the company as a market leader at the time. Ricard himself explained: “The 
advertising ban, which could appear as a formidable handicap, was actually a 
secret advantage which obliged us to exercise our imagination” (Knowles, 2012). 
For alcohol promotion in current ‘dark markets’, marketing experts give similar 
advice on how to connect with consumers: namely, by being creative, push 
boundaries, and using strategies such as sponsorship, innovate packaging, product 
placement and point-of-sale (e.g. discounts), and by engaging on digital platforms 
or in hot-spot holiday destinations where regulation is not as strict (Guy, 2016). 
The second requirement is to design clear content restrictions that do not allow for 
exceptions. This study found that the ABAC Code standards are unspecific, for 
example, one gap in the Code allows the design of alcohol marketing that is 




(e.g. by integrating cartoon characters or kids’ toys) (ABAC, 2017b). These vague 
provisions are common in self-regulation of alcohol marketing around the world 
(Noel et al., 2017b). Young children might be protected to a certain degree. 
However, there are no specific standards in place that protect adolescents, a group 
that is very vulnerable. As a recent Australian study suggests, alcohol advertising 
appeals to adolescents just as much as young adults, and that this appeal is 
associated with intention to purchase and consume the advertised product (Aiken 
et al., 2018). On top of this, studies have found that adolescents are actively 
targeted with appealing marketing content that links alcohol consumption to 
physical success, health, humour and relaxation (Noel et al., 2017a). Despite 
repeated calls to change this provision (ANPHA, 2014; Pettigrew, Johnson, & 
Daube, 2013), ABAC has not. One interviewee suggested:  
The problem is that if you make ads not appealing to anybody, including kids, 
they are going to be drab or brown or beige or green and boring. And that is 
why the industry would hate this, and fight it absolutely. So, it’s a very 
problematic part of the code (ABAC Adjudication Panel Member, #26). 
However, content restrictions ignore the cumulative impact of marketing 
exposure on consumption behaviours and cultural norms. Interviewees agreed that 
a more effective way to protect vulnerable groups from the impact of exposure is 
to put placement restrictions in place. An additional benefit is that breaches can 
be easily detected and do not require a panel to make subjective adjudications. 
The recent decision of ACMA to loosen placement restrictions in the CTS by 
allowing broadcasting of alcohol sponsored sports during children’s viewing 
times, was therefore seen as an example of failure of the regulatory system and 
also as surprising at a time of rising community concern around alcohol 
sponsorship (AARB, 2017; Callinan, Room, & Livingston, 2014).  
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5.11.7.1 Example of a comprehensive marketing code 
The AARB (Alcohol Advertising Review Board) was established in 2012 by the 
McCusker Centre for Action on Alcohol and Youth (MCAAY) and Cancer 
Council WA and provides an alternative and independent system of alcohol 
advertising review of community complaints regarding placement and content of 
AMCs (Pettigrew et al., 2013). It is an example of a comprehensive alcohol 
marketing code that contains the three recommended requirements: a broad 
definition of marketing; clear content restrictions; and evidence-based placement 
restrictions. Remarkably, the AARB Code is constructed using only provisions 
from existing alcohol self- and co-regulatory alcohol marketing codes from 
around the world. Importantly, in order to prevent creative compliance, the 
AARB Code states that MCs “must reflect the spirit, not merely the letter, of the 
Code”23 (AARB, 2012a), which was already recommended by NCRAA back in 
2003 (National Committee for the Review of Alcohol Advertising, 2003). The 
AARB code could be used as a starting point when designing a new alcohol 
marketing code. 
5.11.7.2 Digital marketing  
Digital marketing is discussed as a separate section because under-regulation and 
difficulties of digital regulation were recurring themes in the interviews and also 
hot topics in the current literature. Studies have now shown that there has been an 
increase in alcohol marketing exposure in minors through digital media and that 
this is associated with higher levels of consumption and binge drinking (Lobstein 
et al., 2017) (Noel et al., 2017a). Seemingly due to public pressure, ABAC 
recently decided to include digital media in the definition of marketing (ABAC, 
2017b). Subsequently, the content of digital AMCs can be subject to adjudication, 
                                                




as long as the content is under ‘reasonable control’ of the marketer. Additionally, 
ABAC has developed a ‘Best Practice Guide to Digital Marketing’, which advices 
on placement in digital marketing in relation to minors; however this is non-
binding (ABAC, 2016b). This is a major issue, as minors are currently being 
targeted on “teen-friendly” platforms, such as ‘Snapchat’ (Schultz, 2016).  
While interviewees called for stronger standards and tougher enforcement, there 
was also a consensus that digital marketing is relatively hard to regulate. First, 
because of the borderless nature of the web, making it easier to circumvent 
national laws. Consequently, Babor et al. recommended the development of an 
international public health agreement on alcohol marketing that can support 
nations to move together towards comprehensive and consistent digital marketing 
regulation (Babor, Jernigan, Brookes, & Brown, 2017a). Secondly, interviewees 
pointed out the difficulties around regulating ‘User-Generated Content’ (UGCs; 
content generated by consumers rather than the brand owner). The ABAC scheme 
only adjudicates UGCs under the Code if they are within ‘reasonable’ control of a 
Marketer (e.g. on companies’ own brand pages) or endorsed by the marketer (e.g. 
through sharing, liking and re-tweeting). ABAC further suggest – in non-binding 
placement guidelines – that the marketer should be moderating UGCs and use 
automatic software where possible (ABAC, 2016b). However, only a small 
proportion of UGCs would be under ‘control’ of the marketer, because media 
platforms are specifically designed to stimulate engagement between customer 
and product, mainly through user-generated content (Carah et al., 2018). The 
Finnish government has dealt with this – without restricting consumers’ voice – 
by not allowing UGCs to be used by the marketer in their advertising (e.g. photos 
and stories) (Dunlop, Freeman, & Jones, 2016). 
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Thus, regulation of marketing using digital media platforms is complex. Other 
studies have suggested that policymakers need to consider the extensiveness and 
context of digital marketing, and acknowledge digital media platforms’ ‘native 
model’ in which advertising is hard to distinguish from other content (Carah, 
2014; Carah et al., 2018). Additionally, regulators should take into account the 
age-gating technology problems (i.e. supplying inaccurate age) (Noel et al., 
2017a) and the rapid marketing innovations in digital media (Jernigan et al., 
2017b). Some interviewees suggested that industry in self- and co-regulatory 
arrangements are more equipped than governments to regulate digital marketing, 
as they are more flexible and can make changes quickly (which is supported by 
governance literature and Responsive Regulation theory (Ayres & Braithwaite, 
1992; Campbell, 1999)); and their companies traverse national boundaries, which 
means they can impose international standards. However, a credible threat from 
governments needs to be displayed before effective industry regulation of digital 
marketing can be expected. 
5.12 Regulatory pyramid levels  
This section will discuss this study’s results in relation to the levels of regulation 
in the pyramid and their characteristics in terms of design, monitoring and 
enforcement of the code. The final section will discuss the appropriate entry level 
of the pyramid to ensure effective alcohol marketing regulation. First, however, 




5.12.1 Redefinition of levels of regulation 
As explained in the background literature, the concepts of self- and co-regulation 
are not strictly defined, and often overlapping and placed on a regulatory 
continuum between market mechanism on the one hand and full government 
regulation on the other (Sinclair, 1997). The lack of clarity around these 
definitions also became apparent during the conduction and analysis of the 
interviews. This is not surprising, not only because of the varying definitions in 
the literature, but also because both the terms ‘self-regulation’ and ‘quasi-
regulation’ are used interchangeably to describe the current ABAC scheme, by 
respectively the public health sector (Jones & Gordon, 2013) and advertising 
industry (International Council on Advertising Self- Regulation [ICAS], 2014), 
and alcohol industry (ABAC, 2014b). The co-existence of several codes with 
varying regulatory approaches that deal with alcohol marketing in Australia adds 
to the confusion (ANPHA, 2014). 
As this study looks at the applicability of the pyramid as a regulatory option for 
Australia in particular, it could be considered beneficial when the proposed 
framework’s definitions overlap with those of the governments. Therefore, and in 
order to establish clarity, this study will from now on be guided by the definitions 
of the different forms of regulation recently published by the Australian 
Government (see Table 6) (PM&C, 2014).  
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Table 6 
Levels of regulation and descriptions based on the “Australian Government 
Guide to Regulation” 
 
 
Rather than the two levels suggested by in the NPHT pyramid (see Figure 1, p. 5), 
the table suggests there are three levels that could fit between ‘no-regulation’ 
(market mechanism) and ‘explicit government regulation’: 1) self-regulation, 
which is hundred per cent industry designed and run; 2) quasi-regulation, which 
has some level of government involvement or oversight; and 3) co-regulation, 
which includes underpinning legislation. Registering an industry code with a 




Similarly, there were several interviewees who suggested the need for an 
additional regulatory level, as they thought the jump between industry self-
regulation and implementing underpinning legislation with co-regulation was too 
big and not realistic in relation to the deregulation agenda by the government. On 
the other hand, there was also some concern expressed by some interviewees from 
public health sectors, as they anticipated an extra level would be used as a 
delaying tactic by industry. However, that concern is most likely unfounded, as 
the main alcohol marketing scheme (ABAC) is already dubbed a ‘quasi-
regulatory’ arrangement by both government and the industry, because of 
government representation on the Management Committee since 2003. Also, 
according to the definitions in Table 6, it is better classified as quasi-regulation. 
However, independent of what label it carries, this scheme has been in place for 
20 years and is considered to be ineffective. Adding quasi-regulation to the 
pyramid and aligning it with the government’s definition that warrants more 
government involvement and accountability might assist in moving closer 
towards more effective forms of regulation.  
The interviews were conducted based on the levels of the NPHT pyramid and 
asked interviewees to comment on the effectiveness of current alcohol marketing 
regulation and to discuss specific characteristics and criteria for effective self-
regulation. Because all interviewees answered with ABAC Code in mind and 
according to government definitions this should be defined as ‘quasi-regulation’, 
the discussion of these results (design, monitoring, and enforcement of the code) 
will now be moved to ‘quasi-regulation’. 
The characteristics of effective quasi-regulation (QR) and co-regulation (CR) will 
be discussed in detail below (i.e. design, involvement of stakeholders, mandatory 
or voluntary participation, monitoring options, enforcement strategies, and legal 
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backstops). A clear overview is provided in Table 6. Self-regulation criteria will 
be briefly discussed in relation to the literature, however, ‘no-regulation’ and 
‘explicit government regulation’ will not be further discussed, as the requirements 
are presumably clear. 
5.12.2 Quasi-regulation and co-regulation criteria 
From a government point of view, the purpose of having QR and CR in place is to 
shift the regulatory burden away from government agencies. Therefore, the daily 
running of the alcohol marketing schemes at these levels will be performed by the 
industry body, including the monitoring and enforcement. However, compared to 
the current QR scheme, a greater level of input and oversight by government is 
required. Additionally, this study recommends that the industry body is set up as a 
‘one stop shop’ that governs the single marketing code and deals with all alcohol 
marketing and associated complaints. 
The regulatory literature emphasises the importance of an industry having the 
organisational capacity (economic and expertise) to implement regulation, and to 
consider compliance motives (Braithwaite et al., 2005; Parker & Nielsen, 2009b). 
Looking at the current QR scheme, it is clear that the alcohol industry body 
(ABAC) has the knowledge, and the financial and technical capacity to 
implement new regulation and develop codes. The current pre-vetting 
infrastructure further indicates that the industry body is also able to build capacity 
among advertisers to comply. Economic and social motives are likely to be 
activated when enforcing compliance. For example, the industry body does not 
want to face bad publicity and reputational damage, as this could result in 
increased regulation or even legislation. Therefore, it could be hypothesised that 




With the provision that fundamental conditions are in place, and with the aims of 
protecting the population from inappropriate content and cumulative exposure of 
alcohol MCs, to change social norms around harmful drinking, and ultimately to 
reduce harmful intake of alcohol, this section discusses the characteristics of 




Required characteristics of regulatory levels 
 Self-regulation Quasi-regulation Co-regulation 
Who is involved?  Industry, other stakeholders may be 
consulted; 
Daily running by industry 
Industry and government co-design; 
Establishment of consultative 
stakeholder committee; 
Daily running by industry 
More government involvement in 
designing stages;  
Establishment of consultative 
stakeholder committee; 
Daily running by industry 
Industry participation Voluntary Voluntary: close to 100% Mandatory: 100% 
Monitoring 
tools  
Pre-vetting, public complaint, pro-active 
monitoring and adjudication 
Pre-vetting, public complaint, pro-active 
monitoring and adjudication 
Pre-vetting, public complaint, pro-active 
monitoring and adjudication 
Adjudication Panels Independent & impartial; Interpretation 
guided by ‘the spirit of the Code’ 
Independent & impartial; Interpretation 
guided by ‘the spirit of the Code’ 
Independent & impartial; Interpretation 
guided by ‘the spirit of the Code’ 
Enforcement strategies  
(deterrents and 
incentives)  
Naming & shaming, media refusal of 
offending advertisement; 
Public recognition and positive 
publicity, e.g. logos & awards 
Naming & shaming, fines, temporary 
advertising bans, paying for public 
health ads, media refusal of offending 
advertisement; 
Public recognition and positive 
publicity, e.g. logos & awards 
Naming & shaming, fines, temporary 
advertising bans, paying for public 
health ads, and court action; 
Public recognition and positive 
publicity, e.g. logos & awards 
Legal ‘backstops’ Adoption of a standard ‘responsibility 
clause’ in all advertising contracts with 
media 
Legally binding commitment; Adoption 
of a standard ‘responsibility clause’ in 
all advertising contracts with media 
Underpinning legislation, e.g. 




5.12.2.1 Design and governance 
In 2003, NCRAA recommended government representation on the ABAC 
management committee, which was taken up by ABAC (National Committee for 
the Review of Alcohol Advertising, 2003). The current study found that the 
government representative on the management committee has successfully 
pushed for modifications to the ABAC Code, and if it was not for them it would 
not have happened. Despite these changes, the interviewees concluded that the 
QR scheme was still not effective in terms of reducing alcohol exposure to 
children (and other vulnerable groups), which is in line with previous Australian 
research (Aiken et al., 2018; Jones, Hall, & Munro, 2008; Noel et al., 2017a). 
Hence, while working within the boundaries of QR, involvement of government 
should be strengthened, for example by co-designing a comprehensive code (with 
broad marketing definition, and both content and placement restrictions) that is 
aligned with the overarching public health objectives. Also, to achieve 
consistency in alcohol policies across jurisdictions, State and Territories should be 
actively involved too. In CR, government involvement should be expanded by 
putting underpinning legislation in place. 
5.12.2.1.1 Stakeholders 
This study’s findings further suggest the need for consultation with a broad array 
of stakeholders when designing and reviewing a code – such as community 
groups, public health experts, government, media and marketing experts. 
Similarly, ANPHA recommended improving on the process of review of the 
ABAC Code, by inviting public comment on proposed changes and by ensuring 
transparent consultation (ANPHA, 2014). Alternatively, a consultative committee 
could be established to further the public health objectives, and to design and 
review the code, and to monitor and enforce practices (National Committee for 
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the Review of Alcohol Advertising, 2003). NCRAA suggested that this 
committee would meet biannually and would include the representatives from the 
regulatory agency and public health, pre-vetters and the adjudication panel 
members, and the Management Committee. The more recent ANPHA report took 
stakeholder engagement a step further by recommending independent stakeholder 
representation (including public health) on the ABAC Board, nominated by the 
minister of health (ANPHA, 2014). 
Multi-stakeholder involvement is also an important feature of the Responsive 
Regulation Tripartism model, which should be in place to avoid regulatory 
capture and involves drawing the commitments and resources of interest groups 
into regulatory roles in order to govern effectively in an era of decentred 
regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Scott, 2017). As such, best practice from 
a Responsive Regulation point of view is that the design of a code includes third 
parties (Braithwaite, 2017). An additional benefit, according to Drahos’ 
Networked Responsiveness theory (which builds on the Responsive Regulation 
theory) is that including stakeholders or networked partners puts pressure on the 
regulatee, which can induce compliance without the need to escalate sanctions 
(Braithwaite, 2017). 
5.12.2.1.2 Signatories 
Interviewees agreed that in both QR and CR, whole-of-industry (alcohol 
producers, distributors, and retailers) participation is needed for the Alcohol 
Marketing scheme to operate effectively. While big players are obviously more 
important to sign up than small independent winemakers, close to 100% coverage 
would be ideal in order to have most MCs covered by pre-vetting services and to 
create a sufficient impact (Buse et al., 2017). Without government legislation 




participation in place. However, some interviewees suggested that the threat of 
‘upregulation’ would encourage the industry regulatory body to push for high 
participation rates, as rogue marketers could jeopardise the success of the system. 
There are also benefits of voluntary participation, such as a feeling of ownership 
by its signatories, which is argued to lead to less resentment towards the regulator 
and increased compliance with the code; whereas mandatory participation would 
need heavier enforcement options to induce compliance (Ayres & Braithwaite, 
1992). Underpinning legislation of the code in CR (more in section 5.12.2.3) 
would make participation mandatory, as it would apply to every marketer 
regardless of them signing up. According to this thesis, mandatory participation 
and underpinning legislation are the two areas where CR fundamentally differs 
from QR. 
5.12.2.2 Monitoring 
This section discusses the need for several monitoring mechanisms in relation to 
the content and placement of AMCs. Monitoring activities can serve as a 
deterrence for non-compliance (fear of detection) (Parker & Nielsen, 2017), as 
well as a way to review the effectiveness of the code, to identify areas for 
improvement, and to complement annual evaluations to assess the overall 
regulatory approach.  
Currently, the ABAC scheme has a pre-vetting and a public complaint system in 
place. This study found that there is a need to improve these systems for 
monitoring in both QR and CR to be effective; along with establishing a pro-
active monitoring system. These findings reinforce criticism that current 
monitoring is flawed and more likely to be in place to assist the industry rather 
than to protect the public (Jones et al., 2008). All three will be described in detail 
below. 
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This study established that pre-vetting of alcohol marketing is essential when you 
want to prevent the appearances of breaches of the code. This is not only 
beneficial for the public, but also for the industry in terms of preventing high 
expenses when having to cease marketing campaigns, and in terms of reputational 
damage (Madelin, 2006; ABAC, 2018b). Currently, pre-vetting is compulsory for 
signatories of the ABAC scheme for a range of traditional forms of media, 
including TV, radio, and cinema. However, for other media outlets – such as 
print, digital, point-of-sale, marketing collateral, and packaging – pre-vetting is 
optional. While acknowledging some interviewees’ concern of the logistic 
nightmare of having to clear every MC, this study identified the need to expand 
current pre-vetting requirements drastically by including: 1) all major marketing 
campaigns24; 2) all MCs with a large reach (e.g. print and digital); and 3) all 
packaging and naming of products, because of their long shelf life. Additionally, 
MCs from non-signatories are generally not subjected to pre-vetting (although the 
system is open for non-signatories). This can be addressed in QR by having 
contracts with media outlets, and in CR by having underpinning legislation in 
place (see section 5.12.2.3 below for further discussion). 
The Australian Association of National Advertisers (AANA) claims that ABAC’s 
complaint system is very effective and that the low number of complaints is an 
indication of this (AANA, 2013). However, this current study concludes that the 
ABAC public complaint system is due for a major overhaul. First, interviewees 
reported there is a need for a high level of public awareness of a complaint system 
in order for people to be able to lodge complaints in the first place (Madelin, 
2006). In Australia, public awareness of ABAC is very low according to their 
                                                
24 A Marketing Campaign is a series of activities linked by a plan of action which all contribute toward a 
larger defined business goal. These activities may be simultaneous, sequential, or both, and can encompass 





own commissioned report: “There was no awareness of ABAC by participants in 
any groups and awareness of the Advertising Standards Bureau or Advertising 
Standards Board was limited” (Colmar Brunton, 2013, p. 7). The follow-up 
report stated that focus group members “assume that Government plays a 
regulatory role when it comes to alcohol advertising” (Colmar Brunton, 2017, p. 
65), which can also be a barrier to complaining. Another suggestion by 
interviewees was that because of inaccessible complaint systems, most complaints 
are lodged by highly motivated people (National Committee for the Review of 
Alcohol Advertising, 2003). While the ABAC website states that: “Australia has 
one of the most accessible complaints systems in the world, accepting complaints 
via its online complaints lodgement system with no costs to the consumer” 
(ABAC, 2018a), the ASB lodging system includes a number of substantive 
barriers.25 For example, there is no option to file complaints anonymously; only 
one complaint at the time can be lodged; and digital technology could be used far 
more effectively improve accessibility. For example, the Swedish branch of the 
temperance movement IOGT launched a campaign whereby hashtags on Twitter 
and Instagram (#alkoholstor) can be used to report a breach of the Swedish 
marketing code. Subsequently, these get forwarded to the official authorities 
(Office of Consumers) (IOGT-NTO, 2014). This campaign has resulted in an 
800% increase of reported complaints over one year (EUCAM, 2018d). 
Finally, adjudication panel members should remain independent of industry, and 
in could be appointed by the regulatory agency. An alternative model is the one 
from the AARB, who’s adjudication panel consists of over 100 unpaid 
adjudicators in order to make the process not too burdensome. They are 
                                                
25 Advertising Standards Bureau is the point of access for public complaints regarding content of alcohol 
marketing. 
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independent of the alcohol industry and from multiple disciplines including 
research, medicine, public health, law, education, social services and marketing 
(Pierce, Stafford, & Daube, 2017). Further, this study found that the interpretation 
of the code by panel members does not benefit from being applied legalistically. 
Both the government commissioned alcohol marketing regulation reviews have 
recommended interpretation to be guided by ‘the spirit of the Code’ (ANPHA, 
2014; National Committee for the Review of Alcohol Advertising, 2003). 
The downside of public complaint systems is that it steers responsibility of 
monitoring towards the public and away from industry. Additionally, it does not 
give an accurate picture of all marketing appearing in the media (ICAS, 2014), 
and it does not pick up problems around short lasting MCs and digital marketing, 
as these are usually not subject to pre-vetting and most likely underreported by 
the public. Therefore, to complement the pre-vetting and public complaint 
systems, interviewees suggested having pro-active monitoring practices in place 
to flag and adjudicate potential breaches. According to the European Advertising 
Standards Alliance (EASA)’s Alcohol Module, pro-active monitoring could 
provide a snapshot of marketing activities in all media and could be carried out 
regularly (e.g. daily, weekly, or monthly), by an independent research company in 
order to increase levels of trust in the objectivity of monitoring data (EASA, 
2011). It can subsequently identify and communicate problems with the marketers 
and improve compliance with the code.  
5.12.2.3 Compliance and enforcement 
Quasi- and co-regulation are significantly more effective with enforcement 
mechanisms in place, especially when punishment and persuasion strategies are 
combined (Bryden et al., 2013), as part of a hierarchal enforcement framework 




Braithwaite, 1992). Moreover, having transparent enforcement mechanisms in 
place is key to the credibility of PPPs (OECD, 2015a). 
While current compliance with the ABAC Code is quite high, it can be expected 
that compliance rates will fall when new public health objectives and 
corresponding code come into place. Therefore, when designing a hierarchal 
enforcement framework for QR and CR, policymakers should re-evaluate 
compliance motives and enforcement options (Parker & Nielsen, 2017). 
This study’s interviewees believed that alcohol companies are predominantly 
motivated by economics and financial gain, and therefore have put significant 
efforts in opposing effective regulation of alcohol marketing that could lower 
sales, which supports previous findings (Babor et al., 2010). Companies with 
predominantly economic motives are mainly affected by the likelihood of 
detection, the likelihood of receiving fines, and the costs of compliance (Winter & 
May, 2001). Interviewees suggested that both QR and CR should have financial 
sanctions in place, such as significant fines, applying periodic advertising bans, 
and paying for public health ads. Importantly, financial sanctions need to be high 
enough to have a strong impact on companies’ budgets (Thornton et al., 2005; van 
Erp, 2011). For example in Italy a fine was as low as EUR 2,500.- per breach, 
which was deemed ‘laughable’ in comparison to the millions spent by marketers 
on campaigns (Beccaria, 2007). Some interviewees suggested also having 
financial incentives in place, such as discounts on membership of pre-vetting 
services. While the Responsive Regulation theory recommends the use of 
incentives, Braithwaite has warned that financial rewards do not promote 
internalisation of regulation (Braithwaite, 2002b). 
This study further found that alcohol companies’ compliance is strongly driven by 
fear of reputational damage. It is important for these businesses to be perceived 
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by the public as responsible alcohol marketers. A threat of public discredit can be 
a major factor in inducing compliance, as it can result in loss in customers and 
sales (van Erp, 2011; Winter & May, 2001), and loss of respect by third parties, 
such as regulators, industry body, competitors, and public interest groups (Ayres 
& Braithwaite, 1992).  
Hence, this study found that ‘naming and shaming’ is an important enforcement 
mechanism when regulating alcohol marketing. The regulator should expose the 
harmfulness of the offence, rather than just naming the company, as it could 
otherwise be perceived by the public as a technical mistake, which has less of an 
impact on reputation (van Erp, 2011). According to the Responsive Regulation 
theory, it is also beneficial to provide moral education and guidance during this 
process and to have a focus on fixing the problems (Braithwaite, Ahmed, & 
Braithwaite, 2006). Because, if companies perceive naming and shaming as 
stigmatising, it can lead to further defiance and less compliance (van Erp, 2011). 
In line with the Responsive Regulation theory, Bryden et al. found that incentives 
that raise companies’ CSR profiles can also assist in improving the effectiveness 
of voluntary agreements, such as public recognition through logos, awards, and 
publishing of participating companies (Bryden et al., 2013).  
Normative motives26 to comply might currently be at play as well: The ABAC 
Code, which claims to guide ‘responsible’ marketing, is most likely regarded as 
appropriate by Australian alcohol companies, they might even be internalised 
                                                
26 Normative motives: “the extent to which the individual or business accepts the specific policy goal of the 
specific regulatory regime and obligation under consideration. That is, they can see that it is aimed at effectively 





over time, and are most of the time adhered to. As one of the alcohol 
representatives explained:  
Alcohol producers recognise that alcohol is a product that is for adults only 
and that it is a drug that has to be used very responsibly. And as such, as 
producers, we need to adhere to rules appropriate to those circumstances. As 
such, we acknowledge that we can’t have the same general marketing 
freedoms that are available for most other products in terms of advertising of 
products. There needs to be a higher-level regime in terms of the rules, 
because of the type of product that we’re selling (Alcohol industry 
representative, #27). 
However, with new public health objectives in place, the likelihood of alcohol 
companies agreeing and internalising these immediately is very low. Hence it can 
be assumed that they will not comply voluntarily and that financial and social 
enforcement mechanisms need to be in place. 
Finally, this study also identified the need for a legal backstop in order to 
strengthen the ability of regulators to enforce the rules, which makes regulatees 
believe in the ‘inexorability of sanctions’ (Braithwaite et al., 2005). Interviewees 
suggested the use of legally binding contracts between the regulator (industry 
body) and signatories in QR. Another option the adoption of a standard 
‘responsibility clause’ in all advertising contracts with media (ICAS, 2014). In co-
regulation interviewees strongly recommended the use of underpinning legislation 
as it provides a credible threat of court action. It has the additional benefits of 
improving transparency through public scrutiny and providing coverage for all 
marketers, not just ABAC signatories. ANPHA has also suggested registering the 
ABAC Code with the ACCC to give it more ‘teeth’ (ANPHA, 2014). 
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5.12.3 Self-regulation 
Self-regulation would imply that industry designs a code, implements, monitors, 
and enforces it (as per the definition of the Australian Government in Table 6). 
However, fundamental requirements for any of the regulatory levels to be 
effective is that the government sets clear public health objectives, communicates 
a threat of up-regulation, and puts timelines and accountability mechanism in 
place as proposed above. Thus, an industry body will need to develop appropriate 
standards, policies, and procedures in order to meet the government’s set 
objectives and benchmarks. As has been described in the literature review, there 
is a substantial body of research around best practice for self-regulation of public 
health issues and advertising. First, in order to further public health objectives and 
to give a self-regulatory scheme more legitimacy, there should be external 
stakeholder participation in regulatory processes of self-regulation (Reeve, 2014), 
especially when drafting the code (ICAS, 2014; Madelin, 2006), ideally with no 
single party having disproportionate power (Sharma et al., 2010). It is also 
important to review the code regularly and to adjust it according to emerging 
marketing techniques (Madelin, 2006). Next, there is a need for having effective 
monitoring mechanism in place, similar to the proposed mechanisms for quasi- 
and co-regulation. EASA reports that while a public complaint system is required, 
the emphasis should be on establishing pro-active monitoring and pre-vetting 
systems, as it “contributes to higher credibility and reactivity of self-regulatory 
systems” (EASA, 2011, p. 8). The report also suggests having an impartial jury of 
lay people to adjudicate the breaches. However, self-regulation does not include 
impactful enforcement mechanisms that can be provided with a regulatory 
backstop, which will most likely affect compliance levels and will undermine the 




regulation above, the adoption of standard ‘responsibility clauses’ in all 
advertising contracts with media could prevent breaches to be broadcasted 
(EASA, 2011). Further, enforcement strategies suitable for self-regulation are 
naming and shaming, and public recognition. 
5.12.4 Removal of pyramid layers 
Many interviewees reported that self-regulation of alcohol marketing does not 
work, and some public health advocates suggested that the bottom layers ‘no 
regulation’ and ‘self-regulation’ should be removed to prevent an entry-level 
lower than current quasi-regulation and to revert to previous ineffective 
regulatory arrangements. 
From a pure capitalist point of view, free market mechanisms should have sorted 
any problems out, e.g. the public was to ‘punish’ companies that inappropriately 
advertised their product by not buying their product anymore or going to the 
competitor. This theory is based on Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ metaphor that 
describes how self-interested decisions made by individuals can collectively and 
unwittingly engineer an effective economic system that is in the public interest 
and produces social benefits (Adam Smith (1776), The Wealth of Nations). The 
invisible hand theory is the primary justification for free-market capitalism and is 
based on the assumption that people make rational choices when they buy 
products; it did not consider the impact of marketing. However, as described in 
Chapter 2, purchasing choices are often based on subjective reasoning, influenced 
by, among other things, marketing via environmental cues (Cohen, 2008; 
Dijksterhuis et al., 2005; Kwasnicka et al., 2016) and social norms (Peyton 
Young, 2015; Rimal & Lapinski, 2015). Thus, the ‘no regulation’ option within a 
free market economy and its ‘invisible hand’ will not correct inappropriate 
corporate behaviour and reduce exposure to alcohol marketing. In Australia, like 
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in many other countries, the problems were recognised by the government (and 
industry) decades ago, and, subsequently, pushed for a self-regulatory alcohol 
marketing code. 
Similarly, self-regulation is theoretically a good option, as it is very flexible, 
sensitive, and efficient and cheaper compared to legislation. However, it is only a 
good option when public interests are aligned with those of the industry and, thus, 
there is a win-win situation (Gunningham et al., 1998), or when the industry’s 
normative motives to comply are at the foreground (Parker & Nielsen, 2017). 
However, if economic motives prevail, strong enforcement options are required to 
induce compliance, which are absent in self-regulation models (Parker & Nielsen, 
2017). In practice, Gunningham et al. explain, self-regulatory standards are often 
weak, as is their enforcement and these frameworks generally lack visibility, 
credibility, accountability (Gunningham et al., 1998).  
Correspondingly, this study found that the quasi-regulatory standards are weak 
and that the ABAC scheme lacks transparency and accountability. At the same 
time, the findings point to the alcohol industry falsely arguing that the current 
alcohol marketing framework is functioning well and there is no need to increase 
regulation. Yet, systematic reviews show that self-regulation of alcohol marketing 
is ineffective in protecting minors from alcohol marketing exposure (Noel et al., 
2017a). Additionally, as the public and industry’s interests are misaligned, 
economic motives (selling more product) are the prime motives of the alcohol 
industry, and self-regulation has by definition no strong enforcement options, it 
can be expected that reverting to self-regulation would be failing miserably – 
even when underlying fundamental conditions are in place – and would be a 
waste of time.  The need for stronger government involvement is confirmed by 




accepted that self-regulation [of marketing] works best within a legislative 
framework” (ICAS, 2014, p. 9). 
There was less consensus among interviewees around the ideal entry level of the 
pyramid. Most interviewees from the public health and public service sectors 
reported that the alcohol industry had been given enough time to make it work, 
and therefore the next step should be co-regulation. Others did not agree, such as 
interviewees aligned with industry and some public servants. They reported that 
not all options on the spectrum between self- and co-regulation had been explored 
and improvements can be made. Compared to the current regulatory scheme, QR 
can be significantly improved, as described in detail above. It would further be 
supported by the underlying fundamental conditions, which includes 
accountability mechanisms, timelines, and a real threat to upregulate. Moreover, 
the current government’s general deregulation position is that ‘no-regulation’ 
option is “the most important option” (PM&C, 2014). Keeping this in mind, it is 
likely that they will decide that quasi-regulation requires more ‘exploring’. Thus, 
keeping quasi-regulation in the model might improve chances for the whole 
pyramid to be taken up.  
All taken together, when advocating for Responsive Regulation in alcohol 
marketing it might indeed be advisable only to present governments the top three 
layers of the pyramid (quasi-regulation, co-regulation, and explicit government 
regulation) to avoid deregulation. This is a realistic possibility, exemplified by a 
case in the United Kingdom whereby the Responsive Regulation theory (or at 
least concepts thereof) have been used to support the government neoliberalist 
agenda to deregulate health-and-safety-laws, which significantly impacted on 
workers’ rights and safety (Tombs & Whyte, 2013).  
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While the original Responsive Regulation theory emphasised the need to start at 
the bottom of a regulatory pyramid (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992), Braithwaite 
more recently warned that there is a need to be strategic about when to privatise 
and when to socialise markets (Braithwaite, 2013b). He discussed the need for 
reversal of failed privatisation and to bring them gradually back under regulatory 
control (Braithwaite, 2013b). He further suggests that governments privatise when 
induced market competition leads to more ‘goods’, and that they socialise markets 
when stimulated competition leads to the production of more bad things, for 
example, tobacco and gambling (Braithwaite, 2013b). As alcohol can be placed in 
the same category, it can be argued that here too there is a need for reversal of 
failed privatisation and to increase government involvement and excluding the 
‘no regulation’ or ‘self-regulation’ options. 
5.13 Limitations 
The interviews relied on participant’s knowledge and experiences, which means 
that their input reflects personal bias and views. However, this is the nature of 
qualitative interviews, and this method was considered very valuable to gain an 
in-depth understanding of the regulatory processes of alcohol marketing using 
multiple expert perspectives. 
The data collection and interpretation of the data was inevitably influenced by a 
level of the researcher’s personal bias and mainly guided by a critical social 
science perspective. If, for example, a study on the regulation of alcohol 
marketing was guided by corporate perspectives, the research questions, methods, 
and instruments would have been designed differently, and the regulatory 




Not all expert groups were evenly represented, which in most cases was 
acceptable as data saturation in these groups was reached. However, it proved to 
be challenging to recruit politicians and alcohol industry representatives. 
Problems with access to high-level experts are well-known, and it has been 
argued that the higher the social class, the more difficult access becomes (Littig, 
2009). It is often related to lack of time and prioritisation of other issues, but also 
to social status and has resulted in barriers in the form of personal assistants and 
secretaries (Littig, 2009). Federal politicians from the two major parties, including 
the government, declined interviews because of lack of time or ‘experience’, and 
in some cases forwarded the request to public servants working in alcohol 
marketing policy. Thus, certain information, such as the government’s stance on 
alcohol marketing regulation and details of regulatory processes, was retrieved 
through interviews with public servants. This was deemed satisfactory for the 
purposes of this study. However, first-hand information could have provided 
more insight into relationships between politicians and alcohol industry members 
and how this might influence policy outcomes. 
Additionally, this study was only able to recruit two alcohol industry 
representatives, and as discussed above, the study did not reach data saturation 
regarding research questions around improvements of alcohol marketing 
regulation and the applicability of Responsive Regulation. Experts representing 
alcohol companies or industry organisations have been known to decline taking 
part in academic research, which might be due to the perception of opposing 
interests and the publication of previous studies that included alcohol industry 
actors as interview subjects (Hawkins & Cassidy, 2016). Further, when the 
interviewer is perceived as a critic, this could lead to some distrust and disrupted 
dialogue (Bogner & Menz, 2009). This phenomenon was observed in particular 
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with one interviewee from the alcohol industry, who avoided answering questions 
about increased regulation and instead, actively steered the interview towards the 
success of the current regulatory framework. This is a common situation when 
interviewing alcohol industry actors, and one that is difficult to avoid (Hawkins & 
Cassidy, 2016) as media training is often used to teach senior executives how to 
avoid particular questions (Harvey, 2011). All taken together, this has skewed the 
result section even further in the direction of the other stakeholder groups’ views. 
Therefore, Study 2 will analyse industry documents in order to gain a full 
understanding of the alcohol industry’s position on marketing regulation and to 
identify the barriers to uptake. 
5.14 Conclusion 
For this study, in-depth interviews with 28 experts from six different sectors were 
conducted to investigate Responsive Regulation as an alternative and politically 
more palatable option to strengthen alcohol marketing regulation. While, from a 
public health perspective, banning alcohol marketing is the most obvious 
approach to reduce the impact of marketing on the social and psychological 
availability of alcohol in Australia, this study confirms that the Australian 
Government will not ban alcohol marketing. In this time of neo-liberal narrative 
and regulatory capitalism, corporate gain and remaining in power are prioritised 
over long-term policies that can significantly address health consequences to the 
public. 
The Responsive Regulation model provides an alternative regulatory approach 
that aims to increase public accountability, while appealing to the government’s 
deregulation agenda and to its preference of maintaining a dialogue with 
industries as stakeholders. However, for this regulatory approach not to become 




identified potential strategies to decrease the chance of regulatory capture, such as 
stakeholder engagement guidelines and increasing the role of civil society. To 
prevent regulatory failure at the design phase, this study suggests that the 
Responsive Regulatory model should be meta-regulated and recommends to have 
all identified fundamental conditions in place: Overarching objectives; high levels 
of transparency in reporting, regulatory processes and reviews; accountability 
mechanisms; independent evaluation against KPIs and objectives; setting 
timeframes for review and possible upregulation; a threat of legislation in the 
background; and the establishment of a comprehensive single marketing code that 
is focused on placement restrictions. 
This study further suggests to extend upon the NPHT recommended pyramid by 
adding a regulatory layer, increasing involvement of government and other 
stakeholders in the regulatory design and governance, and by avoiding 
deregulation. Additionally, this study suggests increasing compliance by having 
pro-active monitoring mechanisms in place and enforcement strategies that are 
backed by corporate contracts or underpinning legislation.  
Hence, Responsive Regulation seems applicable to alcohol marketing and might 
be effective to reduce marketing and subsequently, the social and psychological 
availability of alcohol in Australia. However, this study did not reach data 
saturation in the alcohol industry sector, and while their claims were similar to 
those made by industry found in studies in other countries, and they are aligned 
with arguments that delayed tobacco marketing regulation, this study cannot be 
certain if the claims presented here are representative of the whole Australian 
alcohol industry. Therefore, definite conclusions cannot be made, and there is a 
need for further investigation of the alcohol industry position on marketing 
regulation. 
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The next chapter presents Study 2 in which a Thematic Analysis of industry 
submissions was undertaken to identify how the Australian alcohol industry 
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A growing body of literature points to the role of vested interests as a barrier to 
the implementation of effective public health policies. Corporate political activity 
by the alcohol industry is commonly used to influence policy and regulation. It is 
important for policymakers to be able to critique alcohol industry claims opposed 
to improved alcohol marketing regulation. The Australian National Preventive 
Health Agency reviewed alcohol marketing regulations in 2012 and stakeholders 
were invited to comment on them. In this study we used thematic analysis to 
examine submissions from the Australian alcohol industry, based on a system 
previously developed in relation to tobacco industry corporate political activity. 
The results show that submissions were a direct lobbying tactic, making claims to 
government that were contrary to the evidence-base. Five main frames were 
identified, in which the alcohol industry claimed that increased regulation: 1) is 
unnecessary; 2) is not backed up by sufficient evidence; 3) will lead to unintended 
negative consequences; and 4) faces legal barriers to implementation; 
underpinned by the view 5) that the industry consists of socially responsible 
companies working toward reducing harmful drinking. In contrast with tobacco 
industry submissions on public policy, which often focused on legal and 
economic barriers, the Australian alcohol industry placed a heavier emphasis on 
notions of regulatory redundancy and insufficient evidence. This may reflect 
differences in where these industries sit on the ‘regulatory pyramid’, alcohol 
being less regulated than tobacco. 
6.2 Introduction 
Exposure to marketing of alcoholic beverages is associated with increased alcohol 
consumption, especially in young people, and contributes to earlier initiation of 




the general public, and alcohol-related violence (Anderson et al., 2009b; Smith & 
Foxcroft, 2009). Similar associations have been found for tobacco; the marketing 
of which increases the likelihood that adolescents start to smoke (Lovato et al., 
2011; Pollay & Dewhirst, 2002). 
6.2.1 Current alcohol marketing regulation 
In Australia, a quasi-regulatory framework is in place to protect against potential 
harmful effects of alcohol marketing on children and youth. At the center of this 
is the Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and Packaging) Code Scheme (ABAC), 
which monitors and responds to complaints about the content of alcohol 
marketing. It consists of three elements: a self-regulatory alcohol marketing code; 
a pre-vetting service; and a public complaints and adjudication panel. These are 
overseen by a six-member management committee, comprised of three alcohol 
industry representatives, an advertising industry representative, a government 
representative and, as of July 2015, an Independent Chair (ABAC, 2015a). 
Compliance with the scheme is voluntary, i.e., there are no legal or pecuniary 
sanctions for violation of the code. Other relevant codes that cover some content 
restrictions include the Australian Association of National Advertisers (AANA) 
Code of Ethics and AANA’s Code for Advertising and Marketing 
Communications to Children; the Australian Subscription Television and Radio 
Association (ASTRA) Code of Practice; and the Commercial Radio Code of 
Practice. The Children’s Television Standards (CTS) and the Commercial 
Television Industry Code of Practice (CTICP) include some restrictions regarding 
placement. For example, the CTS prohibits the broadcast of alcohol advertising 
during a ‘P’ program or period (suitable for pre-schoolers) and ‘C’ program or 
period (suitable for children ≤14 years of age) on free-to-air television. 
Broadcasters are required to show P and C programs for an average of one hour 
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per day (ACMA, 2009); however, in practice this typically occurs outside of 
children’s peak viewing times (ACMA, 2007).  
6.2.2 Issues paper 
In December 2012, the Australian National Preventive Health Agency (ANPHA) 
published an Issues Paper which reviewed current alcohol marketing regulations, 
focusing on children and young people’s exposure, and the effectiveness of these 
regulations in addressing community concerns about harmful alcohol 
consumption (ANPHA, 2012). In particular, the ANPHA report examined: 1) the 
level of exposure to alcohol advertising among children and young people, for 
example, exposure arising from an exemption allowing alcohol advertisements to 
appear during live sport television broadcasts at times when alcohol advertising 
would ordinarily be banned; 2) the limited scope of current regulations, including 
new media marketing, the focus on content rather than placement, and the failure 
to regulate sponsorship of sporting and cultural events; 3) the voluntary nature of 
the current regulatory system; and, therefore, 4) its inability to penalise 
advertisers for breaches of the ABAC. Stakeholders were given the opportunity 
until March 2013 to present their views of current alcohol marketing regulations 
in submissions to ANPHA, the content of which is the subject of the current 
paper. 
6.2.3 Corporate political activity 
There is a growing body of literature identifying vested interests as barriers to the 
implementation of effective public health policies (Chapman & Carter, 2003; 
Hancock, 2011; Miller et al., 2011). Corporate political activity by the alcohol 
industry is a common strategy to influence policy in ways favourable to 
corporations (Hillman et al., 2004; Jernigan, 2011). In Australia the alcohol 




industry representatives were invited by the Inter-governmental Committee on 
Drugs to the development of a new National Drug Strategy (InterGovernmental 
Committee on Drugs, 2014). However, research suggests that such partnerships 
advance the interests of the industry rather than public health (Moodie et al., 
2013; Munro, 2004) because the industry merely argues the need for more 
research and promotes policies that fail to reduce alcohol sales, such as education 
and interventions aimed at only the riskiest drinkers (Hawkins & Holden, 2014; 
Miller et al., 2011). Illustrating the possible influence of alcohol industry is the 
comment reiterating industry claims by Fiona Nash, Assistant Minister for Health, 
in response to the release of the final ANPHA report on alcohol advertising: “I do 
have concerns around the advertising of alcohol during sporting events, which is 
watched by many children…However the issue around it is genuinely complex 
and more research and work is required…” (Davey, 2015). 
Systematic analysis of alcohol industry framing of claims against increased 
marketing regulation has not been undertaken to date. Analysis of framing builds 
on notions of ‘agenda setting’ and ‘stakeholder analysis’. These approaches 
describe policy processes, but often neglect analysis of power and interests, and 
the strategies used to gain influence over policy, which are our focus. Framing 
analysis has a long history and has been used in different disciplines, for example, 
in cultural studies and communication (Benford & Snow, 2000; Van Gorp, 2007); 
in sociology (Gerhards, 1995); and in applied policy areas, such as environmental 
studies (Ihlen & Nitz, 2008). Its use in policy analysis of controversial policy 
issues draws on the work of Donald Schön and Martin Rein (Rein & Schön, 1977; 
Schon & Rein, 1994), which has been applied to a diverse range of policies; and 
drawn on by others for interpretive policy analysis (Fischer, 2003). Framing the 
public health debate to align with commercial interests is one important industry 
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strategy to influence policy makers and politicians (Moodie et al., 2013). This 
debate reflects the tension between personal freedom and collective responsibility 
(Dorfman, Wallack, & Woodruff, 2005) and represents two opposing ethical 
frames of 1) industry actors, asserting individual responsibility and limited 
government interference; and 2) public health actors, asserting the need for 
control of hazards, prevention of harm, and burden sharing (Beauchamp, 1976; 
Weishaar et al., 2016). Policy makers are often unaware of the framing (Van 
Hulst & Yanow, 2016), so there is value in providing guidance to enable critique 
of alcohol industry framing of claims against the implementation of effective 
policies.  
A recent study (Savell, Gilmore, & Fooks, 2014) identified tactics and arguments 
used by the tobacco industry to influence policy on marketing regulation. Their 
work builds on research that applied corporate political analysis to wide-ranging 
policy applications (Hillman et al., 2004). Savell et al.’s review developed two 
frameworks to aid understanding of tobacco industry arguments and strategies. 
Given the parallels between tobacco and alcohol industry tactics to delay 
development of public health policy (Bond et al., 2010), this study will use the 
frameworks developed by Savell et al. to analyse the claims of the Australian 
alcohol industry in their submissions to the 2014 ANPHA issues report (Savell et 
al., 2014). Systematic analysis of the Australian alcohol industry framing of 
claims against increased marketing regulation has not been undertaken to date. 
6.3 Methods 
6.3.1 Procedure 
We started with the assumption that corporations' framing of alcohol problems, 
scientific evidence, and government policies, is part of a strategy to influence 




submissions to the Australian National Preventative Health Agency Issues report 
(ANPHA, 2014). We categorised the submissions in five stakeholder groups: 1) 
alcohol industry, including nine submissions from alcohol industry associations, 
major alcohol companies and retailers; 2) media and marketing industry (n=9); 3) 
public health, including eight submissions from non-government organisations 
and academic research groups; 4) governments (n=3); and, 5) others (n=5), 
including three anonymous submissions (see Table Table 8). 
Inclusion criteria for the analysis of submissions were: 1) authored by (or by a 
representative of) an alcohol industry association, an alcohol producer (or 
association), an alcohol retailer (or association), or an alcohol outlet (or 
association); and 2) the content had to discuss ANPHA’s Issues Paper. Of the 
nine alcohol industry submissions, one simply provided information about the 
ABAC, its background, operations, services, management and coverage, and 
statistics about complaints and did not discuss the Issues Paper. Therefore, eight 
submissions by alcohol industry peak bodies, which broadly represent Australian 




Submissions by stakeholder groups 
Stakeholder group Contributors (Referred to in this thesis) 
Alcohol industry 
(included in analysis) 
1. Winemakers' Federation of Australia (WFA) 
2. Lion (Lion) 
3. Diageo Australia (Diageo) 
4. Brewers Association of Australia and New Zealand 
(BAANZ) 
5. Australian Hotels Association (AHA) 
6. Woolworths (Woolworths) 
7. Australian Liquor Stores Association (ALSA) 
8. Distilled Spirits Industry Council of Australia (DSICA) 
9. Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and Packaging) Code 
Scheme (ABAC) (not included) 
Media and marketing 
industry 
1. Advertising Standards Bureau (ASB) 
2. Commercial Radio Australia 
3. The Publishers' Advertising Advisory Bureau (PAAB) 
4. Australian Association of National Advertisers (AANA) 
5. Interactive Advertising Bureau Australia (IAB) 
6. Free TV Australia 
7. Outdoor Media Association (OMA) 
8. The Australian Subscription Television and Radio 
Association (ASTRA) 




1. Victorian Alcohol and Drug Association (VAADA) 
2. Cancer Council NSW 
3. Ms Sarah Yeates, University of Queensland 
4. Dr Nicholas Carah, University of Queensland / Dr Sven 
Brodmerkel, Bond University 
5. Alcohol and other Drugs Council of Australia (ADCA)/ 
Public Health Association of Australia (PHAA) 
6. National Alliance for Action on Alcohol (NAAA) 
7. Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education (FARE) 
8. McCusker Centre for Action on Alcohol and Youth 
(MCAAY) 
Public servants 1. Murrumbidgee Local Health District 
2. Western Australian Police 
3. Dr Adrian Reynolds, Department of Health, Tasmanian 
Government 
Other 1. Mr Sarosh Mehta 
2. Foundation for Advertising Research (Glen Wiggs) 
3-5. Classified as confidential 






6.3.2 Savell et al.’s Corporate Political Activity frameworks 
Savell et al. developed classifications for the tobacco industry’s corporate 
political activity and split them into two frameworks (Savell et al., 2014). The 
first describes the attempts corporations made to influence marketing regulation, 
splitting them into strategies (such as information) and subcategories labelled 
tactics (such as contesting evidence; see Appendix K). The second is presented in 
terms of frames (such as regulatory redundancy) which included illustrative 
individual arguments (e.g., ‘the existing regulation is adequate’; see Appendix L). 
While Savell et al. use the term ‘arguments’ to refer to assertions or claims made 
by the tobacco industry in support of its position in favour of or against particular 
policies, this study suggests a more suitable label. The word ‘argument’ is 
generally understood to refer to a connected series of propositions intended to 
establish a conclusion (Murray, Bradley, Craigie, Onions, & Burchfield, 1933). 
The validity of the conclusion depends on the veracity of the propositions and the 
soundness of the logic linking them. In this study’s view, by using the term 
‘argument’, Savell et al. elevate what are, almost without exception merely claims 
or assertions, to a status they do not deserve. Accordingly, the terms ‘claim’ and 
‘assertion’ are used interchangeably in this analysis reflecting the class 
‘argument’ in Savell et al.’s system.  
Thematic analysis of these submissions was undertaken using deductive coding 
(Miles et al., 2014), according to Savell et al.’s frames and arguments (see 
Appendix L). As the current study concerns a different industry than was 
examined by Savell et al., emergent coding (an inductive approach) was also used 
to adapt and develop new categories specific to the alcohol industry (Boyatzis, 
1998). Thus, an integrated approach involving inductive and deductive methods 
was used to develop a categorisation of frames and claims (Bradley, Curry, & 
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Devers, 2007). Final categories were decided on once all the submissions were 
coded independently by two researchers (FM and KC) in order to increase 
reliability. Inter-coder reliability was strengthened by evolving decision rules for 
coding where categories were crosschecked and amended as appropriate and the 
addition of new tactics where necessary. After independently coding the data 
according to the (deductive) Savell et al. coding framework, the two coders had 
in-depth discussion to establish consensus on appropriate frames and claims. 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Frames and claims  
This study identified the same four frames as those in Savell et al.’s analysis of 
tobacco industry behaviour: 1) Regulatory Redundancy; 2) Insufficient Evidence; 
3) Negative Unintended Consequences; and 4) Legal. In addition, 5) Corporate 
Social Responsibility was identified as a frame. Within these five frames several 
other types of claims were identified in addition to those identified by Savell et 
al., especially under Regulatory Redundancy; and adapted other existing claims 
(see Table 9 for a summary of frames and claims).  
6.4.2 Regulatory redundancy 
Submissions asserted that because it is a legal product, alcohol is legitimately 
advertised to adults (e.g., #1, refers to exemplar quotes provided in Table 9). They 
also claimed that the current system is satisfactory, that self-regulation is flexible 
and responsive, and that social marketing is sufficiently regulated by this 
mechanism (e.g. #2a, b); that the public complaint system is accessible; and that 
the adjudication panel and pre-vetting experts are independent. Some businesses 
claimed to have gone further and developed their own codes and guidelines that 




claim was that they have ongoing ‘partnerships’ with Australian governments, via 
their representation on the ABAC management committee (e.g. #4). Some called 
the system ‘quasi’- or ‘co-regulation’ instead of self-regulation. Relatedly, 
different types of claims were that ‘the vast majority of people drink responsibly’ 
(e.g. #5), and that ‘drinking alcohol can be part of a healthy lifestyle’ (e.g. #6a, b).  
Other submissions included assertions disputing the increasing community 
concern about the link between alcohol advertising and risky drinking (e.g. #8a, b, 
9a, b). Finally, submissions claimed that one of the industry’s goals is to promote 








Table 9  
Claims used by the alcohol industry attempting to influence marketing regulation using Savell et al.’s classification framework 
Frame Sub-frames (where applicable) 
Claims in submissions (number 
of submissions presenting claim, 
out of 8) 





  Industry only markets to those of 
legal age/is actively opposed to 
minors using product (4) 
“Alcohol is a legal product and individual producers 
are well within their rights to use advertising for 
commercial gain provided the activities do not promote 
misuse and meet ABAC requirements.” (WFA) 
1 
Current self-regulation is 
satisfactory# (8) 
“The independent pre-vetting service and the 
adjudication process for handling complaints are 
particularly effective in stopping irresponsible 
marketing.” (Diageo) 
“The ABAC Scheme is flexible to changing marketing 
conditions and techniques, and can quickly respond to 






Industry adheres to own self-
regulatory codes (5) 
“ABAC has the support and backing of the alcohol and 










‘gaming’ that can take place with regulation that relies 
on ‘black letter law’ and strict definitions.” (DSICA) 
Codes are supported by the 
government* (4) 
“It has continuous and substantial input from the 
Australian Government.” (DSICA) 
4 
Most consumers drink 
responsibly* (6) 
“The vast majority of Australians enjoy alcohol 
responsibly.” (ALSA) 5 
Drinking is part of a healthy 
lifestyle* (4) 
“…moderate consumption of alcohol, which is a 
normal, enjoyable part of life for many adults.” (Lion) 
“…when consumed in moderation, [alcohol] can be 






Suggesting alternative policy 
strategies that address harmful 
consumption of minority that 
misuses alcohol * (6) 
“Alcohol policies that seek to reduce total alcohol 
consumption in Australia will not reduce misuse, but 
rather simply punish the majority of consumers who 
are already drinking responsibly in moderation.” 
(BAANZ) 
“…the most effective way to reduce harmful 
consumption of alcohol is a focus on targeted 
interventions as opposed to any further population-








Disputing community concern/ 
codes are in line with community 
expectations* (8) 
“…the complaints process and code accurately delivers 









“The small percentage of alcohol advertisements 
complained about each year…reinforces the industry 
view that there is no widely held community concern 
about alcohol advertising…” (WFA) 













Alcohol industry encourages 
responsible consumption* (4) 
“Responsible drinking is at the heart of our business 
interests.” (Diageo)  
“…committed to working with ANPHA and others to 
better understand and develop strategies to address 







 There’s insufficient 
evidence that the 
proposed policy will 




(marketing is used to 
convince individuals 
switch brands and to 
sustain or increase 
company’s market 
share), so regulation 
More research is needed, 
insufficient evidence for causal 
link between marketing and 
increased consumption levels (5) 
“Important areas of contention, such as the link 
between advertising and misuse, require further 
analysis and for a clear consensus to emerge in the 
relevant research.” (WFA) 
10 
Marketing only affects market 
share (5) 
“Diageo markets its brands […] to gain market share 
by encouraging consumers to switch from other brands 
to one of ours. Our marketing is not designed to 










will have no effect# 
(8) 
Reporting on declining trends of 
alcohol consumption (5) 
“…in fact alcohol misuse has declined in Australia 
over the last few decades.” (Lion) 
“The case for further restrictions on alcohol 
advertising is further weakened when looking more 
broadly at per capita consumption of alcohol as this 
has been essentially static for the past 20 years. If 
advertising increases alcohol consumption then it does 










 Biased public health advocates* 
(6) 
“The present structure for administering the ABAC 
Scheme has not attracted criticisms other than from 
individuals or organisations that have taken a very 
public anti-alcohol or anti-industry position with 








Manufacturer (4) Regulation will cause problems 
maintaining or increasing market 
share for existing brands# (3) 
“It would also have the potential to introduce 
significant market distortion to the competition between 
responsible producers trying to win market share.” 
(WFA) 
14 
Regulation will cause difficulties 
for new market entrants# (1) 
“New market entrants will find it much more difficult to 
establish a presence if advertising is restricted, 











Regulation will result in financial 
or job losses (among retailers or 
associated industries, e.g. 
agriculture, hospitality, tourism, 
manufacturing and logistics) (4) 
“Placing further, more onerous restrictions on 
advertisers will have a serious commercial impact on a 
wide range of industries…” (Lion) 
“…due to [the alcohol industry’s] important role in the 







Public Revenue (2) Loss of direct contribution to the 
Australian economy by alcohol 
industry# (2) 
“ACIL Tasman has estimated that the direct economic 
contribution of the Australian brewing industry to the 
Australian economy was approximately $4.3 billion in 
the 2010-11 financial year.” (BAANZ) 
17 
Consumers* (3) Impacts on consumer choice* (3) “Without the ability to be informed of their choices, 
consumers suffer a loss of welfare as they are not 





 Regulation might impact 
negatively on health outcomes in 
moderate drinkers# (1) 
“…alcohol policy should not impact moderate drinkers 
in its efforts to address problem drinkers, as this will 
result in perverse health outcomes.” (Lion) 
19 
Legal (5)   Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) 
needs to be developed before 
proposing new regulation* (3) 
“Further consideration of the potential increased 
regulatory burden on the industry from the proposals 
canvassed in the Issues Paper also demands a 
Regulatory Impact Statement process.” (WFA) 
20 
Body does not have the power to 
regulate/it is beyond their 
jurisdiction (3) 
“The AHA is also surprised to see in the Issues Paper a 










ANPHA in the Australian Government Response to the 





  Supporting efforts and programs to 
reduce harmful consumption* (5) 
“Recent examples of our social responsibility 
initiatives include…a social marketing campaign, using 
the strapline ‘Don’t see a good night wasted’, aimed at 
18-25 year olds socializing in and around licensed 
venues in Sydney.” (Diageo)  
22 
We are members of DrinkWise 
*(4) 
“Lion is also a founding member of DrinkWise 
Australia…” (Lion) 
 “Woolworths fully supports the efforts and activities of 
DrinkWise that aim to affect generational change in the 





* Frame or claim developed by Martino et al. 2014; 
 # Frame or claim taken from Savell et al. and adapted for the alcohol industry by Martino et al. 2014;  
‡Researcher assigned quote number; referred to in the results section text 
The following claims, taken from Savell et al.’s corporate political activity framework, were not used by the Australian Alcohol Industry: The health impacts of consumption remain unproven; The cost of compliance 
for manufacturers will be high/the time required for implementation has been underestimated; Regulation will cause an increase in illicit trade; Regulation could have other negative unintended consequences; Infringes 




6.4.3 Insufficient evidence 
It was claimed within industry submissions that there was insufficient evidence to 
link marketing of alcohol products to increased alcohol consumption, and 
therefore, that marketing regulation would have no effect (e.g. PHA, #10). Some 
specifically stated that more research would be needed to prove this link. 
Submissions cited Australian government research purporting to show a decline 
in alcohol consumption in minors and pregnant women (AIHW, 2011) and 
claiming “…there is no evidence to suggest that alcohol problems are on the rise 
which could justify further regulatory constraints on the alcohol industry” 
(Brewers Association of Australia and New Zealand (BAANZ)).  
Biased public health advocates was a newly identified type of claim within the 
Insufficient Evidence frame. Submissions asserted that the Expert Committee on 
Alcohol, with whom ANPHA consulted to develop this report, was biased and 
anti-alcohol and that the research referenced in the report was not scientifically 
valid (e.g. #13). For example: “Lion believes that ANPHA should be careful to 
distinguish between research that is the best available, expert, peer-reviewed 
research and surveys that are produced by anti-alcohol activists…” (Lion). 
6.4.4 Negative unintended consequences 
A set of claims was also framed around the notion that increased regulation has 
negative unintended consequences. The key themes were: 1) manufacturers, who 
would, as a consequence of regulation, have trouble maintaining or increasing 
market share (e.g. PH academic, #14), or have difficulties introducing new brands 
(e.g. #15); 2) employment in associated industries (e.g. #16a, b); 3) loss of public 
revenue from alcohol tax and the alcohol industry’s direct contribution to the 




contrast to the tobacco industry, no submissions mentioned ‘Illicit Trade’ and 
only one warned of “…perverse health outcomes” of increased marketing 
regulation, without explaining what these were (e.g. #19).  
6.4.5 Legal 
Two claims were identified within the Legal frame. Some submissions asserted 
the need for a Regulation Impact Statement before proposing new regulation, for 
example “…any proposals to further regulate alcohol advertising needs to clearly 
demonstrate that the social and economic cost it potentially introduces are 
outweighed by the benefits in an environment where rates of “at risk” 
consumption and harm are either stable or in decline.” (#20, Winemaker’s 
Federation of Australia). A number of submissions questioned why alcohol 
marketing regulation was reviewed in the first place, as it was, according to them, 
not ANPHA’s task to do this (e.g. #21). Unlike Savell et al.’s findings regarding 
the tobacco industry, the alcohol industry did not refer to international trade 
agreements or intellectual property. 
6.4.6 Corporate social responsibility 
Some submitters claimed they were ‘socially responsible companies’ by 
presenting involvement in efforts and programs to reduce harmful consumption. 
For instance, “Recent examples of our social responsibility initiatives include…a 
social marketing campaign, using the strapline ‘Don’t see a good night wasted’, 
aimed at 18-25 year olds socializing in and around licensed venues in Sydney.” 
(#22; Diageo). Some emphasised their membership of DrinkWise (eg #23a; an 
industry-funded ‘social aspects/public relations’ organisation (SAPRO)), as 




2011). For example, Lion stated that it “is committed to … funding culture change 
initiatives, such as those developed by DrinkWise”. 
6.4.7 Alternative strategies 
Submissions provided recommendations for alternative strategies that the 
government could use to address the small section of society that drinks heavily, 
instead of “punishing the majority” of responsible drinkers (BAANZ). Proposed 
alternative countermeasures focused on individual responsibility, for example, 
education, and more severe drink-driving penalties.   
6.5 Discussion 
The Australian alcohol industry used the following five overarching frames to 
oppose increased alcohol marketing regulation: 1) Regulatory Redundancy; 2) 
Insufficient Evidence; 3) Negative Unintended Consequences; 4) Legal; and 5) 
Corporate Social Responsibility. Savell et al.’s tobacco industry corporate 
political activity framework for frames and arguments was, for the most part, 
applicable to the analysis of the Australian alcohol industry policy documents 
with one additional frame needed to characterise the submissions, namely: 
Corporate Social Responsibility. The predominant alcohol industry claims were 
that increased marketing regulation was unnecessary in Australia and that there is 
insufficient evidence to support the proposal to regulate the promotion of alcohol. 
In contrast, the tobacco industry focused more on supposed detrimental economic 
and legal effects of regulation (Savell et al., 2014). These findings reflect the 
different stages of government regulation applied to these two industries (i.e., 
their different positions on the regulatory pyramid), where tobacco is regulated 
more strictly by legislation than alcohol, where industry codes prevail (Reeve, 




the effectiveness of these comprehensive policies is plentiful (Blecher, 2008; 
Quentin, Neubauer, Leidl, & König, 2007), such that the tobacco industry focuses 
on the negative economic effects of such regulation. Few governments, on the 
other hand, are actively considering stronger alcohol marketing regulation and the 
alcohol industry argues that current self-regulation is working well (NPHT, 
2009a). 
6.5.1 Regulatory redundancy 
This study identified nine different claims within the Regulatory Redundancy 
frame, whereas Savell et al. found only three used by the tobacco industry. The 
alcohol industry claims its marketing targets only adults, however, research shows 
that young people are also exposed to this marketing and are negatively affected 
by it (Anderson et al., 2009b; Smith & Foxcroft, 2009). If the industry genuinely 
wishes to target only adults, the self-regulatory codes should include restrictions 
on sports sponsorship, outdoor media and product placement in films and music 
videos.  
While the ABAC scheme has a high voluntary participation rate (ABAC, 2014a), 
the support may reflect the low standards of the code, the low likelihood of a 
finding against advertisers, and the lack of penalties in the event of complaints 
being upheld (Munro, 2004). The submissions cited the low number of complaints 
submitted to ABAC as evidence of no community concern about the marketing of 
alcohol to children. However, an alternative complaint panel, set up by the 
McCusker Centre for Action on Alcohol and Youth and Cancer Council WA, the 
Alcohol Advertising Review Board, received more than double the number of 
complaints in their first year (2012), 68% of which were upheld, compared with 




The alcohol industry repeats the mantras that ‘most people drink responsibly’ and 
that alcohol consumption can be ‘part of a healthy lifestyle’ (International 
Alliance for responsible drinking, 2015), claiming then that the majority of the 
population should therefore not be ‘punished for the sins of the few’ through 
policies that reduce the promotion of alcohol (Casswell, 2013). In line with this, 
the alcohol industry promotes targeted regulation for the ‘minority of problematic 
drinkers’ (Room et al., 2005). Research shows that alcohol marketing has a 
deleterious effect on vulnerable groups, such as ethnic minorities and problem 
drinkers (Wilson & Till, 2012), and these groups are specifically targeted through 
segment marketing (Grier & Kumanyika, 2010). Further, alcohol marketing has 
implications beyond these minority groups for adults in general (Argyriou & 
Melewar, 2011; Brown et al., 2017; Meier, 2011), underlining the need for broad 
restrictions. 
6.5.2 Insufficient evidence 
Like the tobacco industry, the alcohol industry proposed that there is insufficient 
evidence to show that marketing influences consumption, asserting that it merely 
affects brand loyalty. However, a recent analysis of alcohol industry documents 
shows that the major companies plan to create new drinking occasions and 
opportunities, that is, to increase overall consumption (Alcohol Concern, 2014). 
Recently, Ross et al. (Ross et al., 2014a) found that, after controlling for variables 
known to influence drinking rates, such as parental drinking and overall market 
share, minors drink the brands they see advertised most. The industry argued in 
the submissions that there is insufficient evidence on the effectiveness of 
increased regulation on consumption levels. However, a recent extensive cross-
national study showed that higher levels of regulation in Europe were associated 




6.5.3 Negative unintended consequences 
Savell et al. reported that the tobacco industry framed most of its claims around 
negative unintended consequences of increased marketing regulation, whereas the 
alcohol industry submissions in this study presented few such claims. Some 
asserted that alcohol production provides substantial economic benefit and 
employment within Australia, and that increased marketing regulation would 
adversely affect the economy. While effective regulation would undoubtedly 
reduce alcohol production and marketing, such impacts should be considered in 
light of changes related to global market conditions and in light of the cost of 
alcohol harm. For example, the recently announced merger of AB InBev and 
SABMiller will result in ‘savings’ to the company of $1.4b, most of which is 
being achieved by exporting jobs to countries where wages are lower (Massoudi, 
2016). On the other hand, the reductions in potential sales are comparatively 
small when compared to the huge direct societal cost of alcohol consumption to 
the Australian community, estimated to be $14.352b in 2010 alone (Manning, 
Smith, & Mazerolle, 2013).  
In contrast to tobacco submissions, alcohol industry submissions did not mention 
illicit trade, and only one mentioned negative public health consequences (i.e. 
Lion). While the alcohol industry is still defending self-regulation, the tobacco 
industry seems to accept that it has lost this battle and therefore focuses on 
economic consequences of increased regulation.  
6.5.4 Legal 
Savell et al. (2014) identified four different claims used by the tobacco industry 
under the Legal frame; namely, that restrictions are infringements of legal rights 
(for example trademarks), that they constitute disproportionate regulation, that the 




increasing number of compensation claims. This study found only two alcohol 
industry assertions within this frame, namely, the need for Regulation Impact 
Statements and that ANPHA does not have the power to regulate. The Australian 
Government requires that a Regulation Impact Statements is prepared for 
significant regulatory proposals (PM&C, 2013). However, ANPHA’s role was to 
provide policy advice to the Department of Health, not to put a proposal to 
Cabinet, and it was therefore not appropriate for ANPHA to provide such a 
statement. Contesting the authority of key organisations or groups involved in 
policy development, such as ANPHA, is common practice of ‘dangerous 
consumption’ industries (Savell et al., 2014). In this case, however, Australia’s 
InterGovernmental Committee on Drugs underpins ANPHA’s role legitimacy: 
“…it was decided that ANPHA’s approach to alcohol advertising should be 
broadened to review the effectiveness of the alcohol industry’s voluntary code on 
advertising and its effectiveness in addressing community concerns” 
(InterGovernmental Committee on Drugs, 2012). The three other claims within 
Savell et al.’s frame were not identified in the current study, probably because the 
threat of legislation is lower than it is for the tobacco industry.  
6.5.5 Corporate social responsibility 
Corporate Social Responsibility was invoked in submissions to encourage policy 
advisors to resist recommending regulation of alcohol marketing. A recent UK 
study confirms that corporate social responsibility initiatives are a vehicle for the 
alcohol industry to influence government policy (Hawkins & Holden, 2014). 
Another study of British American Tobacco’s internal documents showed that 
corporate social responsibility initiatives are a key corporate political activity, 
because they facilitate access to policymakers (Fooks et al., 2011). For the alcohol 




also been identified as a tactic to establish submitters’ credentials as socially 
responsible corporations (Miller et al., 2011). 
6.5.6 Accusations of bias 
Finally, Biased Public Health Advocates was a newly identified type of claim 
within the frame of Insufficient Evidence. While actors with vested interests have 
often engaged in disputes with advocates for evidence-based reform, there has 
rarely been a focus on public health advocates in official documents. Attacking 
the credibility of public health advocates in submissions to government appears to 
be increasing (Rosenstock & Lee, 2002). Rosenstock and colleagues proposed 
that government agencies, academic centres, and researchers affiliated with them 
are subject to efforts to politicise or silence independent scientific researchers. 
Such efforts may employ sophisticated strategies that put evidence-based policy 
making at risk, especially because most researchers are not trained or prepared for 
such attacks, and most are unable to access policymakers to the extent that 
corporate lobbyists can. This appears to be an extension of the tactics employed 
by as the likes of the tobacco industry which support movements such as ‘Junk 
science’ to undermine public and political confidence in science (Ong & Glantz, 
2001; Samet & Burke, 2001). This tactic deserves further investigation as 
previous literature demonstrates that such strategies are usually part of 
sophisticated, well-resourced, and outcome-focused campaigns (Yach & Bialous, 
2001). 
6.6 Limitations 
This study sought to minimise bias in the subjectivity of thematic coding by 
having two researchers independently code all documents, and after discussion, 




adaptations of existing classification frameworks, and created new frames and 
claims to characterise the alcohol industry submissions. A second limitation is the 
single country focus. Savell et al. (2014) showed that the tobacco industries 
worldwide use coherent strategies and claims to influence marketing regulation. It 
remains unknown as to whether alcohol industry bodies in other countries adopt 
similar strategies (Hawkins, Holden, & McCambridge, 2012). 
6.7 Conclusions 
This study examined Australian alcohol industry claims regarding marketing 
regulation, finding strong similarities with the frames and claims used by the 
tobacco industry (Savell et al., 2014). Alcohol industry actors used multiple 
strategies to push their claims that increased marketing regulation in Australia is 
unnecessary, including claims that: there is ‘insufficient evidence for the 
effectiveness of increased regulation’; ‘there is insufficient evidence that alcohol 
marketing contributes to drinking’; ‘current regulation is satisfactory’; ‘there is no 
community concern’; and that ‘the alcohol industry markets its products in a way 
that minimise harmful consumption’. These assertions, at least regarding health, 
stand in contrast to the scientific literature regarding alcohol-related harm and 
continuing high levels of alcohol consumption in the community. The available 
evidence reveals the poverty of industry claims that industry actors put to public 
servants whose job it is to evaluate submissions. Recent tobacco research 
(Ulucanlar, Fooks, Hatchard, & Gilmore, 2014) suggests that the tobacco industry 
seeks to ‘sow reasonable doubt’ about the science (Jasanoff, 1996) among 
policymakers in order to resist or delay regulation. Continuing to engage with 
industry as stakeholders in public health policies increases their opportunities to 




Chapter 7 Final Discussion and Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
Alcohol consumption is one of the leading preventable causes of death and 
disability worldwide, and a major cause of social harm. In Australia alone, 5,554 
deaths and over 150,000 hospitalisations were attributed to alcohol in 2010 (Gao 
et al., 2014), while 46% of young Australian adults and 33% of teenagers drink at 
harmful levels at least once a month (AIHW, 2017). Moreover, a recent report by 
the Foundation of Alcohol Research and Education showed that 20% of the 
heaviest drinkers account for 74.2% of all alcohol consumed in Australia, and that 
the industry’s profits are heavily reliant on these ‘super consumers’ (FARE, 
2018a). At the same time, the Australian alcohol industry spends billions on 
marketing their products (White & Bero, 2011), and disproportionately targets 
young people and other vulnerable groups who are already more likely to 
experience adverse outcomes from alcohol (Babor et al., 2017b; Grier & 
Kumanyika, 2010). Evidence shows, for example, that greater exposure to alcohol 
marketing in young people increases the chance of them binge drinking a few 
years later, it leads to earlier initiation of alcohol use, and increases underage 
drinking (Anderson et al., 2009b; Babor et al., 2010; Jernigan et al., 2017a; Smith 
& Foxcroft, 2009). Hence, concerns have been raised by consumers, parents, 
governments, and public health advocates. 
In 1998, the Australian advertising and alcohol industries responded by putting a 
self-regulatory code in place. While over the last two decades the ABAC Code 
has expanded and government involvement has somewhat increased, the current 
quasi-regulatory ABAC scheme is not effective in protecting minors from the vast 
volumes of alcohol marketing (Aiken et al., 2018; Jones & Donovan, 2002; Jones 




other vulnerable groups, such as pregnant women, ethnic minorities, and 
alcoholics. Finally, the code ignores the impact on adults in general, for example 
through social norms that are, at a minimum, uncritical toward excessive alcohol 
consumption. 
Despite this evidence and the success of a tobacco marketing ban which has 
contributed to changing social norms and the reduction of the number of daily 
smokers by half since the commencement of the Tobacco Advertising Prohibition 
Act in 1992, the Australian Government remains reluctant to legislate. To 
improve the ABAC scheme, the National Preventative Health Taskforce 
suggested that the government would use an alternative regulatory framework, 
based on the Responsive Regulation theory and its regulatory pyramid. In this 
thesis, I explored the application and refinement of the NPHT proposed 
Responsive Regulation pyramid in alcohol marketing in Australia. 
In this Chapter, I will first compare outcomes of Studies 1 and 2 to establish if the 
responses of the two interviewees from the alcohol industry in Study 1 are 
representative for the alcohol industry in Australia. In the next section, I will 
present a modified Responsive Regulation model for alcohol marketing (the 
‘meta-regulated Polder model’). I will then explore the political feasibility of the 
Polder model27 in Australia where neoliberal values and corporate freedom are 
pursued. Subsequently, I will examine to what extent the proposed alcohol 
marketing model still resembles the original Responsive Regulatory theory. The 
chapter finishes with an overall thesis conclusion.  
                                                




7.2 Comparing alcohol industry arguments across Study 
1 and Study 2 
Study 2’s analysis of the eight official alcohol industry submissions to ANPHA’s 
issues report into alcohol advertising regulation (ANPHA, 2012) concluded that 
the alcohol industry argued in a consistent and unified way against strengthening 
regulation. Five frames of argument were identified; however, significant 
emphasis was on the frames and claims around ‘regulatory redundancy’ and 
‘insufficient evidence’ of alcohol marketing regulation. The analysis of the 
transcripts from the alcohol industry in Study 1 also identified ‘regulatory 
redundancy’ and ‘insufficient evidence’, and Table 10 shows there was a high 
level of consistency in the specific arguments used between both studies. This is 
potentially due to well-coordinated industry PR strategies which aim to convey 
messages from a united voice (Kypri, Wolfenden, Hutchesson, Langley, & Voas, 
2014). However, many of these claims were found to be in contrast to the 
scientific evidence, and have been previously identified as tools to delay or avoid 






Overview of industry arguments against strengthened alcohol marketing 
regulation across Study 1 & 2 
Frames and Arguments by alcohol industry against 





Regulatory Redundancy ü ü 
Industry only markets to those of legal age ü ü 
Current self-regulation is satisfactory ü ü 
Industry adheres to own self-regulatory codes ü ü 
Codes are supported by the government ü ü 
Most consumers drink responsibly ü ü 
Drinking is part of a healthy lifestyle ü ü 
Suggesting alternative policy strategies ü ü 
Codes are in line with community expectations ü ü 
Drinking is a personal choice, not a matter for ‘nanny 
state’ regulation ü  
Alcohol industry encourages responsible consumption ü ü 
Insufficient Evidence ü ü 
Insufficient evidence for causal link between 
marketing and increased consumption levels ü ü 
Marketing only affects market share ü ü 
Reporting on declining trends of alcohol consumption ü ü 
Biased public health advocates ü ü 
Negative Unintended Consequences (e.g. economic)  ü 
Legal  ü 
Corporate Social Responsibility  ü 
 
The analysis of Study 2 identified a few more arguments under three additional 
frames that were not presented in the interviews of Study 1 (see Table 10). First, 
the industry claimed in their written submissions that alcohol production provides 
economic benefits and employment to the country, which would be jeopardised 
by increased regulation (negative unintended consequences). Second, they 
questioned ANPHA’s role in advising the government on increased marketing 
regulation without providing a Regulation Impact Statement (legal frame). 




by emphasising their support to DrinkWise in reducing alcohol abuse in the 
Australian community, for example:  
The Australian alcohol beverage and hospitality sector is committed to the 
goal of reducing alcohol misuse and abuse as evidenced by extensive 
involvement in targeted programs including establishing and actively 
supporting DrinkWise Australia (Australian Liquor Stores Association). 
It was not surprising that these frames were not identified in Study 1, as they were 
clearly aimed at government officials and would have had less persuasive power 
over the interviewer (being a public health researcher). The different use of 
framing could indicate that the industry designs and targets its messages for 
specific audiences. For example, a recent study found that the alcohol industry 
frames its media messages in opposite ways to appeal to either policymakers and 
the public by highlighting social responsibility, or to potential investors by 
emphasising economic growth in emerging markets (Thornton & Hawkins, 2017). 
Despite the additional arguments in the submissions, the results from Study 2 
strongly align with the findings in Study 1, and the industry interviewees in Study 
1 did not deviate from the official industry positions in the submissions to 
ANPHA. Therefore, the responses of the two interviewees from the alcohol 
industry in Study 1 are likely to be representative of the wider industry. 
7.3 Final model of Responsive Regulation of alcohol 
marketing 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate if the Responsive Regulation theory and 
the NPHT pyramid could be perceived as a politically palatable solution and at 
the same time could provide practical solutions to strengthening alcohol 




NPHT pyramid regulatory pyramid was too narrow and that it is essential to have 
clear parameters and conditions in place before engaging in any partnership with 
industry.  
As this thesis contains a complex set of recommendations, I developed a visual 
representation of the most important requirements in one expanded model for 
alcohol marketing regulation. 
7.3.1 The meta-regulated Polder model for alcohol marketing 
Throughout history, the Dutch have been in a battle with water and since the 
Middle Ages were able to create ‘polders’ (reclaimed land from swamp land or 
sea), and successfully build and live on it. Impoldering is a process that requires 
constant monitoring and maintenance. Particular characteristics need to be in 
place to prevent groundwater rising and to prevent dikes from breaking and water 
flooding the land. This ‘polder’ model28 will be used as a metaphor to explain and 
visualise the regulatory conditions required for effectively preventing a ‘sea’ of 
alcohol marketing to expose vulnerable groups. 
7.3.1.1 Government leadership to prioritise public health 
Before building anything (e.g. a regulatory pyramid), land needs to be reclaimed 
from the sea. Similarly, in a flood of alcohol marketing where parameters are 
unclear, and enforcement options are weak, it would be impossible to set up an 
effective regulatory framework. The first step in reclaiming this land is for the 
government to take charge and sincerely commit to changing the tide by 
                                                
28 ‘Polder model’ also has a different meaning in The Netherlands, and is usually used to refer to consensus-
based decision making. According to Stijn Kuijpers “the ‘poldermodel’ is considered to be the legally 
institutionalised deliberation between labour unions, the employer organisations and the government, in 
which they collectively steer the socioeconomic policy in the Netherlands (by advising the government and 





prioritising public health over economic gain (see Figure 9). The government 
should then appoint an agency that is responsible for executing these changes and 
governs the regulatory framework, using a meta-regulatory approach (Parker, 
2002a). While the government does not prescribe specific standards, it should 
meta-regulate the quasi- or co-regulatory efforts by scrutinising the industry 
body’s internal control and management systems and by determining if the 
industry can and have achieve(d) the regulatory objectives. Study 1 suggested 
Australian government agencies for the evaluation of the framework: a health 
agency (similar to ANPHA), the ACCC (Australian Competition & Consumer 
Commission), or ACMA (Australian Communications and Media Authority). 
Either of these would also be suitable for executing a government decree to 
tighten alcohol marketing regulation, with each their own area of expertise and 
skills. 
 
Figure 9. Government leadership and commitment starts changing the tides by setting 





7.3.1.2 Overarching objectives 
In the same way that a water management department would set the parameters of 
the impoldering area, e.g. the location and size of the dikes; the regulatory agency 
will need to decide on the overarching objectives, independently of industry (see 
Figure 9). As discussed above (see section 5.11.2), the objectives need to be 
measurable and clearly defined, they should aim to denormalise harmful 
consumption of alcohol, and reduce the overall volume of alcohol marketing to 
minimise exposure to minors and other vulnerable groups. These objectives 
should be set regardless of the form the regulatory arrangement will take; the 
pyramid levels (self-, quasi-, co-, and explicit government regulation) are seen as 
different regulatory instruments to enforce the code and reach the objectives. 
7.3.2 Laying the foundations 
Once objectives have been specified and water has been drained, the base of the 
polder can be solidified to form a stable foundation. In this expanded regulatory 
model, this stable foundation is comprised of the fundamental conditions 
identified in Study 1. Only when these are in place, the design and construction of 
the regulatory pyramid can begin (see Figure 10). If any of the fundamental 
conditions are disregarded or left out, the quasi- or co-regulatory framework will 





Figure 10. Foundations of the regulatory system required before building the pyramid 
7.3.2.1 Formalised stakeholder engagement and empowered public 
interest groups 
In regulatory arrangements with the industry, there will be stakeholder 
engagement around policy development. Many interviewees, in particular outside 
of public health, agreed that there is a need for the inclusion of all stakeholders 
during the designing process in order to establish (as much as possible) agreement 
and collaboration. However, the findings in this thesis confirmed that there is a 
significant misalignment between public health and industry goals, and that 
engagement with industry allows them to present inaccurate claims against 
increased alcohol marketing regulation and to sow doubt around the scientific 
evidence. There is no robust evidence that collaboration with industry has been 
effective to reduce the availability of alcohol (Petticrew et al., 2017a). Therefore, 




development of objectives and policy design, but should instead co-operate with 
the implementation. 
However, Study 1 also found that engagement with all stakeholders, especially 
industry, is valued by the Australian government. Thus, to avoid regulatory 
capture and to maintain a focus on public health outcomes, the findings of this 
thesis point to the need for formalised stakeholder engagement and guidelines of 
interaction. The ‘Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors’ (FENSA) is 
an example of how the WHO attempts to manage conflict of interest, with an 
overarching principle that stipulates that any engagement with non-state 
stakeholders must demonstrate a clear benefit to public health (WHO, 2016, 
2017). The guidelines contain standards on conducting due diligence and risk 
assessments, acceptance of funding, participation in meetings and workgroups, 
and transparency. I suggest that the FENSA could be used to develop similar 
guidelines for when the Australian Government engages with the alcohol 
industry. Additionally, clear documentation of industry claims and tactics, and 
evidence-based counter arguments and strategies would be valuable for public 
servants to advance public health goals and could supplement the guidelines. 
Influence from vested interests could be further avoided by having representation 
of various stakeholder groups on a working group to overcome the ‘democratic 
deficit’, and by having tripartite regulation in place that empowers public interest 
groups to hold the other parties to account. 
7.3.2.2 Transparency and accountability 
Study 1 found that all regulatory processes need to be transparent, be reported on, 
and be publicly available for stakeholders to gain trust in the system and, 
importantly, in each other. As others have confirmed, a low level of transparency 




public acceptance of these regulatory arrangements (Bryden et al., 2013; Harker, 
2003; Madelin, 2006; Taskforce on Industry Self-regulation, 2000). To further 
enhance trustworthiness, the findings suggest having accountability mechanisms 
in place to scrutinise the regulatory framework and to hold stakeholders to 
account. While accountability mechanisms can motivate compliance and increase 
the effectiveness of regulation, these are often lacking in regulatory arrangements 
with the alcohol industry (Buse et al., 2017; Moodie et al., 2013). 
7.3.2.3 Evaluation tool 
One such accountability mechanism is an evaluation tool, which is also the next 
fundamental layer in the Polder model and key to meta-regulation of the pyramid. 
The evaluation tool’s aims is to review practices and procedures, and its 
components should include: tracking of exposure rates of alcohol marketing in 
relation to KPIs and benchmarks at regular intervals (like monitoring fluctuation 
of the water levels); reviewing the marketing code and its alignment with 
overarching objectives (like monitoring leaks in dikes and establishing causes); 
predicting, be advised on, and be responsive to new marketing techniques or 
platforms (similarly, taking into account long-term weather forecasts and sea level 
risings); and importantly, review governance processes by the industry body (e.g. 
review the functioning of the pump houses that remove excess rain- and 
groundwater). 
Evaluations should be performed independently of the alcohol industry. Further, 
evaluators need access to all relevant information and require full autonomy in 
conducting the evaluation and reporting on findings. Industry data could 
potentially be requested by an empowered agency, similar to the Federal Trade 
Commission in the US. The findings suggest that an independent scientific panel 




to account and to avoid regulatory capture, similar to Ayers and Braithwaite’s 
tripartite model (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2017). Reviews from 
the different sources and actors should feed into the overall evaluation by the 
government agency (see Figure 11). The outcomes can be used to review and to 
revise policy in order to improve the system and to make informed decisions to 
move up the pyramid to strengthen regulation and to increase government 
involvement. This meta-regulation feedback model also shows that within a 
predetermined timeline for a regulatory level to prove its success, there are plenty 
of opportunities to review and revise procedures and standards. 
The success of a regulatory level will be measured as collective industry 
compliance rather than individual company compliance. Ultimately, success or 
failure will be dependent on the industry body’s ability to agree on a code that is 
aligned with the overarching public health objectives. Additionally, it will be 
determined by the type of monitoring mechanisms and enforcement strategies that 






Figure 11. Meta-regulation and quadruple loop* evaluation of an alcohol marketing 
framework. Adapted from the ‘Triple loop evaluation of self-regulation model’ in Meta-
regulation: The regulation of self-regulation (p. 278), by C. Parker (Ed.), The Open 
Corporation: Effective Self-regulation and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
7.3.2.4 Setting timeframes 
The next fundamental layer is ‘setting timeframes for review’ of a regulatory 
level. Study 1 found that objectives need to be time-bound, and a decision to 
move up the regulatory pyramid would be appropriate to make when the 
regulatory scheme has been running for two-to-five years, depending on 
objectives and KPIs. As discussed earlier in chapter 5 (section 5.11.5), if 
timelines are not put in place, it is likely that the industry will delay effective 
alcohol marketing, to allow them to market their product without significant 
restrictions (Bryden et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2016). 
7.3.2.5 Threat of regulation 
To have a meaningful regulatory arrangement, there is a need for the government 




regulatory pyramid and to increase its involvement. Having this threat in the 
background will create the perception of an invincible regulatory agency, and this 
is predicted to bring about industry compliance with the marketing code without 
the need to legislate (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2002a). 
7.3.2.6 Comprehensive marketing code 
There is one final fundamental layer that should be addressed before designing a 
regulatory arrangement with the industry (i.e. building the pyramid). This is a set 
of conditions for an effective and comprehensive marketing code. First, there is a 
need for an all-encompassing definition of the term ‘marketing’ to reduce 
discussion and to avoid the creation of loopholes. An example of such a broad 
definition is that of the WHO: “Any form of commercial communication or 
message that is designed to increase, or has the effect of increasing, the 
recognition, appeal and/or consumption of particular products and services. It 
could comprise anything that acts to advertise or otherwise promote a product or 
service” (WHO, 2010). A challenging and rapidly evolving area is the regulation 
of digital alcohol marketing. A credible threat from governments needs to be 
displayed before effective industry regulation of digital marketing can be 
expected. This can be supported by international public health agreements on 
alcohol policy (Babor et al., 2017a), provided that parties of the agreement 
collaborate to monitor and report on cross-border online promotions (Dunlop, 
Freeman, & Perez, 2016). 
Second, there is a need for clearly defined content restrictions that do not allow 
for exceptions, unlike the current standards that include vague descriptions, such 
as ‘evident’ appeal. However, a sole focus on content restrictions ignores the 
effect of the cumulative impact of marketing. Thus, thirdly and probably most 




will reduce alcohol marketing exposure and alcohol availability in all vulnerable 
groups in Australian society. Additionally, it will remove the 'spillover' effects 
that minors encounter currently. 
When clear public health objectives are put in place (dikes), and the underlying 
conditions (fundaments) have been built up, the regulatory arrangements can be 
designed (pyramid levels), and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms can be 
put in place (like canals that catch ground- and rainwater, which is forced out to 
sea). 
7.3.3 Building the regulatory pyramid 
According to the Australian Government, in decentred regulatory approaches, 
such as co-regulation, the “industry develops and administers its own 
arrangement and government provides the underpinning legislation to enforce it” 
(PM&C, 2014). Hence, in quasi- and co-regulation of alcohol marketing, the 
industry body would administer the marketing code, would monitor breaches, and 
would enforce the rules on a daily basis. This is seen as beneficial arrangement 
for the government as is less costly and quicker to establish than explicit 
government regulation (Bryden et al., 2013). An additional benefit might be that 
companies are more responsive to an industry body that enforces the code, rather 
than an external agency (Michael, 1995). 
As these types of regulatory arrangements are often ineffective in terms of public 
health outcomes, I have recommended above meta-regulating the industry 
through government oversight and ‘tripartism’, and emphasised the importance of 
having all the fundamental conditions in place. Compared to the current quasi-
regulatory ABAC scheme, future arrangements need more government and third-




the ultimate responsibility for closing the gap in social health disparities (see 
section 5.11.2), for reducing alcohol availability (see section 5.11.1), and for 
guaranteeing individual’s freedom to make informed choices by ensuring that 
vulnerable populations are not ‘flooded’ with alcohol marketing (see section 
5.10.1). 
Section 5.12.1 presented my reasoning for aligning the five regulatory options of 
the pyramid with those definitions provided by the Australian Government 
(PM&C, 2014). However, in light of ineffective alcohol marketing regulation, and 
the clear intention of the industry to delay and avoid effective regulation 
identified in both studies, this final model will not include the option of ‘no 
regulation’ and ‘self-regulation’ in order to avoid deregulation (see Figure 12 for 
final Polder model). While acknowledging that current quasi-regulation has also 
not been effective in protecting vulnerable populations, this regulatory approach 
will remain in the pyramid as this is likely an attractive option to the government 
and one that is not yet fully explored. Optimal governance characteristics for 





Figure 12. Final meta-regulated Polder model for alcohol marketing regulation 
7.3.3.1 Quasi- and co-regulation characteristics 
In quasi- and co-regulatory arrangements, the industry body would co-design with 
government a ‘one stop shop’ alcohol marketing scheme that governs the single 
marketing code and deals with all alcohol marketing and associated complaints 
(see Table 11). Stakeholders should also be included to keep the public health 
objectives in the foremind of the industry and to apply more pressure to comply 
with the standards (Braithwaite, 2017). Hence, a consultative stakeholder 
committee could be established; alternatively, stakeholders could be represented 
on the board. The nature of quasi- and co-regulation allows for flexible and timely 
changes to the code and procedures as needed. Additionally, whole-of-industry 
(alcohol producers, distributors, and retailers) participation is required for any 




100%. Because of underpinning legislation in co-regulation, compliance with the 
code will, in this case, be mandatory. 
Table 11 
Optimal characteristics of quasi- and co-regulation levels for effective 
governance of a single comprehensive Alcohol Marketing Code 
 Quasi-regulation Co-regulation 
Who?  Industry and government co-
design; 
Establishment of consultative 
stakeholder committee 
Daily running by industry 
More government involvement 
in designing stages;  
Establishment of consultative 
stakeholder committee; 
Daily running by industry 
Industry 
participation 
Voluntary: close to 100% Mandatory: 100% 
Monitoring 
tools  
Pre-vetting, public complaint, 
pro-active monitoring and 
adjudication 
Pre-vetting, public complaint, 




Independent & impartial; 
Interpretation guided by ‘the 
spirit of the Code’ 
Independent & impartial; 
Interpretation guided by ‘the 





Naming & shaming, fines, 
temporary advertising bans, 
paying for public health ads, 
media refusal of offending 
advertisements; 
Public recognition and positive 
publicity, e.g. logos & awards 
Naming & shaming, fines, 
temporary advertising bans, 
paying for public health ads, 
and court action; 
Public recognition and positive 
publicity, e.g. logos & awards 
Legal ‘backstops’ Legally binding commitment; 
Adoption of a standard 
‘responsibility clause’ in all 
advertising contracts with 
media 
Underpinning legislation, e.g. 







Both quasi- and co-regulation require the same monitoring mechanisms, ones that 
increase the likelihood of detection (see Table 11). The need for pre-vetting 
remains, as this prevents the appearances of breaches of the code and should 
include at least: 1) all major marketing campaigns; 2) all alcohol marketing 
communications with a large reach (e.g. print and digital); and 3) all packaging 
and naming of products, because of their long shelf life. However, processes and 
adjudication decisions should be transparent. Second, there is a need for an 
accessible public complaint system with a high level of public awareness. Social 
media platforms, for example, could be used to lodge complaints without 
difficulty. Adjudication panel members need to remain independent of industry, 
and their impartial interpretation should be guided by ‘the spirit of the Code’, 
rather than a legalistic approach (ANPHA, 2014; National Committee for the 
Review of Alcohol Advertising, 2003). To avoid reliance on the public alone, pro-
active monitoring should be carried out regularly (e.g. daily, weekly, or monthly 
depending on the medium) by an independent research company to provide a 
snapshot of marketing activities in all media (EASA, 2011). 
Further, because compliance by these reputational-sensitive companies is largely 
driven by CSR and cost of compliance, both quasi-regulation and co-regulation 
should combine punishment and persuasion strategies (Ayres & Braithwaite, 
1992). Enforcement strategies should include ‘naming & shaming’, which expose 
the harmfulness of the offence, positive publicity such as logos or awards, and 
fines. Importantly, financial sanctions need to be high enough to have a strong 
impact on companies’ budgets (Thornton et al., 2005; van Erp, 2011). 
To increase compliance further, regulatees should believe in the ‘inexorability of 
sanctions’ (Braithwaite et al., 2005), which can be provided by legal backstops. In 




regulator (industry body) and signatories. Another option is the adoption of a 
standard ‘responsibility clause’ in all advertising contracts with media (ICAS, 
2014). In co-regulation, the government should have underpinning legislation in 
place (e.g. by registering the Code with a government body such as the ACCC), 
which will enable court action and at the same time provides a credible threat that 
could bring about compliance. 
Thus, the optimal characteristics for effective governance of an alcohol marketing 
code are very similar in these two versions of industry partnerships. The two 
distinguishing features of co-regulation are mandatory instead of voluntary 
industry participation, and underpinning legislation instead of corporate contracts. 
The final layer of the pyramid is ‘explicit government regulation’, whereby the 
alcohol industry is purely the subject of regulation. In that case, the government 
agency will implement legislation and will be responsible for monitoring and 
enforcement of the code. Similar to tobacco marketing legislation, it is likely that 
the threat of hefty fines and court action will induce compliance, and will 
decrease monitoring and enforcement duties. 
7.3.4 Summary of the final meta-regulated Polder model 
Thus, in order to keep the sea of marketing at bay, the regulatory pyramid needs 
to be meta-regulated by the government with help from third parties. The 
government will need to drive change and enable the government agency to put 
underpinning infrastructure in place, to set public health goals, and to design 
processes that ensure transparency and accountability. Additionally, it will need 
to evaluate and review on a regular basis and have benchmarks and timelines in 
place. And finally, the government should communicate a threat to escalate up the 




While the government should be involved in the design of the pyramid, the 
regulatory industry body will be responsible for the governance, monitoring, and 
enforcement of the code and need to be held to account by government and third 
parties. The industry body will interact with the alcohol companies and marketers 
frequently and should enforce the code in a responsive manner (i.e. 
accommodative approaches and responsive use of punishment and persuasion 
strategies to induce cooperation and compliance). 
The next section explains why this Polder model, which provides practical 
solutions for strengthening alcohol marketing regulation, could be attractive to the 
Australian Government and discusses briefly reasons for the alcohol industry to 
cooperate. 
7.4 Benefits of the use of the Polder model  
While the neoliberal narrative continues and industry has a major influence on 
health policy in Australia, responsive regulation and the Polder model can be used 
to improve alcohol marketing regulation incrementally and protect vulnerable 
populations. Considering the current political climate in Australia, this thesis 
proposes that the ‘Meta-regulated Polder model for alcohol marketing’ is a more 
politically palatable solution to this problem than legislation. Similarly, Cullerton 
et al. found that neoliberalist western governments are more supportive of non-
legislative solutions in public health (Cullerton et al., 2016). Due to the Australian 
Government’s dependence on the alcohol industry (e.g. via political donations) 
and the fear of industry accusations of nanny-statism, there is a preference to keep 
the relationship with industry alive (see section 5.10.3). Moreover, a decentred 
approach would possibly result in less backlash from the industry than when 




While the Polder model will only function well if it is well meta-regulated (i.e. 
proper oversight, commitment, and a drive for change by the government), I argue 
that its incremental nature is attractive to politicians as it will be viewed by the 
public as less paternalistic and it can ease the public into significant changes over 
time. Generally, governments tend to select public health policies that are least 
disruptive and cause the least commotion in the broader community (Cullerton et 
al., 2016). At the same time, this model has accountability mechanisms in place, 
which give the government objective and robust evidence to support a decision to 
move to stricter regulation. Other studies have also suggested that if explicit 
government regulation is not feasible, public health regulation should be 
incrementally improved instead (Noel et al., 2017a), through responsive models 
that enhance accountability (Baker et al., 2017; Magnusson & Reeve, 2015; 
Moodie et al., 2013; Swinburn et al., 2015). 
Further, governments prefer a clear plan for health policies (Roxon, 2017), which 
this Polder model provides. Additionally, it is suitable for a whole-of-government 
commitment to reduce the psychological and social availability of alcohol, and 
alcohol-related harm. The Polder model further aids the identification of required 
actions, processes, and responsible parties (e.g. different departments, 
governments, and stakeholders). 
The main reason for the industry to co-operate with the implementation of the 
Polder model is to avoid or delay comprehensive legislation that would further 
restrict their ability to market their product. Additionally, co-operation will keep 
the alcohol industry’s highly-valued CSR image intact, which means that they 
will maintain their position as a stakeholder in public health policy (unlike the 
tobacco industry in tobacco legislation). It further avoids the establishment of a 




World, which is beneficial for these transnational companies. For instance, the 
Australian Government’s decision to move to plain packaging of cigarettes has 
led to other countries to follow their lead (such as the UK, France, Norway, and 
New Zealand) (Anker, 2016). 
Importantly, a complex regulatory model like this can backfire when only parts 
are implemented. This happened in the past in the United Kingdom, where the 
government used elements of the Responsive Regulation theory to support their 
deregulation agenda, which resulted in both the loss of monitoring and a credible 
threat of enforcement in health-and-safety-laws (Tombs & Whyte, 2013). This 
research underlines that while cherry-picking characteristics of Responsive 
Regulation can be appealing to governments, it is essential that the whole Polder 
model is adopted (Braithwaite, 2011), for it to be effective in regulating alcohol 
marketing and reducing the availability of alcohol in Australia. 
7.5 How responsive is the Polder model? 
With these many conditions for success, questions might surface about remaining 
similarities between the proposed Polder model and the Responsive Regulation 
theory. Ayres and Braithwaite’s theory is, however, not a ‘tightly prescriptive 
theory’ and insists on a practical application. It is therefore appropriate that the 
development of the Polder model was approached flexibly and adjusted according 
to the regulatory context. Many aspects of Responsive Regulation theory 
remained essential to the Polder Model. 
7.5.1 Comparing fundamental components 
The Polder model, like Responsive Regulation, was developed with the intention 
to assist social change, and it too assumes that the government is willing and has 




Further, the Responsive Regulation theory also holds that while regulation can be 
delegated to industry, the government is required to maintain oversight of the 
pyramid and should hold industry to account (Bartle & Vass, 2007). This is 
referred to as enforced self-regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992), and later as 
meta-regulation (Parker, 2002a). Furthermore, Ayres and Braithwaite warn 
against regulatory capture and corruption and suggest that the solution involves 
having third parties involved through tripartism with public interest groups (Ayres 
& Braithwaite, 1992), which the Polder model has taken on board. Braithwaite 
recently argued that without “some third party (or a number of them) in the 
regulatory game, regulation will be captured and corrupted by money power” 
(Braithwaite, 2016). 
Next, the Polder model, like the Responsive Regulation theory, aims to be 
reflective and to improve on a system continuously by evaluating what worked 
well and what aspect failed, and why (see Figure 11, quadruple loop evaluation 
model, p. 234) (Braithwaite, 2011). Further, the Polder model agrees with the 
Responsive Regulation theory that compliance is more likely to occur if the 
regulator is perceived as a ‘benign big gun’ (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992), a 
perception that can only be established with political leadership (Parker, 2006). 
Finally, a government commitment and a threat of regulation are critical 
fundamental conditions in the Polder model to induce compliance with the code. 
Braithwaite explains that if the government has a “locked-in commitment to 
escalation where reform does not occur … then escalation beyond the lower 
levels of the pyramid will rarely [need to] occur” (Braithwaite, 2011, p. 489). 
7.5.2 Adaptations to the regulatory pyramid 
Findings from Study 2 indicated that removal of the two bottom options ‘no 




ensure that entry level is not lowered due to alcohol industry’s CPA and influence 
on health policies. This section discusses how compatible this adaptation is with 
the Responsive Regulation theory, as Braithwaite emphasises the need to start at 
the bottom of a regulatory pyramid, and to use persuasive and informal regulatory 
tools (Braithwaite, 2002a). These principles are, however, based on assumptions 
that most businesses can be persuaded to do the right thing on moral grounds or 
that non-compliance is due to lacking competence or capacity (Braithwaite, 
2002a). Hence, he suggests it is better not to escalate to harsher enforcement or 
regulatory options when softer or lateral (e.g. networked regulation) options are 
still available. However, Braithwaite also explains that when problems have not 
been solved at lower pyramid levels, and persuasion has failed, it is likely that 
non-compliance is due to ‘rational calculation to cheat’ (Braithwaite, 2008). In 
this case, the regulator should move to apply deterrence strategies and, ultimately, 
incapacitation (Braithwaite, 2008).  
At the same time, the Responsive Regulation theory posits that regulation needs 
to be responsive to the regulatees’ ‘motivational postures’, and to their behaviour 
and conduct (Braithwaite, 2008, p. 163). Additionally, Braithwaite more recently 
iterated that there is a need to be strategic about when to privatise and when to 
socialise markets, and to bring certain industries back under regulatory control 
where privatisation has failed, such as tobacco and gambling (Braithwaite, 
2013b). In the context of the ongoing, active and deliberate alcohol industry 
opposition to effective regulation, the findings in this thesis indicate that there is a 
need for reversal of failed privatisation and that the alcohol industry should be 
classified as a ‘rational actor’ who will likely respond to a higher level of 
government involvement. For the same reasons, I argue that deregulation, or 




Additionally, at an industry scale of this size, it is impractical to move between 
regulatory levels often (Ford, 2013); a regulatory level needs several years to 
prove itself, and it would take some years to move to another level of regulation. 
While not able to move highly dynamic along the regulatory pyramid, the Polder 
model is dynamic and responsive to the functioning of rules and procedures. The 
stakeholders will have ample opportunity to repair policy, procedures, and 
practices where necessary due to the regular consultative committee meetings and 
yearly evaluations by the government agency. 
On the other hand, when enforcing the code, the industry body can be flexible and 
responsive to individual companies’ behaviour and circumstances. Hierarchal 
enforcement strategies, including deterrents and incentives, should be in place 
(Dukes et al., 2014). For example, responses to first-time breaches can be in the 
form of education and accompanied by ‘naming and shaming’, whereas 
subsequent breaches could be responded to with fines, and ultimately court action. 
When regulation of the code has been escalated to legislation (e.g. an ‘Alcohol 
Marketing Act’), the government might not be able to enforce as responsively. 
In conclusion, the Polder model’s fundamental conditions are aligned with the 
Responsive Regulation theory’s broader values and principles. However, as the 
Polder model is designed explicitly for alcohol marketing regulation, it has a few 
extra conditions, such as having a comprehensive code in place and having 
formalised stakeholder engagement. The meta-regulated Polder model is 
responsive up to a certain level, but reviewing the industry’s performance as a 





The findings presented in this thesis highlight that policymaking is not a rational 
and straightforward process that is only influenced by evidence. Instead, it is 
affected by the interests of multiple stakeholders with different degrees of 
influence and power. The Australian Government is reluctant to increase 
regulation in alcohol marketing in this era of ‘regulatory capitalism’ and 
neoliberal ideology. In part, this can be attributed to fear of public backlash when 
interventions are perceived as too paternalistic, and partly because of the 
deregulation agenda which has resulted in a requirement for new policies to 
demonstrate that the social and health benefits outweigh the cost to business in 
financial terms. 
At the same time, the powerful alcohol industry, who has united itself in industry 
bodies, who has aligned itself with other powerful industries (e.g. media, sport, 
gambling), who pays for influential lobbyists, who is considered by the 
government to be a legitimate stakeholder in public health policy, and whom the 
government relies on financially, argues consistently for ‘regulatory redundancy’ 
and a ‘lack of evidence’ of increased alcohol marketing regulation. This has led to 
two decades of ineffective regulation, while the industry continues to spend 
billions on alcohol marketing to override people’s desires and willpower, and has 
shifted the onus of responsibility of alcohol-related harm to consumers. In this 
context, it is hardly a surprise that a reduction in alcohol-related harm has not 
been achieved. 
Thus, keeping a critical social perspective, I argue that the alcohol industry with 
their vested interest should not have a role in alcohol health policy development 
and setting of objectives, as was also advocated by Margaret Chan, the former 




while governments fail to regulate alcohol marketing, the use of creative 
regulatory strategies that provide a middle way and increase accountability and 
transparency of all parties through strong government oversight is warranted. 
Stakeholder involvement can counterweigh the industry’s dominant position in 
public health policy. The findings in this thesis indicate that the Responsive 
Regulation theory applies to alcohol marketing in Australia and that it can address 
the current impasse by using an incremental approach to regulation. This might 
not be as effective as alcohol marketing legislation in the short run, but this 
practical solution has the potential to result in significant change over time by 
reducing the availability of alcohol in Australia step-by-step. 
The findings suggest a need to refine the NPHT pyramid and to adapt the 
Responsive Regulation theory to the alcohol marketing regulatory environment in 
Australia. As a result of both the expert interviews in Study 1 and the industry 
document analysis in Study 2, the ‘meta-regulated Polder model’ is proposed. The 
Polder model explains which conditions need to be in place for a regulatory 
arrangement with industry to function well and for alcohol marketing regulation 
to be effective. It also provides the government with a clear plan and starting 
point to work from. 
It is likely that the alcohol industry’s efforts to dilute or delay effective regulation 
will continue. Therefore, it is imperative that decentred regulatory approaches are 
meta-regulated and that fundamental conditions are in place before engaging in 
such arrangements with industry. The government will need to take on a 
leadership role, and the development of the objectives should be undertaken 
independently of the industry. In order to hold the government and industry to 
account, representatives of different stakeholder groups, such as consumers, civil 




regulatory framework (tripartism). Further, transparency in policy development 
and decision making should have a high priority, and the Polder model proposes 
that any engagement with industry should be formalised and actively managed 
through guidelines. However, more research is required to investigate if these 
guidelines truly result in a heightened awareness of industry framings of alcohol 
issues among public servants and if this awareness subsequently would generate 
different policy outcomes. As findings from Study 1 suggest that significant 
change is driven by political commitment, it is also worth exploring if these 
engagement guidelines would have any effect when industry lobbying and 
donations remain accepted. 
The Polder model also prescribes holding the alcohol industry to account by 
performing regular evaluations and reviews and having a threat of escalation up 
the regulatory pyramid if benchmarks are not met within a predetermined 
timeframe. The Polder model, additionally, requires the implementation of a set 
of governance characteristics for quasi- and co-regulation that should improve 
compliance with the new code that aims to reduce alcohol marketing exposure. 
Legal backstops are valuable in ensuring compliance. Further, there is a need to 
focus on placement restrictions in the marketing code. Sophisticated marketing 
strategies can bypass rational decision making, they influence societal norms and 
have increased the availability of alcohol in Australia. It is, therefore, preferable 
to have rules in place that protect all vulnerable groups and reduce the overall 
volume of alcohol marketing. Besides increasing transparency and accountability, 
which increase confidence in the regulatory arrangement in stakeholders and the 
public, the Polder model’s components, including its evaluations and backing of 





While I argue that the Polder model is well-equipped to be used as a tool to 
increase accountability and to incrementally achieve effective alcohol marketing 
regulation in Australia, I also recognise obstacles and limitations of uptake and 
implementation, such as the current ‘Regulation Impact Statement’ requirement, 
and the current prioritisation of economics over health by the government. 
Therefore, a whole-of-government commitment to public health is needed, which 
could be facilitated by the integration of human rights acts (‘Right to Health’ or 
‘Rights of the Child’) in overarching national alcohol policy. Alternatively, it can 
be generated through binding international agreements for alcohol, e.g. based on 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Further, this proposed model 
should be seen and presented as one component of a comprehensive multi-level 
approach to effectively reduce alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harm, as 
it is unlikely that this single public health intervention can demonstrate that the 
benefits to society will outweigh the costs for business.  
Importantly, there is a chance that this model will backfire if the government only 
adopts parts of the model to further an agenda of deregulation. Additionally, when 
the federal government is not willing to commit, policy changes can happen at 
State and Territory level, which could promote policy-transfer at the Federal level 
government. 
This thesis adopted a case study design to investigate alternative alcohol 
marketing regulation in Australia. It is, therefore, unclear if the outcomes are 
transferable to other jurisdictions where a range of key variables might differ, 
such as the deregulation agenda, industry power, and effectiveness of current 
alcohol marketing regulation. As ongoing political commitment and strong rule of 
law are required in order to have a threat of escalation in the background, 




Polder model. Furthermore, there is scope to explore the Polder model’s 
adaptation to other alcohol policy areas, such as alcohol warning labels, and to 
other ‘dangerous consumptions’, such as junk food and gambling where there is a 
need to move public health policy beyond the regulatory stalemate. 
In 1985, Boddewyn concluded that “the true challenges in this area lie in the 
governmental support and supervision of [advertising] self-
regulation” (Boddewyn, 1985, p. 138). Not much seems to have changed since 
then. However, responsive regulation might provide a politically palatable and 
practical solution to the alcohol marketing regulation impasse in Australia. With 
the potential for step-by-step escalation up the pyramid, this framework could 
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NS C? TV ?  Voluntary 
• Federal government introduction 














• In 1969, Federal legislation was introduced 
to enable health warnings to appear on 
packaging, but every State/Territory had to 
pass their own legislation as well 
• National legislation of mandatory health 
warnings was delayed until 1973 due to 
lobbying by tobacco industry 
• “Warning. Smoking is a health hazard” had 
to be carried on every tobacco product. The 











• Federal government 
• Removal of tobacco advertising on TV and 
Radio  
• Allowing “accidental and incidental” 
advertising created loophole for 
sponsorship  













• Age child/adolescent defined as <18 years 
• Authorized by the Trade Practices 
Commission 
• Placement/volume of advertising was not 
addressed 
• Voluntary codes could not be enforced, 
accreditation scheme 
Tobacco Act 1987 

















• First comprehensive tobacco advertising 
ban 
• Exclusion of interior point-of-sale 
advertising and print advertising 
• Establishment of VicHealth through 
hypothecated tax on tobacco products 
• VicHealth funds compensated for loss of 
funds of sporting/art bodies that refused 
tobacco sponsorship 
• Act inspired replication (policy-transfer) in 
other states and encouraged federal 
government to ban tobacco advertising in 
















• Federal government  
• Ban on tobacco advertising in print media 
























• Federal government 
• Phasing out sport sponsorship over 4 years 
• Sponsorship exemptions granted to events 
of international significance up (last event 
in 2006) 
• Excludes point-of-sale (state jurisdiction) 
• Amendment includes electronic advertising 



















• Plain packaging for all tobacco products 
sold in Australia 
• Olive-green packaging with a graphic 
health warning 
• Brand of the cigarette will appear in plain 
type and small font 
• Enforced from December 1, 2012 
Note. *PCS = Public Complaint System. 
a I was not able to retrieve the content of the earliest tobacco codes (1966 and 1971). Information about their existence was obtained through grey literature findings 
Appendix B Examples of Regulatory pyramids in practice 
 
Example 1: Responsive Regulation pyramid of strategies and examples of patient safety 
mechanism in hospitals 
Healy and Dugdale have proposed the use of the Responsive Regulation model to 
improve the safety of health care for patients, by guiding both regulatory reform and 
regulatory practice in individual hospitals (Boddewyn, 1985, p. 138). Traditionally 
the state has left the regulation of health care performance to the medical profession, 
however external pressures have been insisting on a higher accountability and 
transparency of health care. The authors suggest escalating up the pyramid when the 
hospital continues to fail to regulate itself internally. 
 
Source: Healy, J., & Dugdale, P. (2009). Patient safety first: responsive regulation in health 
care. Australia: Allen & Unwin, p 557.  
  
Example 2: Administrative Review Council (ARC) Pyramid of Business Rules 
The Administrative Review Council (ARC) wrote a report in 2008 as a response to 
an inquiry from the Attorney-General regarding “the increasing complexity of 
regulatory regimes which apply to Australian businesses”. It proposes a Pyramid of 
Business Rules and distinguishes the rules between and their application of ‘Soft 
law’ and ‘Black letter law’. 
 
 
Source: Administrative Research Council. (2008). Administrative accountability in business 
areas subject to complex and specific regulation. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, p. 
x. 
  
Example 3: ACMA Regulatory continuum 
Australian Communication and Media Authority described the “optimal conditions 
for effective self- and co-regulatory arrangement in the Australian Media and 
Communications context” in the following flow-chart. This regulatory continuum is 
similar to the proposed NPHT pyramid; however, this flow chart moves down 
towards less interventions. 
 
Source: Australian Communications and Media Authority. (2015). Optimal conditions for 
effective self- and co-regulatory arrangements: Occasional paper. Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 9. 
 
Appendix C Networked regulation 
 
Networked’ regulation allows for lateral movement in the pyramid and incorporates 






























Appendix E Consolidated criteria for reporting qualitative studies 
(COREQ): 32-item checklist 




Answers for Study 1 
Domain 1: Research team and reflexivity  
Personal Characteristics  
1. Interviewer/facilitator Which author/s conducted 
the interview or focus group?  
Florentine Martino 
2. Credentials What were the researcher’s 
credentials? E.g. PhD, MD  
PhD candidate, MSc, 
BSc 
3. Occupation What was their occupation at 
the time of the study?  
PhD candidate 
4. Gender Was the researcher male or 
female?  
Female 
5. Experience and training What experience or training 
did the researcher have?  
Transcription and 




Relationship with participants  
6. Relationship established Was a relationship 
established prior to study 
commencement?  
On a professional 
level, I knew some 
participants. 
7. Participant knowledge of 
the interviewer  
What did the participants 
know about the researcher? 
e.g. personal goals, reasons 
for doing the research  
They knew I was 
doing a PhD. 
8. Interviewer characteristics What characteristics were 
reported about the 
interviewer/facilitator? e.g. 
Bias, assumptions, reasons 
and interests in the research 
topic  
Interest from a public 
health perspective 
and applicability of 
the Responsive 
Regulation Theory in 
alcohol marketing 
Domain 2: study design  
Theoretical framework  
9. Methodological orientation 
and Theory  
What methodological 
orientation was stated to 
underpin the study? e.g. 







strategy: Case study; 
and Method: Expert 
interviews 
Participant selection  
10. Sampling How were participants 





11. Method of approach How were participants 
approached? e.g. face-to-
face, telephone, mail, email  
Email 
12. Sample size How many participants were 
in the study?  
28 
13. Non-participation How many people refused to 
participate or dropped out? 
Reasons?  
8 people did not 
respond to the 
invitation; 14 people 
refused participation.  
Setting 
14. Setting of data collection Where was the data 
collected? e.g. home, clinic, 
workplace  
Workplace of 
participants, a quiet 
neutral public space, 
and Skype or phone 
call 
15. Presence of non-
participants 
Was anyone else present 
besides the participants and 
researchers?  
No 
16. Description of sample What are the important 
characteristics of the sample? 
e.g. demographic data, date  
Experts from several 












(All ages, both 
genders)	
Data collection  
17. Interview guide Were questions, prompts, 
guides provided by the 
authors? Was it pilot tested?  
The NPHT proposed 
regulatory pyramid 
was provided before 
the interview. The 
main sections of the 
interview guide were 
pilot tested and 
revised. The flexible 
part of the 
questionnaire was 
adapted slightly to 
the expert’s specific 
knowledge area. 
18. Repeat interviews Were repeat inter views 
carried out? If yes, how 
many?  
No 
19. Audio/visual recording Did the research use audio or 




20. Field notes Were field notes made during 
and/or after the interview or 
focus group? 
Yes, after each 
interview 
21. Duration What was the duration of the 
inter views or focus group?  
Between 45 min – 1.5 
hrs 
22. Data saturation Was data saturation Yes 
discussed?  
23. Transcripts returned Were transcripts returned to 
participants for comment 
and/or correction?  
Yes, when requested 
Domain 3: analysis and findings  
Data analysis 
24. Number of data coders How many data coders coded 
the data?  
FM coded all the 
data; however, PM 
(supervisor) double-
coded 2 transcripts, 
and non-consensus 
was discussed. 
25. Description of the coding 
tree 
Did authors provide a 
description of the coding 
tree? 
Appendix – NVIVO 
Codebook 
26. Derivation of themes Were themes identified in 
advance or derived from the 
data?  
 
Initial coding was 
concept driven, and 
as new ideas emerged 
the codes were 
adjusted and 
expanded. 
27. Software What software, if applicable, 
was used to manage the data?  
NVivo 11.4.2 
28. Participant checking Did participants provide 
feedback on the findings?  
No 
Reporting 
29. Quotations presented Were participant quotations 
presented to illustrate the 
themes/findings? Was each 
quotation identified? e.g. 
participant number 
Yes, the quotation 
was identified with a 
generic term for their 
relevant profession 
30. Data and findings 
consistent 
Was there consistency 
between the data presented 
and the findings?  
Yes 
31. Clarity of major themes Were major themes clearly 
presented in the findings?  
Yes 
32. Clarity of minor themes Is there a description of 
diverse cases or discussion of 








Title and abstract 
1 Title Concise description of the nature and topic of 
the study Identifying the study as qualitative 
or indicating the approach (e.g., ethnography, 
grounded theory) or data collection methods 
(e.g., interview, focus group) is recommended 
2 Abstract Summary of key elements of the study using 
the abstract format of the intended 
publication; typically includes background, 
purpose, methods, results, and conclusions 
Introduction 
3 Problem formulation Description and significance of the 
problem/phenomenon studied; review of 
relevant theory and empirical work; problem 
statement 
4 Purpose or research 
question 
Purpose of the study and specific objectives 
or questions 
Methods 
5 Qualitative approach and 
research paradigm 
Qualitative approach (e.g., ethnography, 
grounded theory, case study, 
phenomenology, narrative research) 
and guiding theory if appropriate; 
identifying the research paradigm (e.g., 
postpositivist, 





Researchers’ characteristics that may 
influence the research, including personal 
attributes, qualifications/experience, 
relationship with participants, assumptions, 
and/or presuppositions; potential or actual 
interaction between researchers’ 
characteristics and the research questions, 
approach, methods, results, and/or 
transferability 
7 Context Setting/site and salient contextual factors; 
rationale** 
8 Sampling strategy How and why research participants, 
documents, or events were selected; criteria 
for deciding when no further sampling was 
necessary (e.g., sampling saturation); 
rationale** 
9 Ethical issues pertaining 
to human subjects 
Documentation of approval by an appropriate 
ethics review board and participant consent, 
or explanation for lack thereof; other 
confidentiality and data security issues 
10 Data collection methods Types of data collected; details of data 
collection procedures including (as 
appropriate) start and stop dates of data 
collection and analysis, iterative process, 
triangulation of sources/methods, and 
modification of procedures in response to 
evolving study findings; rationale** 
11 Data collection 
instruments and 
technologies 
Description of instruments (e.g., interview 
guides, questionnaires) and devices (e.g., 
audio recorders) used for data collection; 
if/how the instrument(s) changed over the 
course of the study 
12 Units of study Number and relevant characteristics of 
participants, documents, or events included in 
the study; level of participation (could be 
reported in results) 
13 Data processing Methods for processing data prior to and 
during analysis, including transcription, data 
entry, data management and security, 
verification of data integrity, data coding, and 
anonymization/de-identification of excerpts 
14 Data analysis Process by which inferences, themes, etc., 
were identified and developed, including the 
researchers involved in data analysis; usually 
references a specific paradigm or approach; 
rationale** 
15 Techniques to enhance 
trustworthiness 
Techniques to enhance trustworthiness and 
credibility of data analysis (e.g., member 
checking, audit trail, triangulation); 
rationale** 
Results/findings 
16 Synthesis and 
interpretation 
Main findings (e.g., interpretations, 
inferences, and themes); might include 
development of a theory or model, or 
integration with prior research or theory 
17 Links to empirical data Evidence (e.g., quotes, field notes, text 
excerpts, photographs) to substantiate analytic 
findings 
Discussion 
18 Integration with prior 
work, implications, 
transferability, and 
contribution(s) to the field 
Short summary of main findings; explanation 
of how findings and conclusions connect to, 
support, elaborate on, or challenge 
conclusions of earlier scholarship; discussion 
of scope of application/generalizability; 
identification of unique contribution(s) to 
scholarship in a discipline or field 
19 Limitations Trustworthiness and limitations of findings 
Other 
20 Conflicts of interest Potential sources of influence or perceived 
influence on study conduct and conclusions; 
how these were managed 
21 Funding Sources of funding and other support; role of 
funders in data collection, interpretation, and 
reporting 
*The authors created the SRQR by searching the literature to identify guidelines, reporting standards, and critical appraisal 
criteria for qualitative research; reviewing the reference lists of retrieved sources; and contacting experts to gain feedback. The 
SRQR aims to improve the transparency of all aspects of qualitative research by providing clear standards for reporting 
qualitative research. 
**The rationale should briefly discuss the justification for choosing that theory, approach, method, or technique rather than 
other options available, the assumptions and limitations implicit in those choices, and how those choices influence study 




Appendix H Plain language statement and consent form 
 
 
   
Appendix I Example interview structure (Study 1) 
 
Introduction 
Interviewer: The National Preventative Health Taskforce was given the task by the 
Minister for Health and Ageing to develop the National Preventative Health Strategy, 
focusing initially on obesity, tobacco and excessive consumption of alcohol, to “help 
making Australia a healthier country”. The Strategy is directed at primary 
prevention, and places substantial emphasis on the use of the responsive regulation 
theory and a corresponding pyramid in alcohol marketing regulation. The reports 
state that with the use of the proposed pyramid, “the effectiveness of the voluntary 
codes that are in place can now be monitored and shifted to ‘harder’ mechanisms if 




Interviewer: The pyramid consists of four layers, moving up when external 
monitoring shows no significant improvements in compliance. At the bottom of the 
pyramid we see market mechanisms, then self-regulation, the next level is co-
regulation (or regulated self-regulation), which is a co-designed system and the last 
proposed level is full government regulation and enforcement. It proposes 
independent monitoring and setting of realistic benchmarks, which can indicate when 
to escalate up the pyramid. This model has not been tested or applied in this setting 
yet. By interviewing stakeholders of alcohol marketing, I hope to find out:  
If this pyramid is applicable in the governance of alcohol marketing; 
What the criteria should be for the different levels of regulation, according to 
stakeholders; 
And what realistic benchmarks should be. 
My study looks at regulatory frameworks for alcohol marketing from a public health 
perspective.  
 
Questions tailored to experts’ knowledge and experience (left out)  
 
Questions to all experts: 
Developing effective code(s) 
Q: What are your thoughts on a regulatory model like this in the alcohol marketing 
regulation setting? 
Q: What kind of barriers do you perceive in regard to improving the alcohol 
marketing regulation framework in Australia? 
Q: In your opinion, should there be one overarching alcohol marketing code? Or 
should, like the situation is now, placement be governed by media industry and 
content with alcohol industry? 
To be able to determine when to move up the pyramid, benchmarks need to be in 
place.  
Q: Do you agree that the objectives & code (and benchmarking) need to be the same 
for any of the levels of regulation in this pyramid? 
Criteria for Self and Co-Regulation levels  
We will only discuss self-regulation and co-regulation and its criteria, as the other 
two levels should be quite clear, explain: 
• Pyramid Level 1: Free market: no regulation in place.  
(Reminder: A free market is a market structure in which the distribution and costs of 
goods and services, along with the structure and hierarchy between capital and 
consumer goods, are coordinated by supply and demand unhindered by external 
regulation or control by government or monopolies.) 
• Pyramid Level 4: Full government regulation and enforcement. 
Development of policies: government. 
Participation: mandatory.  
Monitoring: active. Regular monitoring by a government agency. 
Enforcement: alcohol marketing laws, cases go to court. 
Pyramid Level 2: Self-regulation  
Q: Do you think current self-regulation of alcohol marketing can be improved? If so, 
how?  
Prompt (when required):  
• Development of policies: Can codes be improved?  
• Participation: ABAC reports that a large percentage of bridges of code are 
by companies who have not signed up to the scheme. (Would it be more 
effective if every company was participating?) 
• Monitoring: Q: Do you think a public complaint system is an effective way 
to monitor compliance? Why/why not? Does it detect most breaches? 
Q: What is your opinion on mandatory pre-vetting?  
Q: Could the complaint system be improved? If so how? Could this make 
self-regulation more effective? 
• Enforcement: Q: For those companies who do not comply with the ABAC 
panel’s advice to withdraw an ad, what other enforcement strategies could be 
put in place? 
Q: In your opinion, could these improvements to the self-regulation system 
lead to limiting people’s exposure to advertising, promotion & sponsorship? 
Pyramid Level 3 Co-regulation 
If we move away from self-regulation to a higher level of government interference, 
but at the same time working together with the industry and other stakeholders (e.g. 
in an equal partnership), we arrive at the level of co-regulation. At this level, it is 
again not clear what the regulatory criteria should look like, who should be 
responsible for which parts and who should pay for the costs of governance.  
(Note: Self-regulation and co-regulation can be placed on a continuum and 
characteristics or criteria of these two situations can overlap. Co-regulation in other 
fields typically involves a legislative framework with minimum standards, which is 
then usually supplemented by industry codes or other regulatory mechanisms created 
by industry-bodies and are approved and/or monitored by a government regulator.)  
Development of policies 
Q: Who should be involved in the development of policies? 
Q: How would you ideally engage with the different stakeholders to develop the 
policies?  
• Prompts: Who should initiate the process? Round table discussion? White 
paper? 
Q: Who should have the final say and responsibility at this level? 
Participation 
Q: Should participation in the scheme be mandatory or voluntary at this level of co-
regulation?  
Monitoring 
There are three different forms of monitoring: Active, information is sought out 
actively; Reactive, relying on public complaints; and Interactive, which can be 
considered somewhere between active and reactive, which imposes periodic 
reporting and auditing. As we discussed before, at the moment monitoring is reactive 
and relies on a public complaint system. 
Q: What elements are necessary to have an effective monitoring system in place at 
this level? 
Q: Who should do the routine monitoring? 
Q: How often should this happen and how should this be reported? 
Enforcement 
Q: Do you think a legal backstop/legislation is needed at this level? And what would 
this ideally look like? 
Enforcement techniques 
There are different forms of enforcing rules and regulation and to respond to non-
compliance such as education, advising, warnings and finally economic sanctions 
and or public shaming.  
Q: Which enforcement strategies are required to get the highest level of compliance 
at CR?   
Q: Is there a need for warnings prior to sanctions?  
KPIs and Benchmarks 
To be able to determine when to move up the pyramid, benchmarks need to be in 
place.  
My idea is that there should be no differences in benchmarks and indicators of 
performance between different levels of governance/regulation. The goals should 
stay the same; children shouldn’t be exposed to alcohol marketing. 
Q: Do you agree with this idea? Please expand. 
Q: What should the indicators of performance be? I.e. what do you actually test or 
look for to evaluate performance of a regulatory framework? (write down during 
interview for next question) 
Q: For each indicator of performance, what do you think are realistic benchmarks 
that need to be set? 
Q: At what time intervals need to be decided if it is necessary to move up the pyramid 
(when benchmarks are not met)? 
 
Thank you very much for your time and sharing your knowledge with me.  
Do you have anything to add or do you have any last comments? 










Appendix J Final codebook for thematic analysis of expert interview transcripts (Study 1) 
 
Name and level of Codes (levels can be collapsed in NVivo software) Description (where required) 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 level 4 Level 5 Level 6   
Self-Regulation             
  Effective SR         here are subjects discussed that are essential 
for an effective self-regulatory system, 
participants talk about what elements should 
be incorporated. 
    Reporting - SR        What, where and how often needs to be 
reported? 
    Mandatory 
participation 
      Should participation be mandatory or 
voluntary? and who should be signing up? 
    Not supportive 
of SR 
      Any negative response about self-regulation of 
alcohol marketing 
    Monitoring - SR         
      Who pays     Who should be paying for monitoring of 
alcohol marketing communications? 
      Public 
complaint 
system 
    Including its effectiveness 
      Prevetting     Prevetting be part of monitoring? 
      Independent     Monitoring should be handled independently 








    Internet -SR       Internet and social media marketing. Including 
mentioning of obstacles of regulation 
    Enforcement SR         
      Naming and 
Shaming 
    Any mention of naming and shaming or similar 
enforcement strategies 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 level 4 Level 5 Level 6  Description 
      Financial 
sanctions 
     Fines, financial sanctions, penalties at SR 
      Alternatives     Alternative enforcement options brought up 
by the interviewees  
  Design SR         
 
    Process SR     Stakeholders engagement, phases of 
development etc.  
    Leading SR     who is leading the development and who has 
the final responsibility?  
    Involved 
design SR 
    Who should be involved in the development of 
the SR framework, including codes?  
Current SR          Nodes cover current self-regulatory 
framework  
  Too many codes        Any mention of multiple codes 
 
    complicated 
for public 
    Any mention that multiple codes results in 
confusion in public when trying to complain  
    complicated 
for companies 
     Multiple codes results in confusion among 
companies when designing advertising  
  Problems 
current ABAC 
Code 
      This node includes general statements about 
current code. What can be improved? what 
are the current problems?  










      Reporting   Transparency issues regarding reporting. this 
can be regarding frequency or content of 
reports, what is and isn't included  
      Process level   Transparency issues regarding processes, e.g. 
prevetting process that is unclear.  
    Poor 
objectives 
    The overarching goal and objectives or unclear 
or not far reaching 
      Evident 
appeal 
  when something is an appeal to a child, a 
strong or evident appeal to a child, then it will 
be considered a breach, 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 level 4 Level 5 Level 6  Description 
 
    Placement     volume and or placement of advertising needs 
to be addressed  
    Participation 
in scheme 
    discusses the participation levels of 
companies, manufacturers, retailers and the 
impact on enforcing adjudications  
    Monitoring       
 
      Public 
complaint 
system 
  Including its effectiveness 
 
        transparency 
PC 
Need more transparency in adjudication 
 
        Speediness Should have fast turnaround of complaints 
 
        Motivation  Public needs lot of motivation to complain 
 
        Complicated  Complicated or easy lodging process 
 








        Adjudication 
panel 
 Any mention of adjudication panel role 
 
      Prevetting    Any mention and comments on prevetting 
process  
      One off 
loophole 
  One off promotions are not being prevetted 
and do their damage before they can be 
complained about and retracted  
    Governance     this node brings together comments on the 
governance of the current ABAC code  
      Management 
Com 
  any issues around the management 
committee or the interaction between MC and 
adjudication panel  
    Enforcement      Current enforcement strategies 
 
    Cover all     Definition of advertising needs to be 
broadened to cover all advertising and 
marketing 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 level 4 Level 5 Level 6  Description 
 
      Sponsorship 
public events 
   Coverage of sponsorship in marketing 
definition  
      Placement   Coverage of placement of alcohol products in 
films and music videos  
      Packaging   Packaging as a form of advertising. This cannot 
just be retracted if found in breach with the 
code. Therefore, important to be prevetted 
and that all companies are signatories.  
      New media    Coverage of internet, social marketing, phone 
etc. in marketing definition  
    Content     Codes that address content of the code need 
improvements 
Co-Regulation             









   Who monitors - 
CR 
      Who monitors? 
   Public 
complaint 
system - CR 
      Any mention public complaint system in CR 
   Pro-active 
monitoring - CR 
      Pro-active monitoring instead of re-active, 
what the process should look like, how 
reporting has to be done, how often 
   Pre-vetting        Any mention pre-vetting system in CR 
   Independent - 
CR 
       Any mention of independent monitoring of 
alcohol marketing communication in Co-
regulation 
   alternative 
monitoring 
      any mention of alternative solutions for 
monitoring the scheme (e.g. external 
monitoring companies, members of public) 
     Mandatory 
participation - 
CR 
    Should participation be mandatory and who 
should be signing up? 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 level 4 Level 5 Level 6  Description 
 Enforcement - 
CR 
         
   Who enforces - 
CR 
      Who enforces the Codes at CR level? 
   Financial 
sanctions - CR 
      Fines, financial sanctions, penalties 
   Legal backstop - 
CR 
      Legal backstop required? Law, registered code 
etc. 







   Process CR       Stakeholders engagement, phases of 
development etc. 
   Pay for system 
CR 
      Who pays for the system 
   Leading CR       Who should be leading the design? Who 
should have the final responsibility of the 
design of co-regulation? 
   Involved design 
CR 
      Which stakeholders should be involved in 
design of CR framework 
Full regulation           Any comments on Full / explicit government 
regulation or top of pyramid 
Overall RR 
pyramid 
          these sections discuss the responsive 
regulation pyramid as a whole; especially: 
which overarching objectives should be set, 
what the related indicators of performance 
are, and what the benchmarks for these 
indicators of performance should be. 
 Pyramid 
processes 
        this encompasses: overall objectives of the 
scheme; KPIs, evaluation, benchmarks, 
reporting and moving up the pyramid. 
   Reporting       How often and what? 
   Objectives       here is discussed if setting overarching 
objectives in the framework is essential and 
should be independent of regulatory level. 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 level 4 Level 5 Level 6  Description 
     Code?     Any mention of a future alcohol marketing 
Code  
       Age?   Discussions around what age cut off there 
should be 
   Moving up 
pyramid 
      What time intervals do you need to move from 









   Evaluation tool       Overall evaluation of the scheme, scheme 
performance etc. 
   Indicators of 
performance 
      suggestions of types of KPIs 
   Benchmarks - 
overall 
      It is discussed if setting of benchmarks to 
monitor compliance is essential and if this 
should be independent of the level of 
regulation. 
 Forces and 
Obstacles 
        How do you achieve to get the government to 
introduce the responsive pyramid? What 
obstacles will you encounter? political will? 
lobbying? 
   Public       public view of consumption of alcohol and 
what is acceptable regarding marketing. E.g. 
marketing to kids is by lots of people regarded 
as unacceptable. But drinking by adults is seen 
as enjoyable. 
     Community 
standards 
    Participants discussing how community 
standards reflect or should reflect the codes 
  Industry    Industry tactics and arguments 
     Tobacco     How does the alcohol industry compare to the 
tobacco industry? Comments around 
transferability of tobacco marketing model on 
alcohol  
    Political 
donations 
    Financial donations to political parties 
 
    Industry 
lobbying 
    Industries efforts to keep status quo and to 
remain in control. 








    CSR     Corporate social responsibility and front 
organisations that deter regulation to be 
passed.   
      DrinkWise   Any mention of DrinkWise 
 
        Labelling Any mention of alcohol health warning 
labelling done by DrinkWise  
    Costs     The costs it will bring to the industry as an 
argument  
    Benefits of 
alcohol 
    The positive aspects and benefits of the 
alcohol industry and of alcohol consumption as 
arguments against introducing regulation  
  Governments        Government barriers 
 
    Pyramid 
attractive 
    Would governments find this type of model 
attractive to use to regulate?  
    Political will     Any mention of the need for political will or 
leadership  
    Deregulation     Any mention of deregulation agenda as 
obstacle  
  Evidence       Arguments relating to evidence of negative 
effects of alcohol and alcohol marketing. And 
how these is used in discussions around 
introducing alcohol marketing regulation  
  Collaboration 
possible 
      Is collaboration possible? What will be the 
obstacles for industry and public health to 
collaborate?   
  Advocacy       by public health to try to introduce more 
restrictive regulation, civil regulation 
 Conflict of 
Interest 










Appendix K Strategies and Tactics used by the tobacco industry when attempting to influence marketing regulation 
Strategy Tactic 
Information Direct lobbying (meetings and correspondence with legislators/policymakers) 
Indirect lobbying (using third parties, including front groups, to lobby on the industry’s behalf) 
Shaping the evidence base Commissioning, writing (or ghost writing), or disseminating research/publications 
Preparing position papers, technical reports or data on impacts 
(including economic impact studies) 
Establishing industry/policymaker collaboration (e.g. via working group, technical group, advisory group)/work 
alongside policymakers providing technical support/advice 
Constituency building External constituency 
building 
Form alliances with and mobilise other industry sectors/business/trade organisations 
Media advocacy (press releases, publicity campaigns, public hearings, interviews) 
Form alliances with or mobilize unions/civil society organizations/ 
consumers/employees/the public 
Creation of front groups or astroturf organisations 
Internal constituency 
building 
Collaboration between companies/development of pan-industry group or industry 
trade association 
Policy substitution Develop/promote (new or existing) voluntary code/self-regulation 
Develop/promote alternative regulatory policy 
Develop/promote non-regulatory initiative (generally seen to be ineffective/less effective, e.g. education 
programmes) 
Legal Pre-emption 
Using litigation/threat of legal action 
Constituency fragmentation 
and destabilization 
Preventing the emergence of, neutralising and/or discrediting potential opponents (individuals, organisations or 
coalitions) 
Financial Incentive Providing current or offering future employment to those in influential role 
Gifts, entertainment or other direct financial inducement 
Source: Savell E, Gilmore AB, Fooks G (2014) How Does the Tobacco Industry Attempt to Influence Marketing Regulations? A Systematic Review. PLoS ONE 9(2): 









Appendix L Frames and Arguments used by the tobacco industry when attempting to influence marketing regulation 




Economic Manufacturer The cost of compliance for manufacturers will be high/the time 
required for implementation has been underestimated No 
  Regulation will result in financial or job losses (among 
manufacturers) Yes 
The regulation is discriminatory/regulation will not affect all 
producers/customers equally Yes 
Public Revenue Regulation will cause economic/financial problems (for city, 
state, country or economic area (e.g. European Union)) Yes 
Associated 
Industries 
Regulation will result in financial or job losses (among retailers 
and other associated industries, e.g. printing, advertising, 
leisure) 
Yes 
Public Health  Regulation will have negative public health consequences Yes 
Illicit Trade  Regulation will cause an increase in illicit trade No 
Other  Regulation could have other negative unintended consequences 
(e.g. cause confusion amongst customers, set a precedent for 




  Infringes legal rights of company (trademarks, intellectual 
property, constitutionally protected free speech (e.g. US First 
Amendment), international trade agreements) 
No 









Body doesn’t have the power to regulate/it’s beyond their 
jurisdiction Yes 
Regulation will cause an increase in compensation claims No 
Regulatory 
Redundancy  
  Industry adheres to own self-regulation codes/self-regulation is 
working well Yes 
Industry only markets to those of legal age/is actively opposed 
to minors using product Yes 
Existing regulation is satisfactory/existing regulation is 
satisfactory, but requires better enforcement Yes 
Insufficient Evidence   There’s insufficient evidence that the proposed policy will 
work / marketing doesn’t cause or change behavior (it’s only 
used for brand selection and capturing market share), so 
regulation will have no effect 
Yes 
The health impacts of consumption remain unproven No 
Source: Savell E, Gilmore AB, Fooks G (2014) How Does the Tobacco Industry Attempt to Influence Marketing Regulations? A Systematic Review. PLoS 
ONE 9(2): e87389. Table 3. 
 
